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ABSTRACT
In a large number of real world domains, such as the control of autonomous
vehicles, team sports, medical diagnosis and treatment, and many others, multiple
autonomous agents need to take actions based on local observations, and are in-
terdependent in the sense that they rely on each other to accomplish tasks. Thus,
achieving desired outcomes in these domains requires interagent coordination. The
form of coordination this thesis focuses on is commitments, where an agent, referred
to as the commitment provider, specifies guarantees about its behavior to another,
referred to as the commitment recipient, so that the recipient can plan and execute
accordingly without taking into account the details of the provider’s behavior. This
thesis grounds the concept of commitments into decision-theoretic settings where the
provider’s guarantees might have to be probabilistic when its actions have stochas-
tic outcomes and it expects to reduce its uncertainty about the environment during
execution.
More concretely, this thesis presents a set of contributions that address three core
issues for commitment-based coordination: probabilistic commitment adherence, in-
terpretation, and formulation. The first contribution is a principled semantics for the
provider to exercise maximal autonomy that responds to evolving knowledge about
the environment without violating its probabilistic commitment, along with a family
of algorithms for the provider to construct policies that provably respect the semantics
and make explicit tradeoffs between computation cost and plan quality. The second
contribution consists of theoretical analyses and empirical studies that improve our
understanding of the recipient’s interpretation of the partial information specified in
a probabilistic commitment; the thesis shows that it is inherently easier for the re-
cipient to robustly model a probabilistic commitment where the provider promises
to enable preconditions that the recipient requires than where the provider instead
promises to avoid changing already-enabled preconditions. The third contribution
focuses on the problem of formulating probabilistic commitments for the fully coop-
erative provider and recipient; the thesis proves structural properties of the agents’
values as functions of the parameters of the commitment specification that can be
exploited to achieve orders of magnitude less computation for 1) formulating optimal
viii
commitments in a centralized manner, and 2) formulating (approximately) optimal
queries that induce (approximately) optimal commitments for the decentralized set-
ting in which information relevant to optimization is distributed among the agents.
ix
CHAPTER I
Introduction
The capability of making sequences of decisions to accomplish complex tasks is a
fundamental characteristic of both humans and artificial intelligent systems. Thus,
developing sequential decision makers, or agents, that are capable of accomplishing
tasks in uncertain, complex environments is a core research area in Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI). Agent-based systems, which are designed to support intelligent decision
making, address many important AI applications, such as household robots, medical
diagnosis and treatment, online recommendation systems, video game AI, etc.
In multiagent systems, multiple agents make decisions in a distributed manner,
in the sense that each agent’s decisions are based on its local information, with lim-
ited or even no communication with others. When agents are purely selfish with
potential conflict of interests, each agent aims to find its optimal strategy given oth-
ers’ strategies. This is the scenario that is commonly studied in game theory. This
thesis focuses on a different situation in which agents’ interests are (at least par-
tially) aligned, so that they have incentives to cooperate on shared goals that require
collective efforts. Successful cooperation often requires coordination among agents,
especially when agents are interdependent in the sense that one agent’s actions will
not yield desired outcomes unless other agents act in concert. Coordination can be
best achieved by a centralized decision maker that can directly control all agents.
However, the distributed nature of multiagent systems often precludes that, making
multiagent coordination a challenging problem.
This thesis focuses on the two-agent coordination problem where one agent de-
pends on the other to achieve goals. In such a dependency, successful coordination
requires the agent that is depended on to provide some guarantee on the outcomes
of its actions, so that the other agent can plan its own actions accordingly. When
a centralized decision maker is precluded, how can the two agents be coordinated in
a distributed manner? Commitments in a multiagent system capture relationships
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between two agents, and thus can be used to achieve successful coordination for such
dependencies. By making a commitment, the depended-on agent probabilistically
guarantees to bring about outcomes that the other agent needs. In this thesis, we
refer to the agent that makes a commitment as the commitment provider, and to
the other agent as the commitment recipient. A commitment decouples the plan-
ning between the provider and the recipient. The provider can freely exercise its
individual autonomy as long as its actions are in accordance with the commitment,
and the recipient autonomously plans its own actions with the expectation that the
commitment will be realized. Other than the commitment, neither agent needs to
take into account the details of the other agent. This decoupling effectively divides
the coordination problem into two independent subproblems, making commitments
a flexible and scalable framework for multiagent coordination.
Due to their efficacy, commitments are pervasive both in human society and among
artificial intelligent agents. Drivers use turn signals as commitments to changing lanes
shortly, so that other drivers can react safely. When a doctor is treating a patient, the
(perhaps implicit) commitment by the doctor is to cure the patient. As an instance
in artificial intelligence systems, consider a rover sent by a spacecraft to collect rocks
on the surface of Mars. After collection, the rover should deliver the rocks to a base
station, where the spacecraft will pick up the rocks and send them back to Earth.
The rover can make a commitment that specifies the time it will arrive at the base
station, so that, instead of staying idle, the spacecraft can be occupied with other
missions before the time the rover commits to. Commitments can also exist between
humans and artificial agents. Consider another example, in which a household robot
is washing dishes while its human user has asked it to make a cup of coffee in 5
minutes. The request from the human can be modeled by the robot as a commitment
it has made. If the robot can finish the ongoing dishwashing task quickly enough,
it might want to finish it first before making the coffee; otherwise, the robot should
pause and fulfill its commitment first. In a more complicated scenario, if there is no
clean cup at the moment, the robot might need to pause immediately and clean a
cup first. By modelling and reasoning with commitments it has made, the robot can
efficiently and reliably meet the human user’s requests.
1.1 Problems and Contributions
Although a commitment framework is a general notion for multiagent coordina-
tion, to make it useful, computational models of commitments are needed to address
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challenges that arise from inherent uncertainty in the agents’ environment. This
section introduces the core problems of interest in the commitment framework, and
summarize the contributions of this thesis that solve these problems.
The outcome of actions might be uncertain, immediately giving rise to a challenge
for the commitment provider. We say that a commitment is realized if the provider
has successfully brought about the outcome specified in the commitment. Due to
the uncertainty in the outcome of actions, the provider might still fail to realize the
commitment despite its best effort. Therefore, such uncertainty might preclude the
perfect guarantee that a commitment can be surely realized. In the doctor-patient
commitment, for instance, the prescribed treatment might not be effective for the
patient, despite that it is effective for most other people. In the rover-spacecraft
commitment, the extreme weather on Mars might be so impeding that the rover can
be delayed on its way to the base station. Under the uncertainty about the outcome
of the provider’s actions, how can the provider be trusted by the recipient if the
commitment cannot be surely realized, and how should we specify such uncertain
commitments to facilitate coordination between the agents?
To answer such questions, people have framed the uncertainty of actions’ out-
comes using probability models, such as the Markov Decision Process (MDP), which
is going to be reviewed in Section 2.1, and have developed the notion of probabilistic
commitments this thesis adopts [XL00, WD07, BLG10]. In MDPs, we assume that
the possible outcomes of actions are known, and the likelihood of each outcome is
quantified with some probability. Thus, a commitment can be associated with a prob-
ability that quantifies the likelihood of the commitment being realized, which defines
a probabilistic commitment. The provider can be trusted to adhere to a probabilistic
commitment if it takes a course of action that would have realized the commitment
with sufficient likelihood, even if in a particular instance the specified outcome was not
realized. In the doctor-patient commitment, for instance, the doctor could be deemed
to adhere to the commitment in a trustworthy manner if the prescribed treatment is
appropriate for the patient’s condition, even if the condition may not end up being
improved. Moreover, by using a probability to quantify the provider’s action outcome
uncertainty, the commitment gains predictive value for coordination with the recip-
ient, because the recipient can predict the likelihood of possible outcomes, plan to
exploit the outcome of the commitment being realized, and at the same time prepare
against the opposite outcome.
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Contribution 1 - Trustworthy Adherence to Probabilistic Commitments
After making a probabilistic commitment, the provider exercises its own autonomy
to maximize its own utility as long as it takes a course of action that realizes the
commitment with a probability that is at least what was promised. The provider
can solve this commitment-constrained planning problem offline if it has a model of
its environment, which computes the probability of realizing the commitment for any
course of action, along with the utility associated with the course of action. In general,
however, the provider only has partial knowledge about its environment at the time of
making a commitment, and thus it is uncertain about the model it needs for planning;
as the provider interacts with its environment after making the commitment, it can
obtain information to refine the model. The refined model might reveal that the
commitment, already agreed to, is more/less preferable or more/less possible for the
provider to realize. When the Mars rover makes the commitment, for instance, it
might be uncertain at the beginning about how the weather on Mars can change over
time, and it is also uncertain about which areas on Mars have more valuable rocks to
collect. The rover’s uncertainty will be reduced when it actually explores Mars after
the commitment is already made: it could be that the weather suddenly turns worse,
increasing its difficulty to move to the base station, or the rover could discover that a
remote area has more valuable rocks, thus adjusting its plan to visit that area. The
uncertainty about the model gives rise to a problem for the commitment provider.
What is the semantics of a probabilistic commitment, if at the time of making it the
provider is uncertain about how likely its course of action would be to realize it? How
can the provider respond to its evolving knowledge about the environment model to
maximize its utility without violating its probabilistic commitment?
The first contribution of this thesis, based on joint work with Edmund Durfee and
Satinder Singh [ZDS+16, ZSD17, ZDS20b], generalizes the framework of probabilistic
commitments to situations where the provider has Bayesian uncertainty about its
preferences and/or the environment dynamics at the time it makes a probabilistic
commitment. Crucially, in such a setting the provider expects to learn information
in the midst of execution that improves its knowledge about how preferable and/or
possible it is to realize the commitment. This thesis develops a formal semantics
that builds on the novel perspective that the provider, under the Bayesian model un-
certainty, should fulfill the commitment’s probabilistic guarantee with respect to its
Bayesian prior. This semantics equips the provider with the flexibility to respond to
its evolving uncertainty while still preserving the provider’s trustworthiness that se-
cures effective coordination with the recipient. It is the first prescriptive commitment
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semantics under decision-theoretic model uncertainty. In an illustrative domain, we
compare it to several alternative semantics in related work and show how our prescrip-
tive probabilistic commitment semantics allows agents to achieve better coordination
than these alternatives.
Further, this thesis develops a family of methods for the provider to construct
policies that provably respect the semantics. These methods use novel techniques that
implement parametrized lookahead and online iterations to make it practical for the
provider to plan with its evolving posterior in a careful way that provably fulfills
the commitment’s probabilistic guarantee. In several classic planning domains under
model uncertainty, we show that these methods are able to strike a balance between
computation cost and plan quality. The techniques developed in the methods are well
suited for a wide range of settings where an agent is learning about the environment to
maximize its value while its behavior is regulated by predefined constraints, including
but not restricted to probabilistic commitments.
Contribution 2 - Robust Interpretation of Probabilistic Commitments
Another major challenge for the probabilistic commitment framework comes from
the other end of a commitment, which is the recipient. Conditioning on the provider’s
adherence to the commitment, the recipient aims to find its own action selection policy
that is best aligned with its own interests. As the provider’s guarantee is in general not
perfect (the probability of realizing the commitment is less than one), the recipient’s
action selection policy should exploit the likely outcome that the commitment will be
realized, while at the same time prepare against the possibility that the commitment
will not. Moreover, even when the provider realizes the commitment, the provider
might be unable to specify the exact timing of the realization, as it responds to its
evolving knowledge about the environment.
For the second contribution, this thesis formally analyzes alternative strategies the
recipient can use to plan its action selection policy for the commitment’s uncertain
outcomes. Specifically, given a probabilistic commitment, there is a set of candidate
behaviors of the provider that respect the commitment semantics, including various
timings of realizing the commitment, and the possibility that the commitment will
not be realized, and the recipient is uncertain about which of these behaviors the
provider will eventually follow. To deal with such uncertainty for the recipient, this
thesis considers alternative strategies to model a candidate behavior of the provider,
which is then used for the recipient’s planning. To compare the performance between
alternative strategies, this thesis develops a novel notion of suboptimality that quan-
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tifies loss in plan quality against the provider’s possible behaviors in the candidate
set.
To better analyze the recipient’s alternative strategies, this thesis further makes
a clear distinction between two types of commitment by formally defining them in
the probabilistic commitment framework. Specifically, we are concerned with com-
mitments of achievement, where the provider commits to enabling a precondition
needed by the recipient, and also commitments of maintenance, where the provider’s
commitment is instead to avoid changing a precondition that is already enabled for
the recipient. This thesis is the first to give formal definitions of the two types of
commitment in the probabilistic commitment framework.
With the novel notion of suboptimality and the formal definitions, this thesis
presents results showing that, despite strong superficial similarities between the two
types of commitment, there is an inexpensive strategy with low suboptimality for mod-
elling commitments of achievement, while no such strategy exists for maintenance.
The results are obtained from a combination of theoretical analyses on worst-case
suboptimality in an exemplar domain for the recipient, and empirical studies on the
suboptimality for rational commitments in that domain. These results assure us that
the recipient can robustly interpret achievement commitments, and thus the agents
can reliably coordinate well with them, while leaving the question open of how to
improve the representation and reasoning for coordination with maintenance com-
mitments. This is the second contribution of this thesis, based on joint work with
Edmund Durfee and Satinder Singh [ZDS18, ZSD20].
Contribution 3 - Efficient Formulation of Cooperative Commitments
With the prior contributions that apply to an arbitrary probabilistic commit-
ment, the third and final contribution of this thesis focuses on the question of what
probabilistic commitment the agents should agree upon. This thesis takes on this
question in the fully cooperative case where the objective is for the agents to agree
on a commitment that induces behavior that optimizes their joint performance. The
joint performance is measured by the sum of the provider’s value and the recipient’s
value of the commitment they have agreed on. As the third contribution, this thesis
solves the problem of how the agents can efficiently determine a commitment of high
joint performance in the setting where the information of the two agents is precisely
known to a centralized coordinator, and the setting where the information is dis-
tributed among the agents. This contribution is based on joint work with Edmund
Durfee and Satinder Singh [ZDS20a].
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Specifically, this thesis reveals structural properties of the agents’ values as func-
tions of the parameters of the commitment specification, where these properties can
be provably exploited to efficiently formulate optimal cooperative commitments in a
centralized manner. For the provider, this thesis proves the structural properties of
its commitment value function by analyzing the mathematical program that solves its
planning problem, where the commitment parameters appear as the program’s con-
straints. This novel angle of analyzing the commitment value allows us to show the
regularity of the provider’s value as a function the commitment parameters. For the
recipient, the structural properties of its commitment value function are proved by
establishing that the recipient’s robust interpretation defines its commitment value as
a linear function of probability. Excitingly, the structural properties for the two agents
are compatible in a way that the optimal cooperative commitment can be efficiently
formulated with a binary search procedure in the centralized setting.
Further, this thesis considers the decentralized setting in which information rele-
vant to optimization is distributed among the agents. It turns out that the structural
properties define a small number of commitments with potentially high summed value
of the two agents, which can be exploited to develop an efficient querying approach for
the agents to exchange information to converge on (approximately) optimal coopera-
tive commitments. Even on problem instances with randomly-generated MDPs that
have minimal structural assumptions, the method empirically proves to be orders of
magnitude more computationally efficient than several alternatives that are ignorant
of the structural properties. The properties reveal the structure of the commitment
space, and thus they not only lead to efficient solutions to the problems in this thesis,
but also provide insights to any problems involving optimization over the commitment
space.
1.2 Thesis Structure
Chapter II presents the technical background for this thesis, including the for-
mal notions of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), Bayesian model uncertainty, and
probabilistic commitments. With the technical background, Chapter III formulates
the three problems of interest in this thesis, which we have introduced in Section 1.1,
in the context of related work. The three problems are solved in Chapters IV, V,
and VI, respectively, with the three core contributions unrolled in detail. Chapter
VII concludes this thesis with the emphasis of how the thesis work contributes to the
broader research community, and suggests future research directions.
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CHAPTER II
Background
In this chapter, we introduce the computational models this thesis uses for proba-
bilistic commitments and for the decision-making problems of both the provider and
the recipient.
2.1 Markov Decision Processes
We first provide background on the Markov Decision Process (MDP) [Put14],
which describes the interactions between a single agent and its environment. A finite
MDP is formally defined by a tuple M = (S,A, P, R,H) where
• State space S is a finite set of states that the agent might encounter.
• Action space A is a finite set of actions that are available for the agent.
• P : S ×A → ∆(S), where ∆(S) denotes the set of all probability distributions
over S, is the transition function. P (st+1|st, at) specifies the probability of
transitioning into state st+1 upon taking action at in state st.
• R : S ×A → R is the reward function. R(st, at) is the immediate reward upon
taking action at in state st. Note that we assume that the reward only depends
on st and at deterministically. In general, the reward may also depend on
st+1 and may even be stochastic. With respect to expected cumulative reward,
which we ultimately care about, this general setup can be reduced to our setup
by defining R(st, at) = E[rt+1|st, at], where rt+1 is the immediate reward upon
(st, at) that can be dependent on st+1 and stochastic.
• H is the decision horizon. This thesis considers the finite horizon case, in which
the agent interacts with the environment over a finite number, H, of transitions.
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With the horizon being finite, the state space is partitioned into disjoint sets by
the time step, S = ⋃Ht=0 St, and the agent starts in an initial state s0 ∈ S0. In this
thesis, the notation of state s implicitly specifies its time step (i.e. s ∈ St for some t),
and st explicitly specifies its time step. At each time step t = 0, 1, ..., H−1, the agent
takes an action at ∈ A in state st ∈ St, obtains a reward rt+1 = R(st, at), and transits
to a new state st+1 ∈ St+1 stochastically drawn from P (·|st, at), or st+1 ∼ P (·|st, at).
In this thesis, we consider the case in which the initial state is fixed, i.e. S0 = {s0}.
2.1.1 MDP Planning
A (stochastic) policy pi : S → ∆(A) specifies a decision-making strategy for which
the agent chooses actions based on the current state s, i.e. a ∼ pi(·|s). Starting in
initial state s0, a sequence of transitions (s0, a0, r1, s1, ..., sH−1, aH−1, rH , sH) is gener-
ated, which records the entire history up to horizon H. The record
ht = (s0, a0, r1, s1, ..., st−1, at−1, rt, st)
up to time t is referred to as history ht. The value function of pi is V
pi
M(s) =
E[
∑H
t′=t+1 rt′|pi, st = s] where t is such that s ∈ St. There always exists an optimal
policy, denoted as pi∗M , that maximizes V
pi
M for all s ∈ S. Planning refers to the prob-
lem of computing an optimal policy with the MDP specification M = (S,A, P,R,H)
given.
There are several planning algorithms. Here we summarize one based on linear
programming (LP) [Put14]. Each policy pi has a corresponding occupancy measure
xpi : S × A → [0, 1], where xpi(s, a) is the expected number of times action a will be
taken in state s over horizon H, starting in initial state s0:
xpi(s, a) = E
[
1{st=s,at=a}|s0, pi
]
,
where t is such that s ∈ St, and 1E is the indicator function that takes value one if
event E occurs and zero otherwise. We will use shorthand notation x in place of xpi
when policy pi is clear from the context. Policy pi can be recovered from its occupancy
measure via
pi(a|s) = x(s, a)∑
a′ x(s, a
′)
.
Figure 2.1 is the linear program that solves an MDP M . It introduces the occupancy
measure as decision variables, and the policy is constructed from the program’s op-
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max
x
∑
s,a
x(s, a)R(s, a) (2.1a)
subject to ∀s, a x(s, a) ≥ 0; (2.1b)
∀s′
∑
a′
x(s′, a′) =
∑
s,a
x(s, a)P (s′|s, a) + δ(s′, s0). (2.1c)
Figure 2.1: The linear program for MDP planning.
timal solution. Constraints (2.1b) and (2.1c) guarantee that x is a valid occupancy
measure, where δ(s′, s0) is the Kronecker delta that returns 1 when s′ = s0 and 0
otherwise. The expected cumulative reward can be expressed using x in the objective
function (2.1a).
2.2 Bayesian Model Uncertainty
For a single agent, it can solve its planning problem and find the optimal policy
if it knows precisely its MDP tuple M . In this thesis, we will also consider a more
realistic scenario where the agent has uncertainty about the transition and reward
functions of its MDP. This type of uncertainty is referred to as model uncertainty.
Formally, we will consider the Bayesian setting in which the agent’s true MDP is
one out of K possible MDPs drawn from a known prior distribution µ0, where all
MDPs share identical state and action spaces but possibly different transition and
reward functions, and the state and the reward are fully observable during execution.
Thus, the environment with Bayesian model uncertainty is formally defined by the
tuple (S,A, {Pk, Rk}Kk=1, s0, µ0, H). The agent’s objective under Bayesian model un-
certainty is to maximize its initial state value with respect to the prior. For policy pi,
its value for initial state s0 under Bayesian model uncertainty is defined as
V piµ0(s0) = EMk∼µ0
[
V piMk(s0)
]
where Mk is the k-th candidate MDP, and the expectation is with respect to prior
µ0. During execution, the agent can use the knowledge provided by the history so far
to infer which MDP is more/less likely to be the true MDP it is facing. Therefore,
to maximize value V piµ0(s0), the agent’s policy should choose actions depending on
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the history (instead of only on the current state). We use pi(at|ht) to denote the
probability of choosing action at given history ht up to time t when following a
history-dependent policy pi starting from s0. We refer to a policy that chooses actions
only depending on the current state, as those discussed in Section 2.1, as a Markov
policy. With no model uncertainty, there is no loss of optimality by restricting to
Markov policies.
2.3 Probabilistic Commitments
Using MDPs, this section formulates the dependency between the provider and
the recipient established by a probabilistic commitment.
2.3.1 Provider-Recipient Decision-Making Model
This thesis uses MDPs to model the decision-making problems for both the provider
and the recipient, denoted by superscripts p and r, respectively. Thus, the provider’s
MDP is Mp = (Sp,Ap, P p, Rp, Hp) with initial state sp0, and the recipient’s MDP is
M r = (Sr,Ar, P r, Rr, Hr) with initial state sr0. We assume the two MDPs share the
same horizon H = Hp = Hr. Intuitively, the provider’s actions not only determine
the transitions in its own MDP but also influence the transitions in the recipient’s
MDP, and therefore, by making a commitment, the provider can promise to bring
about transitions desired by the recipient with some probability.
To formulate such a coupling between the two MDPs, this thesis adopts the
Transition-Decoupled Partially Observable MDP (TD-POMDP) model [WD07, WD10],
which assumes that states in each MDP can be factored into features, and models
the coupling as the dependency between shared state features. Specifically, both the
provider’s state sp and the recipient’s state sr can be factored into state features. The
provider can fully control its state, in the sense that the next provider state spt+1 is
entirely dependent on the current provider’s state and action (spt , a
p
t ), but not on the
recipient’s state or action. The recipient’s state can be factored as sr = (lr, u), where
lr is the set of all the recipient’s state features locally controlled by the recipient,
and u is the set of state features uncontrollable by the recipient but shared with the
provider, i.e. u = sp ∩ sr. Formally, the recipient’s transition function is factored as
P r = (P rl , P
r
u):
P r
(
srt+1|srt, art
)
=P r
(
(lrt+1, ut+1)|(lrt , ut), art
)
=P ru(ut+1|ut)P rl
(
lrt+1|(lrt , ut), art
)
,
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where the transition dynamics of u, P ru, is determined only by the provider’s policy
(i.e., it is not a function of art). We refer to P
r
u as the true influence that the provider
exerts on the recipient’s MDP.
2.3.2 Predictive Commitment Semantics
A probabilistic commitment is concerned with state features u that are shared
by both agents but only controllable by the provider. Intuitively, a probabilistic
commitment partially specifies how the provider will influence u’s dynamics P ru , and
therefore can be exploited by the recipient to plan accordingly. Definition II.1 formally
gives the definition of a probabilistic commitment regarding the provider’s MDP Mp
and the recipient’s MDP M r.
Definition II.1. Regarding Mp and M r, a probabilistic commitment is formally
defined as a tuple c = (uc, Tc, pc):
• uc is the commitment value for features u.
• Tc is the commitment time.
• pc is the commitment probability.
As a predictive semantics, the commitment probability pc gives a lower bound on
how likely the shared state features u will be taking the value of uc at time Tc, i.e.
Pr(ut=Tc = uc) ≥ pc, based on whatever policy the provider is following.
With its predictive semantics, the probabilistic commitment quantifies the pos-
sibility that the commitment can be unrealized due to action outcome uncertainty.
For example, actions might stochastically have irreversible outcomes from which the
commitment value is unrealizable.
2.3.3 Commitment-based Multiagent Coordination
Since the commitment is concerned with the shared state features, it can be used
to achieve coordination among the two agents. With the commitment’s predictive
semantics, the recipient can make useful predictions about the provider’s influence
and plan accordingly, and the provider can plan its policy to improve its own value
as long as it meets the commitment’s probabilistic guarantee. Thus, high-quality
coordination can be achieved if the two agents agree on an appropriate commitment.
In the next chapter, we will formulate problems solved in this thesis that arise in the
commitment-based multiagent coordination framework.
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Before moving on to the next chapter, we here review alternative frameworks for
multiagent coordination by listing below the strengths of commitment-based coordi-
nation compared with these alternatives.
Improved scalability over centralized multiagent planning. Researcher have
developed a variety of decision-making models that describe the interaction between
multiple agents via shared state features, such as the Multiagent Markov Decision
Process (MMDP) introduced in [Bou96], and the Decentralized MDP (Dec-MDP)
introduced in [BGIZ02], which can be viewed as a variation and a generalization of
the TD-POMDP model this thesis adopts, respectively. For these models, several
solution methods have been proposed that either solve multiagent planning exactly
or approximately. Optimal solution methods include extensions of dynamic program-
ming [HBZ04], heuristic search [SCZ05], and iterative policy optimization [BAHZ09].
Due to the intractable complexity of these models [BGIZ02], the scalability of these
optimal methods is limited. To a great extent, the successes in scaling multiagent
planning to more than two or three agents are achieved by approximate solution
methods that rely on the use of decoupled solution methods that reason about and
optimize each agent’s individual policy locally, in contrast to centralized methods that
optimize all agent’s policies in combination. For example, [NTY+03] develops Joint
Equilibrium-based Search for Policies (JESP) that converges to a set of equilibrium
local policies in which each policy is the best response given the others. Commitment-
based coordination is one of such decoupled methods because both the provider and
the recipient only optimize their local policies upon an agreed commitment, and thus
enjoys improved scalability over centralized multiagent planning.
Reduced complexity by interaction abstraction. In many decoupled solution
methods, like JESP, each agent needs to have others’ local models and/or policies in
detail in order to optimize its own decisions. In contrast, for the provider-recipient
interaction, either agent only needs to reason about the shared state feature for co-
ordination, and not other details, and this is exactly what the commitment is used
for. Thus, compared with alternative decoupled solution methods, the commitment
provides an abstraction of the multiagent interaction in a way that further reduces
the complexity of coordination.
As a quick summary, the probabilistic commitment abstracts the interaction be-
tween the two agents by partially specifying the provider’s influence on the shared
state features, and thus decouples the planning of the two agents and further reduces
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the complexity of coordination. Crucially, the commitment abstraction specifies the
provider’s influence only at a single time step Tc. How is it compared to a more de-
tailed specification that specifies the influence at multiple time steps? For example,
prior work has proposed to instead fully specify the provider’s influence on the shared
state features at every time step [WD10, OWK12]. We next compare the commit-
ment abstraction with more detailed specifications. There are two clear advantages of
using a more detailed specification over the single time step commitment abstraction:
• First, as the recipient gets more information about the influence at multiple time
steps, it can predict the provider’s behavior with more certainty, and plan with
more confidence. In contrast, for the single time step commitment abstraction,
the recipient can only estimate the values of influence at those unspecified time
steps, and inaccurate estimation can sometimes yield a policy of lower quality.
• Second, a specification that specifies the influence at multiple time steps can
be viewed as an generalization of the single time step commitment abstraction,
which can specify only one time step and leave other time steps underspecified.
Thus, advantages of the commitment abstraction can in principle be preserved
in more detailed specifications.
Despite the two advantages of more detailed specifications, in many cases the com-
mitment abstraction is still preferred due to the following reasons.
Computational efficiency for optimization. It is relatively easy to determine
a commitment that best coordinates the provider and the recipient, by identifying a
single time step as the commitment time, along with a probability. In contrast, it can
be computationally challenging to optimize a multiple time step specification due to
the combinatorics. When optimizing for coordination, the agents might prefer to use
the commitment abstraction simply for computational efficiency.
Flexibility for the provider under model uncertainty. As we will formally de-
scribe later in Chapter III, in this thesis we consider the setting in which the provider
has model uncertainty as defined in Section 2.2, and thus would need flexibility to
respond to its evolving knowledge about the model by adopting a history-dependent
policy that equivalently can shift from one Markov policy to another. For a detailed
specification, like the specification that fully specifies the influence at every time step,
it is possible but not convenient for the provider to do Markov policy shifting without
violating the detailed specification. In Chapter IV, we will see empirical evidence that
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shows how the provider’s value is greatly limited without such flexibility. In contrast,
the provider can easily gain more flexibility with the less detailed commitment ab-
straction, and Chapter IV develops methods for the provider to exploit the flexibility
that comes with the commitment. Thus, the provider under model uncertainty would
generally prefer the commitment abstraction.
Being efficiently and robustly modelled by the recipient. While the commit-
ment abstraction gives the provider flexibility, it imposes uncertainty on the recipient
about the exact specification of the influence, including the exact probability of the
commitment being realized at both the commitment time and other time steps. In
order to plan, the recipient’s estimation on the influence with such uncertainty can
yield low-quality policies. Chapter III formulates the problem that arises from such
uncertainty on the recipient, and Chapter V shows that, in many cases, it is possible
for the recipient to estimate the influence in a efficient and robust manner to yield
a high-quality policy no matter what influence the provider ultimately exerts, and
therefore the recipient’s inefficiency induced by the commitment’s partial specification
is nonetheless outweighed by the provider’s flexibility gained from the commitment’s
partial specification.
Although this thesis focuses entirely on the single-time step commitment abstrac-
tion, many of the contributions, especially in Chapters IV and VI, can be extended
to multiple time step abstractions. Chapters IV develops a family of methods based
on mathematical programming that solve the provider’s planning problem for a given
commitment. The mathematical programming techniques can be straightforwardly
extended to multiple time step abstractions by incorporating the specification at ad-
ditional time steps as additional constraints to the mathematical programs. Chapters
VI develops efficient algorithms for optimizing a commitment to induce optimal co-
operation between the two agents. These algorithms can be used as subprocedures
for optimizing multiple time step abstractions, if the optimization is performed on a
single time step at a time and alternates between time steps. These extensions to
multiple time step commitments are left for future work.
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CHAPTER III
Problem Formulation
With the provider’s and the recipient’s decision-making problem described using
two coupled MDPs as in Chapter II, probabilistic commitments that are concerned
with the shared state features that couple the MDPs provide a framework for co-
ordination. The commitment predictive semantics suggests a two-phase procedure
for coordination, which we describe now. In the first phase of commitment formula-
tion, the two agents agree on a probabilistic commitment, which is determined by a
centralized coordinator or as an outcome of communication between the agents in a
decentralized manner. In the second phase of commitment execution, the provider
and the recipient separately compute and follow their plans with respect to the com-
mitment, and in this thesis we assume there is no communication in this phase. For
the commitment execution phase, specifically, the provider should adhere to the com-
mitment by computing and following a policy that will realize the commitment with
at least the promised probability, as described in Section 2.3, because this allows the
recipient to plan its policy accordingly by predicting the provider’s influence on the
shared state features. In this chapter, we formulate the three problems relating to
the three major contributions of this thesis, all of which arise from the two-phase
procedure of the commitment-based coordination.
The first problem is regarding the provider’s commitment execution for a given
probabilistic commitment, which is formulated in Section 3.1 and solved in Chapter
IV. The second problem is regarding the recipient in the commitment execution phase,
which is formulated in Section 3.2 and solved in Chapter V. The third problem is the
commitment formulation, which is formulated in Section 3.3 and solved in Chapter
VI.
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3.1 The Provider’s Adherence under Model Uncertainty
The predictive commitment semantics from prior work defined in Section 2.3 can
fail to match commonsense notions of what making a commitment means, since it
does not in any way impede a provider from unilaterally changing its commitment
whenever it chooses to alter its policy. Therefore, in this thesis, we define and adopt
a prescriptive semantics for a probabilistic commitment. Definition III.1 formally
gives the prescriptive commitment semantics for the provider that knows precisely its
MDP.
Definition III.1. The prescriptive probabilistic commitment semantics for proba-
bilistic commitment c = (uc, Tc, pc) requires that the commitment provider, knowing
its MDP, is constrained to follow a Markov policy pip, such that
Pr(uc ∈ spTc|sp0; pip) ≥ pc. (3.1)
By Equation (3.1), our prescriptive probabilistic commitment semantics is clear:
the provider is constrained to follow a policy, such that, starting at the initial state sp0,
the probability of being in a state with commitment value uc at the commitment time
Tc is at least the commitment probability pc. If the provider follows such a policy,
then by Definition III.1 we say it adheres to its commitment in a trustworthy manner.
Thus, adhering to a commitment is entirely under the provider’s control, despite the
fact that the commitment might be unrealized due to action outcome uncertainty.
To satisfy the prescriptive semantics, the provider should only agree to a com-
mitment if it can find a policy with a sufficiently high probability (≥ pc) of realizing
the commitment. Formally, for a commitment c, let Πpc be the set of all possible
provider’s policies that satisfy the commitment constraint (3.1), i.e.
Πpc = {Markov policy pip : pip satisfies Equation (3.1)}.
We say commitment c is feasible if and only if Πpc is non-empty. Note that since
commitment constraint (3.1) is an inequality, for a given commitment time Tc, there
is a maximum feasible probability p(Tc) such that the commitment is feasible if and
only if pc ∈ [0, p(Tc)]. This maximum feasible commitment probability p(Tc) can
be computed by solving the provider’s MDP with the reward function replaced with
a simple reward function that gives +1 reward for states where the commitment is
realized at Tc and 0 otherwise. This is because maximizing this reward is equivalent to
maximizing the probability of realizing the commitment at time step Tc, i.e., uc ∈ spTc ,
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and thus the optimal initial state value is the maximum feasible probability p(Tc).
For trustworthy adherence to a given probabilistic commitment c, the provider
can choose any policy in the commitment-constrained policy set Πpc to respect the
commitment’s prescriptive semantics. The provider would choose the optimal policy
in Πpc that maximizes its own value of the initial state, i.e.
vp(c) = max
pip∈Πpc
V pi
p
Mp(s
p
0). (3.2)
We refer to vp(c) as the provider’s commitment value function. This commitment-
constrained optimization problem is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Provider’s Adherence under Model Uncer ainty
Problem Formulation
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1
As 𝜇$ evolves, how to characterize Π# and find 𝜋#∗ efficiently?Figure 3.1: Illustration of the provider’s commitment-constrained policy optimizationproblem. The dashed circle denotes the provider’s policy set, in which the optimal
(unconstrained) policy is denoted as pip,∗. The solid circle denotes the commitment-
constrained policy set Πc for a commitment c, in which the optimal commitment-
constrained policy is denoted as pip,∗c ∈ Πc as the solution of problem (3.2).
As the provider knows precisely its MDP Mp, in principle, it can enumerate poli-
cies in Πpc , compute their values, and choose the one that yields the most value.
In practice, prior work has developed more efficient methods for this commitment-
constrained policy optimization. Specifically, the provider’s planning problem (3.2)
can be solved with the linear program in Figure 3.2 [Alt99, WD07], which is adapted
from the program in Figure 2.1 that solves (unconstrained) MDP planning. Specif-
ically, the decision variable xp is the provider’s occupancy measure; objective (3.3a)
and constraints (3.3b), (3.3c) are counterparts of (2.1a), (2.1b), and (2.1c), respec-
tively; and constraint (3.3d) expresses the commitment constraint of Equation (3.1).
In this thesis, we consider the scenario in which the provider, at the time of making
a probabilistic commitment, has the Bayesian model uncertainty with prior µ0 over
K candidate MDPs, as described in Section 2.2, and thus it is not able to directly
perform the commitment-constrained policy optimization in Equation (3.2). An im-
mediate question arises due to the provider’s model uncertainty, and especially due
to its uncertainty about the transition function: What does it mean for the provider
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max
xp
∑
sp,ap
xp(sp, ap)Rp(sp, ap) (3.3a)
subject to ∀sp, ap xp(sp, ap) ≥ 0; (3.3b)
∀sp′
∑
ap′
xp(sp′, ap′) =
∑
sp,ap
xp(sp, ap)P p(sp′|sp, ap) + δ(sp′, sp0);
(3.3c)∑
spTc3uc
∑
ap
xp(spTc , a
p) ≥ pc. (3.3d)
Figure 3.2: The linear program for the provider’s planning.
to adhere to its probabilistic commitment in a trustworthy manner, if the provider
cannot be certain about the probability of its policy realizing the commitment at
the time of making it? This question urges us to develop prescriptive semantics for
probabilistic commitments that can be generalized to model uncertainty. This thesis
develops such a prescriptive semantics, formally defined in Definition III.2, that gen-
eralizes the semantics in Definition III.1 to Bayesian model uncertainty with two key
modifications: the provider is allowed to follow a general history-dependent policy
(instead of only a Markov policy), and it incorporates the Bayesian prior into its
guarantee on probabilistically realizing the commitment.
Definition III.2. After making commitment c = (uc, Tc, pc) under Bayesian model
uncertainty with prior µ0, the provider is constrained to follow a (in general) history-
dependent policy pip, such that
Pr
Mpk∼µ0
(uc ∈ spTc |sp0,Mpk ; pip) ≥ pc. (3.4)
where Mpk is the provider’s k-th candidate MDP.
In words, knowing that it is facing an MDP drawn from prior µ0 over possi-
ble MDPs (Mpk ∼ µ0), the provider is constrained to follow a (in general) history-
dependent policy pip, such that, starting at the initial state sp0, the probability of
realizing the commitment is at least the commitment probability pc. The problem
formulated here of adhering to a probabilistic commitment under model uncertainty
is novel, and this thesis contributes the first prescriptive semantics for probabilistic
commitments under model uncertainty.
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With the novel commitment semantics (3.4) for Bayesian model uncertainty, the
set of commitment-constrained policies can be enlarged to include history-dependent
policies. With slight abuse of notation, we use
Πpc = {History-dependent policy pip : pip satisfies Equation (3.4)}.
to denote these commitment-constrained policies, and we say commitment c is feasible
(under model uncertainty) if and only if Πpc defined as above is non-empty.
As we have discussed in Section 2.2, including history-dependent policies enables
the provider to respond to its evolving knowledge about the environment, thus im-
proving its value. We are interested in finding a policy that maximizes the initial
state value with respect to the prior, while satisfying the constraint of a given feasible
probabilistic commitment, which is formally formulated as the following problem:
arg max
pip∈Πpc
V pi
p
µ0
(sp0).
Solving this problem involves two main challenges. First, it is non-trivial to char-
acterize Πpc in a computationally-efficient manner that eases the policy optimization
step. Second, under model uncertainty, finding the optimal policy (even without the
constraint prescribed by the commitment semantics) requires planning with histories.
This imposes additional computational difficulty, since the space of histories grows
exponentially with the time horizon.
Related Work
There are alternative computational methods to the probabilistic commitment
framework to model commitments among agents. A comprehensive overview of
research into using formal (temporal and modal) logic to characterize and oper-
ationalize commitments has appeared [Sin12], and is based on literature in this
field (e.g., [CL90, Cas95, Sin99, MH03, CMMT13, ASBSEM14]). These represen-
tations support important objectives like the provable pursuit of mutually agreed-
upon goals, and codifying conventions and protocols for managing uncertainty (e.g.,
[Jen93, XS01, Win06]). As an example of a convention, an agent that determines
that it will not keep a commitment might be obligated to inform dependent agents
[Jen93].
Some of the logical representations above (e.g., [Jen93]) enumerate conditions
where an agent is allowed to abandon its local component of a mutual goal, where
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in general these conditions are either: (1) when the agent believes it is impossible to
achieve its local component; (2) when the agent believes the mutual goal is not worth
pursuing anymore; or (3) when the agent believes one or more of the other agents
participating in the mutual goal have abandoned their local components of it. These
conditions are logically reasonable, but fail to impose a prescriptive semantics for the
agent to use in making local decisions. For example, to satisfy the first condition, is
an agent never allowed to take an action that has even a small chance of rendering
its local component unachievable? What if all of its actions have such a chance? For
the second condition, if an agent can unilaterally drop a commitment whenever its
preferred goal changes, then has it really committed in the first place?
To make an agent more predictable, a commitment can be paired with conditions
under which it is guaranteed to hold [Raf82, Sin12, VKP09, AGJ07]. In transactional
settings, for example, an agent could commit to providing a good or service on the
condition that it first receives payment. However, if conditions can be over any-
thing, then they can make commitments worthless because a commitment might be
conditioned simply on no better option coming along. Sandholm and Lesser [SL01]
recognized the general impracticality of enumerating all the conditions that might
affect commitment adherence, and, even if the conditions could be specified, in veri-
fying they hold in a distributed setting. Their solution was a contracting framework
where a decommitment penalty is associated with each commitment, so as to accom-
modate uncertainty but discourage frivolous decommitment. However, even though
the recipient will know it will be compensated if the commitment is abandoned, it in
general will be unable to know how likely that will be, since it cannot look inside the
provider to discern how likely it is that its actions to achieve the commitment will
fail, or that it will decide that other goals should take priority.
Therefore, an alternative to a decommitment penalty is for the commitment
provider to summarize the likelihood that its commitment’s various conditions will
jointly hold (e.g., a factory’s suppliers will meet deadlines, its workers will not strike,
its shippers will fulfill orders, etc.) into a summary probability. Hence, a probabilistic
commitment [XL00, BLG10, WD09] is a form of conditional commitment where the
details of the conditions have been replaced by an estimate of the probability that
they will hold. Xuan and Lesser [XL00] have explained how probabilistic commit-
ments improve joint planning by allowing agents to find policies that are responsive
to possible contingencies, including even unlikely ones, and computing appropriate
alternative courses of action as the probabilities for commitments being met change.
A more myopic (and more tractable) variation of this approach was developed for
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the DARPA Coordinators program [MSB+08], where instead of anticipating ways
that probabilities might change, the recipient would revise its plans only when the
commitment provider would send an updated probability of the commitment being
satisfied. These prior approaches however only treat commitment probabilities as
predictions about how the provider’s plan will affect recipients. In contrast, our goal
is that probabilistic commitments not only provide such predictive information to
the recipient, but also impose prescriptive semantics on the provider to influence its
behavior into a good faith effort towards making those predictions come true.
Our work, summarized in this thesis, is the first to develop prescriptive commit-
ment semantics under decision-theoretic model uncertainty, along with algorithms
that operationalize this semantics for faithful commitment pursuit. The model uncer-
tainty that we consider in this thesis is a form of partial observability, and thus the al-
gorithms we develop can be viewed as extensions of existing techniques for solving (un-
constrained) partially-observable Markov decision problems [SS73, KLC98, Han99].
Our commitment semantics of Equation (3.4) prescribes additional constraints to the
original planning problem, and we develop algorithms that exactly meet the commit-
ment constraints under partial observability. Existing work has developed methods
for constrained decision-theoretic planning without model uncertainty [Alt99], or has
solved the constraints only approximately [PMP+15, STW16]. Others have also devel-
oped planning approaches for given commitments formulated using formal logic, which
mainly rely on techniques of heuristic search (e.g., [TMS13, MTYS15, MMS+18]).
These approaches usually amount to enumerating courses of action in search for con-
ditions that ensure the feasibility of the commitments. For example, Meneguzzi et al.
[MMS+18] develop a depth-first search algorithm to generate realizable enactments
of the commitment. These logic-based planning techniques deal with the provider’s
uncertainty about the outcomes of its actions, while we also consider the provider’s
uncertainty over the rewards and dynamics of its environment.
3.2 The Recipient’s Robust Interpretation
As we have discussed in Section 2.3, the commitment specification (uc, Tc, pc) pro-
vides partial, and also the only, information the recipient has about the provider’s
influence P ru. As elaborated in Section 2.3.3, while specifying just a single time-
probability constraint for the provider gives it more flexibility than a more detailed
specification, doing so also increases the uncertainty for the recipient. This thesis
considers a popular procedure in the literature [WD07, WD10, ZDS+16] for the re-
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cipient to exploit such partial information to plan, which we describe next. The
recipient adopts a strategy, denoted as P̂ ru(·), that maps a given probabilistic com-
mitment c to P̂ ru(c) as an approximation of the provider’s true influence P
r
u, which
is then used for planning [WD07, ZDS+16]. Formally, given P̂ ru(c), let M̂
r(c) = (Sr,
Ar, P̂ r(c), Rr, Hr) be the recipient’s approximate model that differs from M r only in
terms of the dynamics of u, i.e. P̂ r(c) = (P rl , P̂
r
u(c)). The recipient then plans in
M̂ r(c):
vr(c) = max
pir
V pi
r
M̂r(c)
(sr0). (3.5)
We refer to vr(c) as the recipient’s commitment value function. For the remainder of
this section, we will abbreviate P̂ ru(c), P̂
r(c), and M̂ r(c) as P̂ ru, P̂
r, and M̂ r whenever
the dependency on commitment c is clear from context.
We are interested in the quality of the policy computed from approximate influence
P̂ ru, i.e. pi
∗
M̂r
as the solution to Equation (3.5), when evaluated in M r with the (true)
influence P ru. Formally, the gap between the optimal value for M
r and the value
of policy pi∗
M̂r
evaluated in M r is defined as the suboptimality of the approximate
influence, i.e.
Suboptimality
(
P̂ ru(·);P ru, c
)
= V ∗Mr(s
r
0)− V
pi∗
M̂r
Mr (s
r
0).
Since the recipient is uncertain about P ru because it is entirely determined by the
provider, the recipient should adopt a strategy P̂ ru(·) that robustly induces low sub-
optimality for an arbitrary (P ru, c) pair. This problem is referred to as the recipient’s
robust interpretation of the commitment. Specifically, this thesis studies the following
three notions of robustness:
1. Worst-case suboptimality. We are interested in finding a strategy P̂ ru(·) that
induces low suboptimality for a worst (P ru, c) pair, i.e.
min
P̂ ru(·)
max
P ru,c
Suboptimality
(
P̂ ru(·);P ru, c
)
.
2. Suboptimality for a general (P ru, c) pair. We are interested in finding a strategy
P̂ ru(·) that induces low suboptimality for a general (P ru, c) pair which is drawn
from an underlying distribution, i.e.
min
P̂ ru(·)
EP ru,c
[
Suboptimality
(
P̂ ru(·);P ru, c
)]
.
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3. Suboptimality for a rational (P ru, c) pair. We are interested in finding a strategy
P̂ ru(·) that induces low suboptimality when the true influence P ru is determined
by the provider’s optimal policy, and the commitment c is chosen to be either
a local or a joint value maximizer, i.e.
min
P̂ ru(·)
EMp,Mr
[
Suboptimality
(
P̂ ru(·);P ru, c
)]
,
where P ru is determined by pi
∗
Mp , and c maximizes v
p(c), vr(c), or vp(c) + vr(c).
In Chapter V, this thesis focuses on these notions of robustness for two types of
probabilistic commitment, achievement and maintenance, that are commonly studied
in the literature. In an achievement commitment, the provider promises to change the
shared state features of the state in a way desired by the recipient. In a maintenance
commitment, the provider instead promises not to change features that are already the
way the recipient wants them maintained. The chapter presents theoretical analyses
and empirical results showing that, perhaps surprisingly, despite strong similarities
in the provider’s modeling of the two types of commitment, there is an inexpensive
strategy for achievement that satisfies all the three notions of robustness for the
recipient’s interpretation, while no such strategy exists for maintenance.
Related Work
As we have discussed in Section 3.1, others have adopted alternative frameworks,
such as conditional commitments and contracting frameworks, for managing the un-
certainty when the commitment is being pursued. In this vein, there has been substan-
tial work for developing protocols for agents who are modeling and communicating
about commitments. The focus is on the lifecycle of a commitment, from its ini-
tial proposed creation, to the mutual agreement to adopt it, to determining whether
it has been fulfilled, to whether it is time to abandon it. Over the lifecycle, it is
important that interacting agents engage in a communication protocol that ensures
their beliefs about the status of a shared commitment are aligned. In this thesis,
we adopt the probabilistic commitment framework to study both achievement and
maintenance commitments, and focus just on the “detached” stage of the commit-
ment lifecycle where an agreed-upon commitment is being actively pursued, and the
pursuit requires a sequence of actions, where some might not have desired outcomes,
or an agent’s priorities could change in the midst of executing the sequence.
Even though the probabilistic commitment representations of, and reasoning meth-
ods for, achievement and maintenance are nearly identical, prior work has found it
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much harder to successfully coordinate for maintenance than achievement [CS08,
GMDB08, Hia09]. In the past, it has been assumed that the difficulty lies on the
provider’s side—that it might be inherently harder for a provider to find good poli-
cies that maintain a feature than to change it. However, in this thesis we claim
and justify that instead the challenge actually lies on the recipient’s side: that a
maintenance commitment is fundamentally harder for the recipient to interpret in
a robust manner than an achievement commitment is. In Chapter V, we substan-
tiate this claim theoretically and empirically. We begin by analyzing an intuitive
and straightforward strategy, adopted in previous work [WD07, WD10, ZDS+16],
where the recipient models an achievement commitment pessimistically by assuming
the feature will not (probabilistically) attain its desired value any earlier than the
commitment’s promised time. We show analytically that the worst-case suboptimal-
ity induced by such pessimism can be bounded fairly tightly. For the maintenance
counterpart, however, we show that no comparable pessimistic model, and hence no
bound on suboptimality, exists.
3.3 Efficient Formulation of Cooperative Commitments
In the previous two sections, we have formally defined the problems of the provider’s
adherence under model uncertainty and the recipient’s robust interpretation for an
arbitrary commitment, which arise from the commitment execution phase. In this
section, we turn to the earlier phase that formulates a commitment the two agents
agree on.
As will be formally stated in Chapter VI, the provider would prefer a weaker
commitment (e.g., lower commitment probability) to increase its value because the
prescriptive commitment semantics constrains its policy choice; on the other hand, the
recipient would prefer a stronger commitment (e.g., higher commitment probability)
since the outcome specified by the commitment is desired by the recipient. In this
thesis, we consider the scenario in which the two agents are cooperative and would
agree on the commitment that maximizes their summed commitment value:
max
c
vp(c) + vr(c).
Specifically, this thesis considers cooperative commitment formulation in both central-
ized and decentralized settings. In the centralized formulation process, there exists a
centralized coordinator that knows precisely the specifications of both agents’ MDPs,
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and aims to compute the optimal cooperative commitment that maximizes the joint
commitment value. Such a coordinator does not exist in the decentralized formulation
process, where neither agent has full knowledge about the other’s MDP.
The cooperative commitment formulation is an optimization problem over the
space of the commitment tuple c = (uc, Tc, pc). This thesis focuses on the optimization
over the joint space of (Tc, pc) ∈ [H]× [0, 1] with fixed uc, where [H] = {1, 2, ..., H}.
Formally, in the centralized setting, we aim to solve problem
max
c=(Tc,pc)∈[H]×[0,1]
vp(c) + vr(c)
with the provider’s MDP Mp and the recipient’s MDP M r fully known to the cen-
tralized coordinator, where we use abbreviation c = (Tc, pc) since uc is fixed. A na¨ıve
strategy for solving the problem is to discretize the commitment probability space
[0, 1], and evaluate every commitment probability in the discretized probability space
for every commitment time. The finer the discretization is, the more commitments
are considered and the better the solution will be. At the same time, the finer the dis-
cretization, the larger the computational cost of evaluating every commitment in the
discretized commitment space. In Chapter VI, we prove several structural properties
of the joint space of [H] × [0, 1], which enable us to develop a centralized algorithm
that efficiently searches for the optimal commitment.
In the decentralized setting, we assume each agent fully knows its own MDP
but only partially knows the other’s MDP, and they aim to find a jointly-preferred
commitment via communication. As a communication scheme, we consider a querying
approach where one agent poses a query consisting of information about a set of
feasible commitments, and the other responds by selecting the commitment from the
set that has the highest joint commitment value. To limit costs for communication
and computation, the set of commitments in the query is small. A query poser
thus should optimize its choices of commitments to include, and the responder’s
choice should reflect joint value. In general, either the provider or recipient could
be responsible for posing the query. In this thesis, though, we always assign the
provider to be the query poser and the recipient to be the responder, because the set
of feasible commitments is known only to the provider. Since our aim in this thesis
is for the agents to successfully converge quickly, after just a single query-response
round, the responder’s selected commitment must be feasible, which means the poser
must only offer feasible commitments. Only the provider can do this. In Chapter VI,
we solve the provider’s querying problem of formulating a high-quality commitment
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query, such that the two agents will be able to agree on an approximately optimal
commitment after querying.
Related Work
In this work, we assume agents are coordinating through the commitment frame-
work. The commitment framework is general, in that it can support both self-
interested agents and cooperative agents. Much of the literature considers the self-
interested case, focusing on issues of the commitment lifecycle [DNS08, GLZ16,
POM17], and on managing reputation and establishing trust among agents [SS02,
CBG02, RHJ04, HJS06, PSM13, GBL+15].
When agents are cooperative, the focus of agreeing on a commitment shifts from
strategic reasoning to joint optimization. The agents want to form a commitment
to maximize the combined rewards of their plans. Of course, there is considerable
literature on cooperative multiagent planning focused exactly on the problem of max-
imizing joint reward [LR00, KK02, BGIZ02, NTY+03, PL05]. Of that literature, the
closest prior work to our problem of centralized commitment formulation is that of
Witwicki et al. [WD07, WD10, OWK12], whose approach exploited the asymmetric
influence relationship between an agent (in our terminology, the provider) that affects
the state of another, and an agent (the recipient) that relies upon the state changes.
That work showed how the agents could improve the efficiency when maximizing joint
reward by abstracting their policies into subsets.
In contrast to that work, and the larger literature on cooperative multiagent plan-
ning, cooperative agents that can only coordinate through commitments will gener-
ally achieve lower joint reward, because the commitment specification contains less
information than the specifications used in cooperative planning systems, as we have
discussed in Section 2.3.
When the commitment formulation process is decentralized, it will involve mes-
sage passing. The literature on message-passing search techniques is large (e.g.,
[Dec87, Dur99, GKP02, Rob04, BDAMY13]). The message passing between our
decision-theoretic agents serves the purpose of preference elicitation, which is typically
framed in terms of an agent querying another about which from among a set of choices
it most prefers [CKP00, Bou02, BPPS06, VB10, RD11]. Thus, we adopt a querying
protocol. In particular, we draw on recent work that uses value-of-information con-
cepts to formulate multiple-choice queries [Bou02, VB10, CSD14, ZDS17], but as
we will explain we augment prior approaches by annotating offered choices with the
preferences of the agent posing the query.
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CHAPTER IV
Trustworthy Adherence to Probabilistic
Commitments
As we have discussed in Chapter III, if the provider knows precisely the model
of its environment (i.e. the specifications of its MDP), it is able to compute policies
(i.e. mapping from states to actions) that satisfy the commitment’s probabilistic
guarantee, and then chooses from them the one that yields the most value. This
chapter considers the problem formulated in Section 3.1, where the provider, at the
time of making a probabilistic commitment, has uncertainty about the model, or
specifically, about the transition function and reward function of its MDP, and thus
it is not able to directly perform that computation. An immediate question arises
due to model uncertainty: What does it mean for the provider to adhere to its
probabilistic commitment in a trustworthy manner, if the provider is uncertain about
the probability and the value of its policy realizing the commitment at the time of
making it? In Section 3.1, we answered this question for the setting in which the
provider’s model uncertainty is Bayesian: a trustworthy provider is required to follow
a (in general history-dependent) policy that realizes the commitment with sufficient
probability with respect to its Bayesian prior at the time of making the commitment.
This semantics, as formally defined in Definition III.2, preserves the commitment’s
predictive value for coordination with the recipient, and moreover, since the provider
is allowed to adopt a history-dependent policy that chooses the next action based
on the previous experience, it can respond to evolving knowledge about its model
to improve its utility without undermining its trustworthiness. In this chapter, we
develop tractable methods for the provider to construct policies that respect the
commitment semantics.
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4.1 Problem Statement Recapitulation
We begin by revisiting the provider’s commitment semantics under Bayesian model
uncertainty and its policy optimization problem, as formulated in Section 3.1. As
the discussion will be focused on the provider only, we will drop superscripts p for
the notations in this chapter. We consider the setting in which the provider’s true
sequential decision-making problem is one out of K possible MDPs drawn from a
known prior distribution µ0, where all MDPs share identical state and action spaces
but possibly different transition and reward functions, and the state and the reward
are fully observable during execution. Formally, the environment is defined by the
tuple (S,A, {Pk, Rk}Kk=1, s0, µ0, H), and the MDP that the provider is in is drawn
from the known prior distribution, i.e. Mk ∼ µ0. For such model uncertainty, as we
have discussed in Section 2.2, we consider history-dependent stochastic policies that
map the history up to time step t,
ht = (s0, a0, r1, s1, ..., st−1, at−1, rt, st),
to a probability distribution over the next action. Specifically, we use pi(a|h) to denote
the probability of choosing action a given history h when following policy pi.
For the provider operating under such Bayesian model uncertainty, Definition III.2
in Section 3.1 formally gives the semantics of a probabilistic commitment: knowing
that it is facing an MDP drawn from the prior distribution µ0 over possible MDPs
in the environment (Mk ∼ µ0), the provider is constrained to follow a (in general
history-dependent) policy pi, such that, starting at the initial state s0, the probability
of reaching a state with commitment feature value uc at the commitment time Tc is at
least the commitment probability pc. This semantics is prescriptive by constraining
the provider’s choice of its policy, and thus it secures the commitment’s predictive
value for coordination with the recipient. Knowing that the provider follows a policy
respecting the semantics, the recipient can plan accordingly by predicting how likely
the shared state feature u will take value uc at time Tc. As previously said, this is the
first prescriptive commitment semantics under decision-theoretic model uncertainty.
As defined in Section 3.1, we let Πc be the set of all history-dependent policies
satisfying the constraint of commitment c and say that commitment c is feasible if
and only if Πc is not empty. We are interested in finding a policy that maximizes
the initial state value with respect to the prior, while satisfying the constraint of a
given feasible probabilistic commitment, which is formally formulated as the following
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problem:
arg max
pi∈Πc
V piµ0(s0). (4.1)
For the remainder of this chapter, we develop tractable solutions to this problem.
4.2 Methods
This section describes several methods for constructing policies with different
tradeoffs between solution quality and computational cost, while all the constructed
policies are guaranteed to be in Πc to respect the semantics of a given commitment
c. In order to achieve high expected cumulative reward, the provider has to plan
not only with fully observable states but also with the most recent knowledge about
the true MDP it is in. Our first method, Commitment Constrained Full Lookahead
(CCFL), finds the optimal policy in set Πc by generating beforehand all possible pos-
terior distributions over possible MDPs up to the finite time horizon. As a downside,
since the number of posterior distributions generally grows exponentially as the time
horizon grows, planning with all possible posterior distributions can make CCFL com-
putationally infeasible. To this end, our Commitment Constrained Lookahead (CCL)
method, generalizes CCFL by taking as input an integer parameter, L, as the number
of time steps for posterior lookahead. Our Commitment Constrained No-Lookahead
(CCNL) method can be treated as a special case of CCL, in which L = 0, and there-
fore actions are chosen only based on the initial conditions and ignoring posterior
distributions. A small L often saves a lot of computational time compared to full
lookahead, but by being more myopic decreases the expected cumulative reward. To
partially mitigate this shortcoming of CCL (at the cost of a more modest increase in
computation), we create an iterative version of it, referred to as Commitment Con-
strained Iterative Lookahead (CCIL), which reapplies the CCL method in the midst
of execution, where the posterior lookahead of successive applications of CCL reach
closer to the time horizon.
Commitment Constrained Full Lookahead
During execution, the provider can use the knowledge provided by the history so
far to infer which MDP is more/less likely to be the true MDP it is facing. Formally,
one can summarize current history h into a belief, b := 〈s, µ〉, where s is the provider’s
current physical state, and µ is the posterior distribution over all possible MDPs
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given h. We use bt to denote the belief given history ht. The provider can find
the optimal history-dependent policy by planning in the belief MDP defined as the
tuple 〈B,A, b0, P˜ , R˜〉, where B is the set of all beliefs reachable from initial belief
b0 = 〈s0, µ0〉, which is finite because every possible true MDP k is finite and the time
horizon is finite. P˜ and R˜ are belief transition and reward functions, respectively.
Specifically, if we let b|(a, r, s′) be the belief after taking action a in belief state b,
receiving reward r and transiting to state s′, then the probability of transiting to any
belief b′ ∈ B after taking action a in belief state b can be expressed as
P˜ (b′|b, a) =
∑
{r,s′:b|(a,r,s′)=b′}
Pr(r, s′|b, a),
where Pr(r, s′|b, a) is the probability of receiving reward r and transiting to state s′
after taking action a in belief b and can be expressed using {Pk, Rk}Kk=1 as
Pr(r, s′|b, a) = Pr(r, s′|〈s, µ〉, a) =
∑K
k=1
µkPk(s
′|s, a)1{r=Rk(s,a)}.
In words, given any belief b′ ∈ B, P˜ (b′|b, a) sums up probabilities over transitions
(r, s′) which update the belief to b′. Similarly, the belief reward function can be
defined as
R˜(b, a) = R˜(〈s, µ〉, a) =
∑K
k=1
µkRk(s, a).
Our Commitment Constrained Full Lookahead (CCFL) method finds an optimal pol-
icy in Πc among all belief-based policies, i.e., policies that choose actions as a function
of the current belief, while satisfying the commitment constraint. Note since a belief
is a function of the history, then a belief-based policy also gives action probabilities as
a function of the history. For MDP k, each policy pi has a corresponding occupancy
measure ypik for the expected number of times action a will be taken in belief-state b
over the time horizon H:
ypik (b, a) = E
[
1{bt=b,at=a}|b0; k, pi
]
where t is such that s ∈ St for b = 〈s, µ〉. We will use shorthand notation yk in place
of ypik when policy pi is clear from the context. If pi is a belief-based policy, it can be
recovered from its belief-action occupancy measure in any MDP k via
pi(a|b) = yk(b, a)∑
a′ yk(b, a
′)
. (4.2)
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max
y
∑
b,a
y(b, a)R˜(b, a) (4.3a)
subject to ∀b, a y(b, a) ≥ 0; (4.3b)
∀b′
∑
a′
y(b′, a′) =
∑
b,a
y(b, a)P˜ (b′|b, a) + δ(b′, b0); (4.3c)∑
bTc :uc∈sTc
∑
a
y(bTc , a) ≥ pc. (4.3d)
Figure 4.1: CCFL program.
CCFL solves the mathematical program shown in Figure 4.1, which introduces as
decision variables the belief-action occupancy measure for all possible MDPs, and
constructs the policy via Equation (4.2) using the program’s optimal solution. The
CCFL program is a straightforward adaptation of the linear program in Figure 3.2
that solves an MDP. Constraints (4.3b) and (4.3c), which are the counterparts of
constraints (3.3b) and (3.3c) in Figure 3.2, guarantee that y is a valid occupancy
measure with the initial belief being b0 and the transition function being P˜ . The
expected cumulative reward is expressed using y in the objective function (4.3a),
which is the counterpart of objective (3.3a). The commitment semantics of Equation
(3.4) imposes an additional constraint (4.3d), which is the counterpart of objective
(3.3d).
Because the belief is a sufficient statistic (i.e. it provides as much information
for predicting the future as the history does), the CCFL program is feasible if the
commitment is feasible, and the policy constructed by CCFL is optimal among all
history-dependent policies satisfying the commitment constraint, as formally stated
in Theorem IV.1.
Theorem IV.1. If commitment c is feasible, meaning Πc 6= ∅, then the CCFL pro-
gram in Figure 4.1 is also feasible. Let y∗ be an optimal solution to the CCFL pro-
gram. The policy constructed via Equation (4.2) using y∗ is optimal with respect to
the problem in Equation (4.1).
The proofs of theorems in this section are presented at the end of this section.
Commitment Constrained No-Lookahead
Planning with all possible posterior distributions can make CCFL computation-
ally infeasible. To counter this, we now consider policies that ignore this posterior
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knowledge and only depend on the current state to choose actions. We refer to them
as Markov policies and let Π0 be the set of all Markov policies. If commitment
c is feasible for Markov policies, i.e., Πc ∩ Π0 6= ∅, our Commitment Constrained
No-Lookahead (CCNL) method will find an optimal Markov policy that maximizes
expected cumulative reward satisfying the commitment constraint, which is a solution
to the following problem:
arg max
pi∈Πc∩Π0
V piµ0(s0). (4.4)
Note that Π0 is a subset of all history-dependent policies. When, as would gener-
ally be the case, Π0 is a much smaller policy set, the computational cost of CCNL
would be much less than that of CCFL, but the solution policy of CCNL is only
an approximation of the optimal commitment constraint-satisfying policy yielded by
CCFL.
Similar to the belief-action occupancy measure, for MDP k, any policy pi has a
corresponding occupancy measure xpik of state-action pairs:
xpik(s, a) = E
[
1{st=s,at=a}|s0; k, pi
]
where t is such that s ∈ St. We will use shorthand notation xk in place of xpik when
policy pi is clear from the context. If pi is a Markov policy, it can be recovered from
its state-action occupancy measure in any MDP k via
pi(a|s) = xk(s, a)∑
a′ xk(s, a
′)
. (4.5)
CCNL constructs the policy by solving the mathematical program shown in Fig-
ure 4.2. It introduces as decision variables the state-action occupancy measure for all
possible MDPs. Constraints (4.6b) and (4.6c), as counterparts of constraints (3.3b)
and (3.3c), guarantee that xk is a valid occupancy measure with the initial state be-
ing s0 and the transition function being Pk. The commitment semantics of Equation
(3.4) is explicitly expressed in constraint (4.6e), which is the counter counterpart of
constraint (3.3d). The expected cumulative reward is expressed using x in the objec-
tive function (4.6a), where µ0,k is the probability that the true MDP is k according
to µ0. The corresponding Markov policy can be derived via Equation (4.5). Unlike
CCFL, the CCNL program is no longer a straightforward adaptation of the linear
program in Figure 3.2 because a challenging problem here is to ensure that these K
sets of occupancy measures all derive the same Markov policy. To this end, we use
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max
x
∑
k
µ0,k
(∑
s,a
xk(s, a)Rk(s, a)
)
(4.6a)
subject to ∀k, s, a xk(s, a) ≥ 0; (4.6b)
∀k, s′
∑
a′
xk(s
′, a′) =
∑
s,a
xk(s, a)Pk(s
′|s, a) + δ(s′, s0); (4.6c)
∀k, k′, s, a xk(s, a)∑
a′ xk(s, a
′)
=
xk′(s, a)∑
a′ xk′(s, a
′)
; (4.6d)∑
sTc3uc
∑
a
(∑
k
µ0,kxk(sTc , a)
)
≥ pc. (4.6e)
Figure 4.2: CCNL program.
constraint (4.6d) to enforce alignment across all K sets of occupancy measures. The
constraints in Figure 4.2 are feasible if and only if Πc ∩ Π0 6= ∅.
Commitment Constrained Lookahead
CCFL pre-plans for every possible revision to the provider’s posterior knowledge
about the true MDP it might be in, which guarantees optimality but possibly at
a huge computational cost. At the other extreme, CCNL only considers Markov
policies that ignore this evolving posterior knowledge. Here we consider the general
case where the provider plans its first L ∈ [0, H] actions as a function of the evolving
belief, and thereafter plans actions based on the evolving state but with the belief
(including both the state and the posterior distribution) the provider was in at time
L. We refer to this parameter, L, as the belief-update lookahead boundary, which
tells the planner how far beyond the current time to look ahead about states and
posterior distributions. The resulting L-updates policy takes the form:
pi(a|ht) =
pi(a|bt) t < Lpi(a|st, bL) t ≥ L
where bt is the belief consistent with ht, and bL is the belief consistent with hL when
t ≥ L. Note that a 0-update policy is the same as a Markov policy and an H-update
policy is a full width belief-based policy. Therefore, belief-update lookahead boundary
L defines a continuum between CCNL and CCFL.
Given a specific value of L, let ΠL be the set of all L-updates policies. If com-
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of CCL. The dashed area denotes the set of reachable beliefs
after executing L from initial belief b0 = 〈s0, µ0〉. The solid area (in green) denotes the
set of commitment constrained L-updates policies, i.e. Πc ∩ ΠL, and the solid arrow
denotes a specific history derived from such a policy. An L-update policy selects the
first L actions based on the evolving belief, i.e. pi(·|bt) for t < L, and thereafter based
on the evolving state and the belief the provider was in at time L, i.e. pi(·|st, bL) for
t ≥ L.
mitment c is feasible for belief-update lookahead boundary L, i.e., Πc ∩ ΠL 6= ∅, our
Commitment Constrained Lookahead (CCL) method will find an optimal L-updates
policy that maximizes expected cumulative reward satisfying the commitment con-
straint, which is a solution to the following problem:
arg max
pi∈Πc∩ΠL
V piµ0(s0). (4.7)
Figure 4.3 illustrates the CCL’s construction of the commitment constrained L-
updates policies, with the dashed area denoting the set of reachable beliefs after
executing L from initial belief b0, the solid area (in green) denoting the set of com-
mitment constrained L-updates policies Πc ∩ ΠL, and the solid arrow denoting a
specific history derived from such a policy. CCL constructs the policy by solving the
mathematical program shown in Figure 4.4, which is a novel and carefully-crafted
combination of the techniques in CCFL and CCNL. The program introduces as de-
cision variables y and x, where y is the belief-action occupancy measure (as defined
for CCFL) for those beliefs reachable within the first L time steps of the plan, and x
is the state-action occupancy measures (as defined for CCNL) for the remaining time
steps to the horizon. We use Bbl to denote the set of reachable beliefs after executing
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exactly l actions from belief b, and Bb≤l =
⋃l′
l=0 Bbl′ to denote the set of reachable
beliefs from b by executing at most l actions starting from b. Because time is a state
feature, Bbl and Bbl′ are disjoint if l 6= l′. CCL generates beforehand all reachable be-
liefs from initial belief b(t=)0 within L actions, Bb(t=)0≤L , as illustrated as the dashed area
in Figure 4.3. The belief-action and state-action measures enable us to express the
expected cumulative reward very conveniently in the objective (4.9a) where the first
term sums up the reward of the first L time steps, and the second term the remaining
time steps to the horizon. The occupancy measures also enable us to express commit-
ment semantics conveniently: if the lookahead does not reach the commitment time
Tc, then the commitment semantics can be expressed in terms of the belief-action
occupancy measure via constraint (4.9h); otherwise, the commitment constraint can
be expressed in terms of those state-action occupancy measures via constraint (4.9i).
Constraints (4.9b) and (4.9c) on y are the counterparts of (4.3b) and (4.3c) in the
CCFL program of Figure 4.1. Similarly, constraints (4.9e), (4.9f), and (4.9g) on x are
the counterparts of (4.6b), (4.6c), and (4.6d) in the CCNL program of Figure 4.2,
which means the CCL program is considerably more sophisticated than the original
linear program of Figure 3.2. These constraints are feasible if and only if Πc∩ΠL 6= ∅.
Any L-updates policy piL that respects the commitment semantics can be derived from
a feasible solution to the program in Figure 4.4 via:
piL(a|ht) =

piL(a|bt) = y(bt, a)∑
a′ y(bt, a
′)
t < L
piL(a|st, bL) = xbL,k(st, a)∑
a′ xbL,k(st, a
′)
t ≥ L
. (4.8)
Theorem IV.2 states that CCL using belief-update lookahead boundary L finds
an optimal policy in Πc ∩ ΠL.
Theorem IV.2. If Πc∩ΠL 6= ∅ holds for commitment c, then the program in Figure
4.4 is feasible. Let x∗, y∗ be its optimal solution, then the policy derived via Equation
(4.8) with x∗, y∗ is the optimal policy in Πc ∩ ΠL.
Intuitively, a belief-update lookahead boundary greater than zero enables the
provider to plan actions not only based on the states it will visit, but also based
on how its actions can provide information to improve its posteriors about what its
true MDP is. Sacrifices in short-term reward may ultimately improve long-term per-
formance. Theorem IV.3 says the expected cumulative reward of the policy derived by
CCL using any L > 0 is lower bounded by that of the policy derived by CCNL. This
is because, by definition, for any L and any Markov policy, there exists an L-updates
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max
x,y
∑
b∈Bb0≤L−1,a
y(b, a)R˜(b, a) +
∑
bL∈Bb0L ,k,s,a
xbL,k(s, a)Rk(s, a) (4.9a)
subject to
∀b ∈ Bb0≤L, a y(b, a) ≥ 0; (4.9b)
∀b′ ∈ Bb0≤L
∑
a′
y(b′, a′) =
∑
b,a
y(b, a)P˜ (b′|b, a) + δ(b′, b0); (4.9c)
∀bL ∈ Bb0L ybL =
∑
a
y(bL, a); (4.9d)
∀bL ∈ Bb0L , k, s, a xbL,k(s, a) ≥ 0; (4.9e)
∀bL = 〈sL, µL〉 ∈ Bb0L , k, s′∑
a′
xbL,k(s
′, a′) =
∑
s,a
xbL,k(s, a)Pk(s
′|s, a) + µL,kybLδ(s′, sL); (4.9f)
∀bL ∈ Bb0L , k, k′, s, a
xbL,k(s, a)∑
a′ xbL,k(s, a
′)
=
xbL,k′(s, a)∑
a′ xbL,k′(s, a
′)
; (4.9g)∑
bTc∈Bb0Tc :sTc3uc,a
y(bTc , a) ≥ pc, if Tc < L; (4.9h)∑
bL∈Bb0L ,k,sTc3uc,a
xbL,k(sTc , a) ≥ pc, if Tc ≥ L. (4.9i)
Figure 4.4: CCL program.
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policy that behaves exactly the same as the Markov policy, i.e. Π0 ⊆ ΠL.
Theorem IV.3. If Πc ∩ Π0 6= ∅ holds for commitment c, then for any integer
L ∈ [0, H] the CCL program in Figure 4.4 is feasible, and we have
V
pi∗L
µ0 (s0) ≥ V pi∗0µ0 (s0)
where pi∗L and pi
∗
0 are the policies derived by CCL using belief-update lookahead bound-
ary L and zero, respectively.
However, one has to be careful in using deeper boundaries because the performance
of CCL is guaranteed to be monotonically non-decreasing in L only when MDPs vary
solely in reward functions, but this monotonicity cannot be guaranteed in general, as
stated in Theorem IV.4 and Theorem IV.5.
Theorem IV.4. If MDPs vary in reward functions and not in transition dynamics,
i.e. ∀k, k′, Pk = Pk′, and Πc ∩ ΠL 6= ∅ for boundary L, then for any L′ > L we have
Πc ∩ ΠL′ 6= ∅, and
V
pi∗L
µ0 (s0) ≤ V pi
∗
L′
µ0 (s0)
where pi∗L and pi
∗
L′ are the policies derived by CCL using boundaries L and L
′, respec-
tively.
Theorem IV.5. There exists an environment, a commitment c, and boundaries 0 <
L < L′ < H satisfying Πc ∩ ΠL 6= ∅ and Πc ∩ ΠL′ 6= ∅, such that
V
pi∗L
µ0 (s0) > V
pi∗
L′
µ0 (s0)
where pi∗L and pi
∗
L′ are the policies derived by CCL using belief-updates boundaries L
and L′, respectively.
These theoretical results provide some insights when choosing L. If the transition
dynamics do not vary across MDPs, as suggested by Theorem IV.4, ΠL is monoton-
ically increasing in L. One should use the largest affordable L because a larger L
is likely to include more policies in Πc and improve the value. A commitment that
is infeasible for a smaller L could be feasible for a larger L. In general, though, the
transition dynamics can vary across MDPs, and ΠL is not guaranteed to be monoton-
ically increasing in L. One should use CCFL if it is affordable. CCFL considers all
policies in Πc if it is non-empty and therefore it yields optimal value. When CCFL is
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not affordable, then as suggested by Theorem IV.3 we can check the feasibility of a
commitment with CCNL because a commitment feasible to CCNL (i.e. Πc ∩Π0 6= ∅)
is also feasible for any L. For the empirical results in Section 4.3, we experiment with
several candidate values of L. Our experience suggests that L can best be chosen
with problem-specific knowledge.
Commitment Constrained Iterative Lookahead
At each time step during execution, the provider observes the state transition that
occurs and reward received to update its posterior µ about the true MDP it is in.
One might think it would be a good idea for the provider to construct and follow
an updated policy from its current state, substituting its updated belief state for the
initial belief. However, the provider cannot shift from one policy to another without
considering its commitment. Clearly, if the provider can find a plan that achieves the
original commitment probability conditioned on the current belief, then shifting to
such a plan will certainly respect the commitment semantics. Observation IV.1 says
this re-planning is not always feasible.
Observation IV.1. There exists an environment, a feasible commitment c, a policy
pi ∈ Πc, and a history ht induced by pi, such that
∀pi′ Pr
k∼µt
(uc ∈ sTc|st, k; pi′) < pc,
where 〈st, µt〉 is the belief consistent with ht.
The example shown in Figure 4.5 verifies Observation IV.1. Starting in state A,
the provider can feasibly commit to reaching the absorbing state D at time step 2
with at least probability .8. If the provider stochastically reached state C at time
step 1, there is no plan that reaches state D from state C with probability at least .8,
and this verifies Observation IV.1.
Our Commitment Constrained Iterative Lookahead (CCIL) method instead up-
dates the commitment probability in a way that guarantees feasible re-planning, and
iteratively applies CCL with that updated commitment probability during execution.
The idea is that, when re-planning, satisfying the commitment constraint does not
require meeting the original probabilistic commitment, but instead to fulfill the com-
mitment probability that had originally been associated with the physical-state history
traversed so far. Here we formally describe CCIL’s first iterative application of CCL
after having executed one or more actions. Suppose the provider now has belief
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Figure 4.5: The example that verifies Observation IV.1. There are two possible
reward functions R1 and R2 shown above with 50-50 prior. In both reward functions,
the reward only depends on the action. There are two actions, α and β, and the
transition dynamics is shown in the annotations of the edges. Starting in A, the
provider commits to reaching the absorbing location D at time step two with at least
probability .8. If the provider happens to be in C at time step one, there is no plan
that reaches D from C with probability at least .8 (verifying Observation IV.1). Even
though re-planning from C does not yield a plan that leads to D with probability
0.8, the new plan will nonetheless yield more reward because at time step one we will
know which reward function applies and can therefore choose the more rewarding
action in C.
bt = 〈st, µt〉 at time step t ≤ L after following policy pi∗L derived from the initial op-
timal solution to the CCL program with belief-update lookahead boundary L. Now
the provider re-plans from st using its updated posterior µt, with the commitment
probability that its previous policy pi∗L ascribed to meeting the commitment if state
st were reached:
pc,t = Pr
k∼µt
(uc ∈ sTc |st, k; pi∗L). (4.10)
Specifically, the provider constructs and follows a new L-updates policy, beginning
from the current belief, by reusing the CCL program in Figure 4.4 with the following
modifications:
1. Start from current belief bt = 〈st, µt〉 instead of b0 = 〈s0, µ0〉.
2. Let L← min(L,H− t) to ensure that the lookahead from the current time step
is bounded by the time horizon, i.e. t+ L ≤ H.
3. If the provider has not reached the commitment time, i.e. t < T , plan with
the updated commitment probability by replacing pc with pc,t calculated as
in Equation (4.10) in constraint (4.9h) if T < t + L or in constraint (4.9i) if
T ≥ t+ L; otherwise, discard constraints (4.9h) and (4.9i) (e.g., let pc,t = 0).
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Revisiting the example in Figure 4.5, the initial policy could meet the commitment
probability (0.8) by committing to take action α with probability 1 if B is reached
at time 1, and otherwise the provider is unconstrained. After taking action α (or
β) at time 0, then at time 1 the provider is either in B or C, and from the reward
it just received knows the true reward function. Using CCIL, the provider re-plans.
If it is in B, then since the original policy attributed probability 1 to meeting the
commitment down this path, its new policy is constrained to take action α (whatever
the true reward is), and afterwards take the better action. If it is in C, the updated
commitment probability is zero (the original policy did not count at all on possibly
meeting the commitment down this path), so the new policy can optimize reward
without constraints.
In principle, the provider can iteratively apply the above procedure at any time
during execution. For example, the provider can apply the procedure whenever the
posterior undergoes a substantial change. We will evaluate empirically a simpler
version of CCIL that takes as input a pair of integers, (L, I), such that it iteratively
uses L as the belief-update lookahead boundary to update the policy every I ≤ L
steps. This procedure is outlined in Algorithm 1, and Figure 4.6 illustrates CCIL’s
first iteration with parameter (L, I). Theorem IV.6 proves that CCIL respects our
commitment semantics.
Theorem IV.6. Let piIL be the history-dependent policy defined as in Algorithm 1.
We have piIL ∈ Πc.
Dealing with the Quadratic Equality Constraint
The CCFL program in Figure 4.1 is a linear program straightforwardly adapted
from the program in Figure 3.2 and thus can be solved by standard linear program-
ming algorithms. The CCL program in Figure 4.4, however, is no longer a straight-
forward adaptation of Figure 3.2 because it introduces a quadratic equality constraint
(4.9g) to ensure that the action selection rules derived from occupancy measures in
all possible MDPs are identical. Similarly, the CCNL program in Figure 4.2 also
introduces such a quadratic equality constraint (4.6d). These quadratic constraints
make the mathematical programs non-convex and hard to solve. In practice, many
math-programming solvers are unable to handle programs with quadratic equality
constraints (e.g., [CPL, Gur]). Although some solvers can deal with such programs
(e.g., [MAT, OPT]), they often need to take as input a feasible solution as the start-
ing point, but finding an initial feasible solution by itself might be difficult, and the
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Algorithm 1: Commitment Constrained Iterative Lookahead (L, I)
Input: Environment tuple (S,A, {Pk, Rk}Kk=1, s0, µ0),
commitment c = 〈uc, Tc, pc〉,
integers L ∈ [0, H], I ∈ (0, H] such that Πc ∩ ΠL 6= ∅ and I ≤ L;
1 b0 ← 〈s0, µ0〉;
2 pi0 ← L-updates policy derived by solving the program in Figure 4.4;
3 t← 0;
4 while t < H do
5 for i = 1, 2, ..., I do
6 Take action at ∼ pit and observe reward-state transition
(st, at, rt+1, st+1);
7 Update belief as bt+1 = 〈st+1, µt+1〉;
8 pit+1 ← pit;
9 t← t+ 1;
10 if t == H then
11 Break the while loop;
12 end
13 end
14 if t < T then
15 pc,t = Prk∼µt(uc ∈ sTc |st, k; pit);
16 end
17 else
18 pc,t = 0;
19 end
20 pit ← Policy derived by solving a modified version of the program in
Figure 4.4: let L← min(L,H − t); replace every b0 with bt; replace pc
with pc,t in constraint (4.9h) if T < t+ L or in constraint (4.9i) if
T ≥ t+ L;
21 end
final solutions are usually sensitive to starting points. Here we introduce two vari-
ant formulations of the CCL program in Figure 4.4 that avoid quadratic equality
constraints.
Deterministic CCL. The policy derived from the program in Figure 4.4 via
Equation (4.8) is in general stochastic. To enforce deterministic policies, Dolgov and
Durfee [DD04, DD05] introduced binary indicators in the linear programs for solving
MDPs. Inspired by their work, we propose a novel formulation that avoids quadratic
equality constraints by introducing binary indicators that force the action selection to
be deterministic after belief-update lookahead boundary L. Specifically, we introduce
indicators ∆ as additional decision variables into the CCL program in Figure 4.4 with
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Figure 4.6: Illustration of CCIL’s first iteration with lookahead boundary L and
iteration parameter I. Following policy pi∗L computed from CCL, the provider executes
the first I actions in the dashed area (in black) starting from initial belief 〈s0, µ0〉, and
arrives in belief 〈sI , µI〉. The provider then re-plans from 〈sI , µI〉 using pc,I , which
is defined in Equation (4.10) with t = I, with another L time steps of lookahead
denoted as the other dashed area (in gold).
the following constraints replacing the quadratic equality constraint (4.9g):
∀bL ∈ Bb0L , s, a ∆bL(s, a) ∈ {0, 1};
∀bL ∈ Bb0L , s
∑
a
∆bL(s, a) ≤ 1;
∀bL ∈ Bb0L , k, s, a xbL,k(s, a) ≤ ∆bL(s, a).
This reformulation yields a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) which is well stud-
ied with many available solvers (e.g., [CPL, Gur, MAT, OPT]). Any feasible solution
with the above constraints replacing constraints (4.9g) of the program in Figure 4.4
yields a policy with deterministic action selection at time steps after belief-update
lookahead boundary L via Equation (4.8), which can be alternatively expressed using
the indicator variables:
piL(a|ht) =

piL(a|bt) = y(bt, a)∑
a′ y(bt, a
′)
t < L
piL(a|st, bL) = 1{∆bL (st,a)=1} t ≥ L
. (4.11)
Reward uncertainty only. Quadratic equality constraint (4.9g) can be avoided
when the transition dynamics do not vary across possible MDPs, i.e. ∀k, k′, Pk = Pk′ .
In this case, for the action selection at time step t ∈ [H − L,H], without loss of
optimality, the provider needs only to plan for the Bayes-optimal Markov policy
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max
x,y
∑
b∈Bb0≤L−1,a
y(b, a)R˜(b, a) +
∑
bL∈Bb0L ,s,a
xbL(s, a)RµL(s, a)
subject to ∀b ∈ Bb0≤L, a y(b, a) ≥ 0;
∀b′ ∈ Bb0≤L
∑
a′
y(b′, a′) =
∑
b,a
y(b, a)P˜ (b′|b, a) + δ(b′, b0);
∀bL ∈ Bb0L ybL =
∑
a
y(bL, a);
∀bL ∈ Bb0L , s, a xbL(s, a) ≥ 0;
∀bL = 〈sL, µL〉 ∈ Bb0L , s′∑
a′
xbL(s
′, a′) =
∑
s,a
xbL(s, a)P (s
′|s, a) + ybLδ(s′, sL);∑
bL∈Bb0L ,sTc3uc,a
xbL(sTc , a) ≥ pc, if L ≤ T ;∑
bTc∈Bb0Tc :sTc3uc,a
y(bTc , a) ≥ pc, if L > T ;
Figure 4.7: CCL program in the reward uncertainty only case, i.e. ∀k, k′ P = Pk =
Pk′ .
w.r.t. the mean reward RµL according to the belief it ended up in at time step L:
RµL(s, a) =
∑
k
µL,kRk(s, a)
The resulting mathematical program is shown in Figure 4.7. The main difference
from the original CCL program in Figure 4.4 is that it only introduces one occupancy
measure xbL for each reachable belief bL at time step L, instead of K sets of occupancy
measures {xbL,k}Kk=1 in the original CCL program. The derived policy can be expressed
via:
piL(a|ht) =

piL(a|bt) = y(bt, a)∑
a′ y(bt, a
′)
t < L
piL(a|st, bL) = xbL(st, a)∑
a′ xbL(st, a
′)
t ≥ L
Proofs
Here we present all the technical proofs of the theorems in this chapter.
Proof of Theorem IV.1. Note that the belief is a sufficient statistic: given history
ht at time step t and the corresponding belief bt consistent with ht, one does not
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need any other information in ht besides bt to predict the future state transitions
and rewards after time step t. Therefore, solving problem (4.1) is equivalent to
solving a constrained MDP, where the MDP is the belief MDP defined as the tuple
〈B,A, b0, P˜ , R˜〉 with finite state space of beliefs, and the constraint comes from the
semantics of commitment c. Our CCFL method can be viewed as a standard linear
programming approach to solving a finite state constrained MDP.
Proof of Theorem IV.2. It is sufficient to show (1) any policy in Πc∩ΠL can be derived
from a feasible solution to the program in Fig. 4.4, and (2) any feasible solution to
the program derives a policy in Πc ∩ ΠL.
To show (1), for any policy pi ∈ Πc∩ΠL, we are going to define vectors mpi and npi
such that with mpi treated as x and npi treated as y, mpi and npi satisfy the constraints
of the program in Fig. 4.4, and the L-updates policy pi can be derived via Equation
(4.8). Specifically, given any policy pi ∈ Πc∩ΠL, let npi be its belief-action occupancy
measure for beliefs in Bb0≤L, and mpi be its state-action occupancy measure for states
from time step L on:
∀b ∈ Bb0≤L, a npi(b, a) = Pr(bt = b, at = a|b0; pi)
where t is the time of belief b, and
∀s, a mpibL,k(s, a) =
Pr(st = s, at = a, bL, k|b0; pi) t ≥ L0 t < L
where t is the time of state s. Then, with mpi treated as x and npi treated as y, mpi
and npi satisfy the constraints of the program in Fig. 4.4, and the L-updates policy
pi can be derived via Equation (4.8).
To show (2), given a feasible solution x, y to the program, let policy pi be the
derived policy via (4.8). Then pi is in ΠL by definition. Further we have m
pi
bL,k
(s, a) =
xbL,k(s, a), n
pi(b, a) = y(b, a), where mpi and npi are defined as above. Therefore pi is
also in Πc because x satisfies commitment constraints (4.9i), (4.9h).
Proof of Theorem IV.3. By Theorem IV.2, CCL with boundary L finds the optimal
policy in Πc ∩ ΠL. Therefore, it is sufficient to show
∀L > 0,Π0 ⊆ ΠL.
This holds because given any Markov policy pi0 ∈ Π0 we can define an L-updates
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policy piL ∈ ΠL that is equivalent to pi0:
piL(a|ht) =
piL(a|bt) = pi0(a|st) t < LpiL(a|st, bL) = pi0(a|st) t ≥ L .
Thus, we know that pi0 ∈ ΠL.
Proof of Theorem IV.4. It is sufficient to show that the statement holds when L′ =
L+1. We next show that when Pk = Pk′ ∀k, k′, given any policy piL ∈ ΠL, there exists
an (L+ 1)-updates policy, piL+1, that mimics piL , and therefore V
pi∗L
µ0 (s0) ≤ V pi
∗
L+1
µ0 (s0).
For the first L actions, an (L + 1)-updates policy can map the current belief to
a distribution of the next actions identical to piL, and the action that is going to be
taken at time step L by piL can also be recovered by an (L+ 1)-updates policy, which
gives
piL+1(a|ht) =
piL+1(a|bt) = piL(a|bt) t < LpiL+1(a|bL) = piL(a|sL, bL) t = L .
Under any L-updates policy piL, and conditioned on being in belief bL+1 at time step
L+1, the provider thereafter selects actions according to piL(·|st, bL) with probability
that the provider was in belief bL at time step L: Pr(bL|bL+1; piL). If the transition
dynamics does not vary across MDPs in the environment, it is well known [Put14]
that a Markov policy pibL+1(·|st), t ≥ L+ 1 is sufficient to recover the state occupancy
measure of piL starting at belief bL+1. Then piL+1 can also recover piL for t ≥ L+ 1 by
demonstrating that pibL+1 satisfies
piL+1(a|ht) = piL+1(a|st, bL+1) = pibL+1(a|st) for t ≥ L+ 1.
This guarantees that the optimal L-updates policy can be represented by an (L+ 1)-
updates policy, and thus the statement of the theorem holds for L′ = L+ 1.
Proof of Theorem IV.5. In the proof of Theorem IV.4, we have shown that for any
L-updates policy piL there exists an (L + 1)-update policy that is able to mimic piL
up to time step L + 1. Provided that Pk = Pk′ ∀k, k′, one can find a Markov policy
that mimics piL starting at any belief at time step L+ 1. When Pk = Pk′ ∀k, k′ does
not hold, however, this Markov policy in general does not exist, and therefore no
(L+ 1)-update policy is able to mimic piL. Inspired by this, we next give an example
as a formal constructive proof.
46
 0 3 
1 
2 
4 
6 
7 
5 
8 
9 Committed state 
Time 𝑡𝑡 = 0 𝑡𝑡 = 1 𝑡𝑡 = 2 𝑡𝑡 = 3 𝑡𝑡 = 4 
Figure 4.8: Example as a proof of Theorem IV.5.
Consider the example shown in Fig. 4.8. The environment has 10 locations
{0,1,...,9}, action space {up, down}, time horizon T = 4, and K = 2 possible MDPs.
The agent starts in location 0 at time step t = 0 with a prior probability of 0.8 for
MDP k = 1 and a prior probability of 0.2 for MDP k = 2. In MDP k = 1, no matter
which action the provider takes, it transits to location 1 or 2 uniformly at random
at time step t = 1, and then to location 3 with probability one at time step t = 2.
Starting from location 3, on taking action up (down) the provider transits to the upper
(lower) location to the right. The transition dynamics of MDP k = 2 is the same
as MDP k = 1 until the provider reaches location 3, and thereafter the transition is
flipped: starting from location 3, on taking action up (down) the provider transits to
the lower (upper) location to the right. In both MDPs, the provider will receive large
negative reward (−∞) in locations 7 and 8. In MDP k = 1, the provider will receive
+1 reward if it reaches location 6. There is no reward elsewhere. The agent commits
to reaching location 9 with probability 0.5. Consider the following (L =)1-updates
policy: if the provider was in location 1 at time step t = 1, always choose action up; if
the provider was in location 2 at time step t = 1, always choose action down. Under
this (L =)1-updates policy the probability of reaching the commitment location 9 is
0.5 and the expected reward is 0.8 × 0.5 × 1 = 0.4. Now consider (L =)2-updates
policies. Because the provider is in location 3 with probability one at time step t = 2,
a (L =)2-updates policy amounts to a Markov policy for time steps t ≥ 2. Further
the provider should minimize the probability of reaching locations 7 and 8 that yield
large negative reward. One can verify that the only Markov policy for time steps t ≥ 2
that avoids reaching locations 7 and 8 while satisfying the commitment constraint is
to always choose action down, whose expected reward is 0, smaller than that of the
(L =)1-updates policy.
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Proof of Theorem IV.6. We need to show piIL satisfies Equation (3.4), i.e.,
Pr
k∼µ0
(uc ∈ sTc |s0, k; piIL) ≥ pc.
Let piL be the CCL L-updates policy derived from the program in Fig. 4.4. The
above inequality holds because:
Pr
k∼µ0
(uc ∈ sTc |s0, k; piIL)
=
∑
bI∈Bb0I
Pr
k∼µ0
(bI |s0, k; piIL) Pr(uc ∈ sTc |bI ; piIL) (law of total probability)
=
∑
bI∈Bb0I
Pr
k∼µ0
(bI |s0, k; piL) Pr(uc ∈ sTc|bI ; piIL)
(piL and piIL are identical in the first I steps)
≥
∑
bI∈Bb0I
Pr
k∼µ0
(bI |s0, k; piL) Pr(uc ∈ sTc|bI ; piL)
= Pr
k∼µ0
(uc ∈ sTc |s0, k; piL) (law of total probability)
≥pc (piL ∈ Πc)
The first inequality holds because CCIL iteratively applies L-step lookahead with
the commitment probability achieved by the policy of the previous iteration. This
concludes the proof.
4.3 Empirical Study
Overview
As summarized in Section 4.1, we are the first to define a prescriptive semantics
for probabilistic commitments under model uncertainty, and develop algorithms that
respect the semantics. Hence, in the empirical studies that follow, we predominantly
focus on developing a deeper understanding of the strengths and limitations of dif-
ferent flavors of our algorithms. However, in an effort to illustrate empirically the
difference between our approach and prior work, in our first study in the illustrative
Windy L-Maze domain, we compare to the closest related work we could identify: a
non-prescriptive semantics for probabilistic commitments, and a prescriptive seman-
tics for non-probabilistic commitments. We show how our prescriptive probabilistic
commitment semantics allows agents to outperform either of these others because
with it agents can balance selfish and unselfish behavior.
We next use a small size Food-or-Fire domain to show how our CCL performs in an
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Figure 4.9: Windy L-Maze. The provider starts in the cell labeled a and can only
move in the vertical corridor, and the recipient starts in the cell labeled b and can
only move in the horizontal corridor. It is admissible that both agents occupy the
cell labeled c at the same time step. The table on the right specifies the reward
functions, where d is the distance, measured by number of cells, between cell c and
the provider/the recipient. For the provider, there are three possible reward functions
{Rpk}3k=1. The recipient’s reward, Rr (bottom row), is known for certain.
environment with both transition and reward uncertainty, and under various choices
of belief-update lookahead boundary. In the subsequent two domains of RockSample
and Change Detection, the number of possible posterior distributions can grow so
quickly with the time horizon that CCFL becomes computationally infeasible. In
RockSample, we show how the iterative version of CCL, CCIL, is able to improve
performance over CCL with modest additional computational cost. In Change De-
tection, we perform a detailed case study on the effects of the belief-update lookahead
boundary and how it should be chosen with domain-specific knowledge, along with
results reconfirming the improvement of CCIL over CCL.
Windy L-Maze
The purpose of the experiments in this domain is to illustrate how our prescriptive
probabilistic commitment semantics can improve multi-agent planning compared to
alternative semantics. The domain consists of an L-maze occupied by a commitment
provider and a recipient, as shown in Figure 4.9.
The provider starts in the cell labeled a and can only move in the vertical corridor,
and the recipient starts in the cell labeled b and can only move in the horizontal
corridor. It is admissible that both agents occupy the cell labeled c at the same time
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step. Let dp, dr be the distance, measured by number of cells, between cell c and the
provider, the recipient, respectively. For the provider, there are three possible reward
functions as functions of dp, {Rpk}3k=1, with a uniform prior:
for dp = 4, Rp1(d
p) = Rp2(d
p) = Rp3(d
p) = 0.1
for dp < 4, Rp1(d
p) = 0, Rp2(d
p) = −Rp3(dp) = dp − 4
The recipient’s reward, Rr, is known as a function of dr: Rr(dr) = 0.1 if dr = 3;
Rr(dr) = 3 if dr = 0; Rr(dr) = 0 for other values of dr. The provider can move up,
down, or stay in the current cell, and its moves succeed with probability one. The
recipient can move left, right, or stay in the current cell. Initially, a door located in
cell c is open with a strong wind blowing in such that the recipient’s moves to the
left only succeed with probability 0.1, and its other moves succeed with probability
one. By occupying cell c, the provider can permanently close the door, in which case
the wind stops and all the recipient’s moves succeed with probability one. The two
agents aim to maximize the joint expected reward up to the time horizon H = 10.
Because the recipient will get a significantly larger reward in cell c than in cell b,
it is beneficial for the recipient if the provider could move to cell c to close the door.
However, under reward functions Rp1 and R
p
2, traveling down the corridor to cell c
will yield less reward for the provider than staying in the starting cell a. Therefore,
effective coordination between the two agents is crucial to achieving high expected
joint reward, where (as we shall see) the uncertain rewards of the provider make an
“all-or-nothing” commitment suboptimal compared to a probabilistic commitment.
We compare the following three commitment semantics:
Non-Prescriptive Probabilistic Semantics: In this case, a probabilistic com-
mitment only represents a prediction of the provider’s behavior [XL00, MSB+08],
rather than a prescription for how it will act. The provider computes and follows
its history-dependent policy maximizing just its own local reward. It informs the
recipient of the probability, pc, that the door will be closed at time step T ≥ 4
under the provider’s policy, and the recipient then computes and follows its own
locally-optimal policy with respect to pc by standard methods of solving MDPs.
We refer to this semantics as selfish and no-commitment because the provider
makes no effort to consider the preferences of the recipient when computing and
executing its policy.
Prescriptive Non-Probabilistic Semantics: This semantics is the logic-based
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Table 4.1: Evaluation of Non-Prescriptive Semantics, Prescriptive Non-Probabilistic
Semantics, and Prescriptive Probabilistic Commitment on the Windy L-maze do-
main. The columns represent the cumulative rewards for the provider individually,
the recipient individually, and both agents jointly.
Semantics Provider Recipient Provider + Recipient
Non-Prescriptive Probabilistic (pc = 1/3) 9.17 4.33 13.50
Prescriptive Non-Probabilistic (pc = 1.0) 4.90 10.61 15.51
Prescriptive Probabilistic (pc = 0.6) 9.06 6.84 15.90
Prescriptive Probabilistic (pc = 0.7) 8.62 7.79 16.41
Prescriptive Probabilistic (pc = 0.8) 7.38 8.73 15.61
semantics alluded to in work on detecting commitment abandonment [POM17],
where a commitment provider will drop all else and single-mindedly pursue a com-
mitment. In this case, the provider computes and follows its history-dependent
policy that achieves the highest probability, pc, of closing the door at the earliest
possible time step which is T = 4. The recipient uses pc to compute and fol-
low its optimal policy assuming maximum help from the provider. We refer to
this semantics as unselfish and full-commitment because the provider prioritizes
satisfying the preferences of the recipient over its own rewards.
Prescriptive Probabilistic Commitment: This is the semantics we advocate
in this thesis. The provider makes a probabilistic commitment: it commits to
closing the door at time step T = 4 with at least probability pc. It uses the
CCFL algorithm to compute and follow its locally-optimal policy that respects
the commitment semantics. The recipient trusts this commitment, and computes
and follows its optimal policy assuming the door will be closed at time step T ≥ 4
with probability pc.
The performance of each of the three different semantics (with a few choices of
pc for our prescriptive probabilistic semantics) is shown in Table 4.1. Notice that
even when the provider is acting entirely selfishly (the non-prescriptive probabilistic
case), it predicts that it will nevertheless close the door with probability pc = 1/3.
This is because its optimal policy is to move down the corridor one step, observe the
reward signal to know exactly what the true reward function is, and then either go
immediately back to a, or, with probability 1/3, it will learn that the reward function
is Rp3 and continue on to c. Following the prescriptive non-probabilistic semantics, the
unselfish provider will follow a policy guaranteed to close the door (pc = 1.0), because
its moves succeed with certainty. With the prescriptive probabilistic commitment
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semantics, the providers can choose a probability of closing the door pc ∈ [0, 1] that
balances selfishness and unselfishness in the provider to attain a higher joint reward.
As pc increases, the provider’s value monotonically decreases and the recipient’s value
monotonically increases. As shown in Table 4.1, both pc = 0.6 and pc = 0.8 achieve
higher joint reward than pc and pc, and pc = 0.7 is even better than pc = 0.6 and
pc = 0.8.
These results confirm that our semantics for probabilistic commitments, coupled
with algorithms for agent decision-making that respect the semantics, can lead to
better joint performance than treating commitments either as inflexible logical con-
straints on the provider’s plan (such that it must provably satisfy the commitment)
or as non-binding predictions about the likelihood the provider’s plan will happen to
satisfy the commitment. Our semantics enable agents to strike a compromise between
these extremes.
Food-or-Fire
The purpose of the experiment in this domain is twofold: 1) it is used to simply
illustrate that CCL works well in an environment with both transition and reward
uncertainty to construct policies satisfying the constraint of a given probabilistic
commitment, and 2) it is small enough that we can show the effect of the belief-update
lookahead boundary by experimenting with all possible choices for the boundary from
zero to the time horizon.
The environment is a simple two by three grid maze with K = 3 possible scenarios,
as shown in Figure 4.10, where solid black lines indicate impassable walls. The prior
over the three scenarios is a uniform distribution. In the “empty” scenario, the
provider can move freely in four directions within the maze, and no reward signal
occurs. In the “food” scenario, there are two sections of impassable wall, and food
associated with a reward of +1 exists in the mid-left cell between the walls. The “fire”
scenario is the same as the second except that food is replaced with fire associated
with a reward of -1. The agent, starting in the bottom left cell, commits to reach the
top left cell (Exit) at the time horizon, i.e. T = H, with at least probability pc. The
agent can fully observe its current location but can only detect a wall by trying (and
failing) to move between two adjacent cells.
Because the transition dynamics vary across the three scenarios, we only imple-
mented deterministic CCL. Figure 4.11 plots the expected cumulative reward against
all possible belief-update boundaries using deterministic CCL under various choices of
Tc and pc. According to Theorem IV.5, the monotonic performance in belief-update
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Figure 4.10: Food-or-Fire. Left: the “empty” scenario. Middle: the “food” scenario.
Right: the “fire” scenario.
lookahead boundary L cannot be guaranteed, but it turns out the expected cumula-
tive reward using deterministic CCL is monotonically non-decreasing with L for all
choices of Tc and pc we tried. Thus, anecdotally, it is not hard to find cases in which a
larger L yields higher value, even though by Theorem IV.5 it is not guaranteed. More-
over, when L increases from two to three, we observe that the expected cumulative
reward increases significantly for most choices of Tc and pc. This is because a belief-
update lookahead boundary L of three is just sufficient to identify which scenario the
provider is actually facing by moving to the middle-left cell using three actions and
reasoning about the observed reward signal of food, fire, or neither. Not surprisingly,
with lower commitment probabilities, the provider is able to achieve higher expected
reward. An interesting observation is that, compared with pc = 0.8, we see the the
expected cumulative reward is more like a step function at L = 3 for pc = 0.5 and
pc = 1.0. When pc = 1.0, the provider has to reach the Exit at time Tc in all three
scenarios, so it suffices to determine the optimal behavior as soon as the provider fig-
ures out at time L = 3 which scenario it is facing. When pc = 0.5, the provider would
certainly reach the Exit in the “empty” scenario and the “fire” scenario. With the
uniform prior, these two scenarios already contribute to 2/3 ≥ pc = 0.5 probability
of fulfilling the commitment, and therefore in the “food” scenario the provider would
stay in the cell with food for the +1 reward and never exit. To achieve this behavior
when pc = 0.5, it suffices to use L = 3. For pc = 0.8, it is more complicated in the
sense that the provider also needs to reach the Exit with some positive probability in
the second (food) scenario, and our results show that, with deterministic CCL, using
L larger than 3 is able to improve the value.
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Figure 4.11: Expected cumulative reward in Food-or-Fire domain as a function of the
commitment and the belief-update lookahead boundary.
RockSample
The size of the Food-or-Fire domain is small enough for us to afford computing
belief-update boundaries up to the time horizon. In this RockSample domain and
the following Change Detection domain, the number of posterior distributions grows
so quickly as the time horizon grows that CCFL becomes computationally infeasible.
Our results show that using the iterative version of CCL, CCIL, can improve the
performance significantly with moderate additional computational cost.
RockSample [SS04] is a classic POMDP problem that models a rover exploring
an unknown environment. In an instance of RockSample(n, s), the rover can move
in an n × n grid containing s rocks. When n and s become large, a large belief-
update lookahead boundary becomes computationally infeasible. The locations of
the rocks are known. Only some of the rocks have scientific value and are of type
Good; the others are of type Bad. The type of each rock is uniformly random. The
task is to determine which rocks are valuable, approach and take samples of valuable
rocks, and leave the map by moving off the right-hand edge of the map. Each time
step, the rover can select from s + 5 actions: {North, East, South, West, Sample,
Check1,...,Checks}. Each Checki action directs the rover’s sensor to rock i, returning
a noisy observation from {Good, Bad}. The noise in the observations received by
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Figure 4.12: RockSample instances. Left: RockSample(2,2). Right: RockSam-
ple(4,4).
executing each Checki action is determined by the Manhattan distance between the
rover and the rock being checked: the probability of receiving a correct observation is
0.9, 0.7, and 0.5 when the the Manhattan distance is 0, 1, and at least 2, respectively.
In an instance of RockSample(n, s), s rocks could have 2s possible combinations of
type assignments. We treat them as K = 2s possible MDPs that only differ in reward,
and solve the program in Figure 4.7 to construct CCL and CCIL policies. During
execution, the observations from Checki actions are model-informative, suggesting
which MDP is more likely.
In the original RockSample problem, the rover chooses actions to execute until
it moves off the map and receives a positive reward. We adapted it to incorporate
the probabilistic commitment: the rover does not receive any reward by moving off
the map, but it has to move off the map by the time horizon, i.e. T = H, with at
least the commitment probability pc. We scale the reward to the range of [−1, 1]: the
rover receives a reward of 1.0 for sampling a rock of type Good, a reward of −1.0 for
sampling a rock of type Bad, and no reward occurs for re-sampling the same rock.
We evaluated CCL and CCIL on instances of RockSample(2, 2) and RockSam-
ple(4, 4) (Figure 4.12). Table 4.2 contains the results of expected reward and run
time in RockSample(2, 2) for commitment time T = 10 and commitment probabil-
ity pc = 1.0 with various choices of L and I. The run time for CCIL is the sum
of the CPU times for each iteration. Note that because 1) the rover can get pretty
accurate observations since it is always close to the rocks, 2) the types of rocks are
uniformly random, and 3) time horizon 10 is large enough, the optimal behavior can
collect in expectation one good rock, yielding an expected cumulative reward close
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to 1.0. For CCL, the results in Table 4.2 indicate that a larger belief-update looka-
head boundary indeed improves the expected reward, but the computational time
also increases dramatically. We can see that CCIL can achieve comparable expected
reward with much less computational time than CCL. Although CCIL(L = 3, I = 1),
CCIL(L = 4, I = 4), and CCL(L = 8) all achieve near-optimal expected reward,
CCIL(L = 3, I = 1) and CCIL(L = 4, I = 4) use much less computational time than
CCL(L = 8).
Table 4.2: Results on RockSample(2,2), |S| = 177, |A| = 7, |O| = 4 with T = 10,
pc = 1.0. 1000s run time limit.
L I Expected Reward Time(s)
0 n.a. 0.00 0.30
1 n.a. 0.20 0.54
2 n.a. 0.40 1.07
3 n.a. 0.60 3.05
4 n.a. 0.64 7.53
6 n.a. 0.82 45
8 n.a. 0.90 710
10 n.a. n.a. >1000
1 1 0.53±0.02 4.83±0.28
3 1 1.01±0.02 33.89±1.67
3 3 0.81±0.02 7.73±0.13
4 1 0.97±0.02 133.11±10.67
4 4 0.92±0.02 17.55±0.30
Table 4.3 contains the results in RockSample(4, 4) for commitment time T = 15
and probability pc = 1.0. With T = 15, the time is just enough for the rover to
correctly detect 3 rocks, sample the good rocks, and move off the map. Since a rock
is good with probability .5, the expected cumulative reward of the optimal behavior is
close to 1.5. For RockSample(4, 4), we can see that CCL can only scale to relatively
small belief-update boundaries. The computational time grows dramatically, and we
run out of memory when L = 5. CCL achieves an expected cumulative reward of 0.9
for L = 4, which means that a larger L is needed to find the near-optimal behavior.
CCIL performs much better than CCL because it iteratively re-plans during the
execution. The performance of CCIL(L = 1, I = 1) is between that of CCL(L = 3)
and CCL(L = 4). CCIL(L = 2, I = 2), CCIL(L = 2, I = 1), and CCIL(L =
3, I = 3) all achieve behavior with expected cumulative reward close to 1.3, which
cannot be achieved by CCL using a moderate amount of computational time. These
three choices of (L, I) achieve comparable expected reward (no statistically significant
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Table 4.3: Results on RockSample(4,4), |S| = 4097, |A| = 9, |O| = 8, with T = 15,
pc = 1.0. 1000s run time limit.
L I Expected Reward Time(s)
0 n.a. 0.00 4.33
1 n.a. 0.30 5.11
2 n.a. 0.30 8.71
3 n.a. 0.60 23.36
4 n.a. 0.90 113
5 n.a. Out of memory n.a.
1 1 0.74±0.02 83.06±0.55
2 1 1.32±0.02 482.30±31.53
2 2 1.31±0.02 132.17±3.73
3 1 n.a. >1000
3 3 1.34±0.02 634.27±67.37
difference), with CCIL(L = 2, I = 2) being the fastest because its iterative lookahead
is less frequent than CCIL(L = 2, I = 1) and shallower than CCIL(L = 3, I = 3).
Change Detection
In Change Detection, we perform a detailed case study on the effects of the belief-
update lookahead boundary, where time horizon H is short enough so that we can
experiment with every L ≤ H for CCL. We also experiment with a larger H for which
CCFL is computationally infeasible, to develop further intuitions about balancing
lookahead with iteration to achieve good performance with reasonable computation.
Change Detection is a classic constrained POMDP problem [Shi63]. The agent
can partially observe the environment, and at some point the environment will tran-
sit into a state where the alarm should be sounded by the agent. The agent aims
to minimize the delay in alerting (sounding the alarm) after the transition, and the
probability of a false alarm should be lower than a given threshold which is referred
to as the false alarm (F.A.) tolerance. Formally, the state space and action space are
S={PreChange, PostChange, PostAlarm, FalseAlarm}, A={NoAlarm, Alarm},
respectively. The environment starts in PreChange, and transits to PostChange at
a random time step if the provider has not performed action Alarm. Specifically, the
problem has a geometric change time parameter η, such that at every time step, if the
state is still PreChange, it will transit to PostChange with probability η. Once the
provider performs action Alarm, the state transits to PostAlarm from PostChange
with a positive reward, or to FalseAlarm from PreChange with no reward. The
commitment is to not reach FalseAlarm with at least a given probability. To en-
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courage early detection, the provider receives a reward of +1.0 if it executes action
Alarm immediately after transiting to PostChange, with the reward discounted each
subsequent time step. The states are not fully observable. Instead, the provider makes
an observation o every time step from the observation space O, suggesting if the en-
vironment has changed or not. The probability of making a specific observation is
determined by probability mass functions f0, f1 : O 7→ [0, 1] when the environment is
in PreChange, and PostChange, respectively. In our experiments, the provider can
make an observation every time step from a set of size |O| = 3. The reward discount
factor is set to γ = 0.8. The PreChange and PostChange observation distributions
are
f0(o1) = 0.6, f0(o2) = 0.3, f0(o3) = 0.1,
f1(o1) = 0.2, f1(o2) = 0.4, f1(o3) = 0.4.
Parameter η provides the provider with the prior distribution of the change time.
After making observations, the provider can use Bayes’ rule to calculate the posterior
distributions.
We consider the finite horizon decision problem, with the commitment time T = H
being equal to the time horizon, and define the state of the Change Detection problem
as s = 〈t, Alarmed〉 where Alarmed is a Boolean that takes the value of true when the
provider executed action Alarmed in any time step before t, or false otherwise. The
current time step t and Boolean Alarmed are both fully observable to the provider.
We define belief as b = 〈s, µ〉, where state s is augmented by probability mass function
µ that gives the probability of all possible change times up to the horizon.
Figure 4.13 contains the results when experimenting with CCL on a Change De-
tection instance with horizon H = T = 10, where CCFL is computationally feasible.
We have experimented with two choices of the geometric change time parameter,
η = 0.1, 0.2, and four choices of the false alarm (F.A.) tolerance. When F.A. toler-
ance is 0.0, the provider is forbidden to execute Alarm actions if there is any possiblity
of false alarm, and therefore the expected cumulative reward is 0 for any choice of
the belief-update lookahead boundary L. Otherwise, the expected cumulative reward
is monotonically increasing with L. Moreover, choosing a large L is most helpful
when the geometric change time parameter η is small (Figure 4.13(left)). For η = 0.1
(Figure 4.13(left)), the expected reward rises anywhere from about 3-fold (for toler-
ance=0.2) to 7-fold (for tolerance=0.05), while for η = 0.2 (Figure 4.13(right)) it is
anywhere from about 1.5-fold (for tolerance=0.2) to 3.5-fold (for tolerance=0.05). So
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Figure 4.13: Results of CCL on Change Detection with T = 10, γ = 0.8.
for the same tolerance, lookahead makes twice the impact when η = 0.1 than η = 0.2.
Small η suggests that the change is more likely to happen later, and therefore a large
L is more likely to envision it. For both choices of η, as lookahead L increases, the
relative increase in expected reward is smaller when F.A. tolerance is larger. This
is because larger tolerance inherently gets more reward regardless of lookahead, and
hence there is less reward for lookahead to recoup. These results suggest that, more
generally, the value of L should be chosen based at least upon: (1) how far into the
future the most meaningful changes to the belief state will occur (as captured by η
in this case), (2) how sensitive the provider’s reward is to making a more informed
decision (as captured by F.A. tolerance in this case), and (3) how dramatically com-
putation costs rise with farther lookahead (where in this case the branching factor of
2 (change or no change) is fairly low).
We have also experimented with a larger horizon, H = T = 50, where CCFL is not
computationally affordable. The geometric change time parameter is η = 0.04. As we
just saw, a low value like this makes the change more likely to happen later and thus
emphasizes farther lookahead. The F.A. tolerance is set to 0.2. Table 4.4 contains the
results of expected reward and run time for CCL and CCIL with various choices of
L, and of I when applicable. The run time of CCL grows dramatically with L. The
expected reward, though, grows relatively slowly, because these lookaheads are still
very short for such a small η that requires large lookahead. This can be inferred from
Figure 4.13 (left), where η = 1.0 is larger and we still see a steep increase in reward
at L = H/2. Nevertheless, there is still a 3-fold increase in reward when we increase
L for CCL until the computation budget is reached. For CCIL, we experiment with
L = 2, 4, 6 and I = 1, L/2, L. Unsurprisingly, with more frequent iterative lookahead
(smaller I), both the expected reward and the run time increase. CCIL(L = 4, I = 1)
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Table 4.4: Results on Change Detection with F.A. tolerance of 0.2, T = 50, η =
0.04, γ = 0.8. 1000s run time limit.
L I Expected Reward Time(s)
1 n.a. 0.05 0.02
2 n.a. 0.06 0.05
3 n.a. 0.07 0.16
4 n.a. 0.09 0.46
6 n.a. 0.11 4.23
9 n.a. 0.15 125
10 n.a. 0.16 761
11 n.a. n.a. > 1000
2 1 0.06±0.02 1.62±0.08
2 2 0.04±0.02 0.99±0.04
4 1 0.28±0.04 16.33±0.98
4 2 0.17±0.04 9.85±0.78
4 4 0.09±0.03 4.04±0.30
6 1 0.32±0.03 117.11±7.84
6 3 0.31±0.04 33.01±2.56
6 6 0.13±0.04 28.41±1.98
achieves reward that is higher than any CCL within the computation budget. Both
CCIL(L = 6, I = 1) and CCIL(L = 6, I = 3) double the reward of CCL(L = 10),
the largest L within the computation budget, yet use much less computation. These
results verify again the effectiveness of the iterative lookahead strategy in CCIL. Recall
that, in RockSample, setting I = L achieves significantly larger reward than CCL with
the same L. However, in Change Detection, I = L achieves no higher reward than
CCL for the values of L we consider. We conjecture that this is because the belief
changes frequently in Change Detection (every time step) and perhaps in a way that
is critical for the provider’s future decisions, making it necessary to perform frequent
iterative lookahead, while it might take several steps in RockSample to experience a
change (after taking the Checki action). From the results of L = 4, 6 and I = 1, L/2,
we observe that with larger L, the provider can use larger I without sacrificing too
much reward. Overall, CCIL(L = 4, I = 1) and CCIL(L = 6, I = 3) achieve the best
compromise for a wide range of tradeoffs between solution quality and computational
cost.
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4.4 Summary
This chapter defined a prescriptive semantics for a probabilistic commitment
provider that is operating under model uncertainty. Our semantics is based on what
a commitment provider can control—its own actions. Specifically, we considered a
decision-theoretic setting where the provider is making sequential decisions in one out
of several MDPs drawn from a known prior. Fulfilling a commitment corresponds to
pursuing a course of action, beginning at the time the commitment was made, that
has sufficient likelihood of realizing the intended state at a certain time prescribed by
the commitment. In this semantics, the provider fulfills its commitment by follow-
ing a commitment-constrained policy even if, due to bad luck, the desired outcome
was not realized. Based on this semantics, we developed Commitment Constrained
Lookahead (CCL), a novel algorithm parameterized by the belief-update lookahead
boundary, that constructs commitment constrained policies offline for the provider.
We empirically compared our new semantics, operationalized in CCL, with prior log-
ical and predictive semantics concepts, to illustrate where and why our semantics is
superior. We also analytically and empirically investigated the impact of the belief-
update lookahead boundary that makes an explicit tradeoff between the computation
cost and performance of the computed policy. Since the lookahead boundary, and
therefore the performance, of CCL is directly limited by memory size, we have fur-
ther extended CCL to Commitment Constrained Iterative Lookahead (CCIL) that
iteratively adjusts the policy online according to the evolving posterior distribution
about the true environment, while still satisfying the commitment constraint. Our
empirical results show that CCIL can achieve the same performance as CCL with
much less computational overhead. In a nutshell, the prescriptive semantics and
the algorithms together offer tractable solutions for the provider to respond to its
evolving model uncertainty without detriment to its trustworthy adherence to the
commitment.
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CHAPTER V
Robust Interpretation of Probabilistic
Commitments
A probabilistic commitment constrains the provider’s policy choice regarding the
shared state feature at a single timestep, and while this gives the provider flexibility
to adjust its policy on the fly, the recipient has to deal with the uncertainty about
the shared feature at other timesteps. The question, then, is how should the recip-
ient interpret the commitment, that is, how can the recipient approximate the true
dynamics of the shared feature in a robust manner to yield a high quality policy?
This is the problem we have formulated in Section 3.2. In this chapter, we focus on
this question for both achievement and maintenance commitments, which are two
types of commitment commonly modeled and studied in the literature. Our notion
of robustness hinges on the suboptimality of the recipient’s approximation of the
influence, which is defined as the difference between the value of the optimal policy
associated with the approximate influence and that associated with the true dynamics
of the shared feature. This chapter presents theoretical analyses and empirical stud-
ies showing that, perhaps surprisingly, despite strong similarities in the provider’s
modeling of the two types of commitment, there is an inexpensive strategy for the
recipient to create an approximate influence with low suboptimality for achievement
commitments, while no such strategy exists for maintenance commitments.
5.1 Problem Statement Recapitulation
In this section, we revisit the problem of suboptimality of the recipient’s approx-
imate influence, as we have defined in Section 3.2. As the discussion will be focused
on the recipient only in this chapter, we will drop superscripts r for the notations.
Adopting the notations in Section 2.1 for MDPs, the recipient’s MDP is denoted as
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M = (S,A, P, R,H) with initial state s0. The optimal policy for M is denoted as
pi∗M , and its value function V
pi∗M
M is abbreviated as V
∗
M . The value of the initial state
for policy pi is abbreviated as vpiM := V
pi
M(s0). As we have discussed in Section 2.3,
we factor the recipient’s state into features, s = (l, u), where features l are locally
controlled by the recipient and features u are shared and controlled by the provider.
Accordingly, the recipient transition function is factored as P = (Pl, Pu), where Pu is
the dynamics of u that is determined purely by the provider and referred to as the
provider’s true influence.
For a given probabilistic commitment c = (uc, Tc, pc), its specification and seman-
tics constrain the provider’s policy based on a single future timestep Tc: at time Tc,
the value of u will be uc with at least the promised probability pc. By not commit-
ting to (bounds on) the probabilities at intervening (and subsequent) timesteps, the
provider retains flexibility to revise its policy on the fly (for example, if its belief
about the reward function changes, as we have discussed in Chapter IV).
The commitment specification is also the only information that the recipient has
about Pu, and while information about only a single future timestep might give the
provider flexibility, it imposes uncertainty on the recipient. That is, while the recipient
knows something about Pu at the commitment’s timestep Tc, it can only guess at the
values of the influence at other timesteps.
Adopting the notations in Section 3.2 and dropping superscripts r, the recipient
adopts a strategy P̂u(·) that maps a given probabilistic commitment c to an approx-
imate influence P̂u(c). When commitment c is fixed, there is no need to distinguish
between a strategy P̂u(·) and the approximate influence P̂u(c) it induces, and thus we
will abbreviate them as P̂u. The approximate influence P̂u is then used for planning in
M̂ = (S,A, P̂ , R,H) where P̂ = (Pl, P̂u). For a fixed commitment, the suboptimality
of P̂u is evaluated using the difference between the value of the optimal policy for
M̂ and the value of the optimal policy for M when both policies are evaluated in M
starting in s0, i.e.
Suboptimality(P̂u;Pu) = V
∗
M(s0)− V
pi∗
M̂
M (s0) = v
∗
M − v
pi∗
M̂
M .
Note that when the support of Pu is not fully contained in the support of P̂u, the
recipient’s policy pi∗
M̂
can associate zero occupancy (hence plan no action) for certain
states when executed in M , which makes V
pi∗
M̂
M ill-defined. In this thesis, we resolve
this by re-planning: during execution of pi∗
M̂
in M , the recipient re-plans from any
zero occupancy state that it happens to reach. Thus, the recipient’s problem of
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commitment interpretation is to identify a high-quality approximate influence that
induces low suboptimality for the given commitment, while a high-quality strategy
should robustly induce low suboptimality for a range of commitments.
5.2 Achievement and Maintenance
In this chapter, we focus on two types of commitment commonly studied in the lit-
erature, which are achievement commitments and maintenance commitments. In an
achievement commitment, the provider commits to courses of action that probabilisti-
cally change the shared state features in a way desired by the recipient. For example,
the recipient plans to take an action (e.g., move from one room to another) with a
precondition (e.g., the door separating rooms is open) that the provider has promised
to likely enable by some deadline. In a maintenance commitment, the provider in-
stead commits to courses of action that, up until a promised time, are sufficiently
unlikely to change features that are already the way the recipient wants them main-
tained. After that time, the provider can freely change the features. For example, a
door the recipient wants open might initially be so, but the provider wants to close it
to clean behind it during housekeeping tasks. The provider could postpone closing it
(clean elsewhere first), but by changing other doors while cleaning elsewhere it might
accidentally introduce a draft that could prematurely close the door the recipient
wants left open.
To formally capture the differences between achievement and maintenance, we
here describe the two types of commitment as subclasses of probabilistic commit-
ments as defined in Section 2.3. Similar to prior work [HvR07, WD09], we assume
that u contains a single state feature that takes binary value and can be toggled at
most once. Let u+, as opposed to u−, be the value of u that is desirable for the recip-
ient. Intuitively, u+(u−) stands for an enabled (disabled) precondition needed by the
recipient. In transactional settings, a feature (e.g., possession of goods) changing only
once is common, as it is in multiagent planning domains where one agent enables a
precondition needed by an action of another. Some cooperative agent work requires
agents to return changed features to prior values (e.g., shutting the door after opening
and passing through it), and in extreme cases where toggling reliably repeats (e.g.,
a traffic light) there may be no need for explicit commitments. In general, when the
binary feature u can indeed toggle more than once, it can be modeled by a series of
alternating togglings in opposite directions, and thus the discussion in this chapter
can apply to such a general setting by dividing it into multiple stages, such that in
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each stage the feature toggles at most once.
Achievement Commitments. Let the recipient’s state at time t be factored as
st = (lt, ut). For achievement commitments, the initial value of the commitment
feature is u−, i.e. u0 = u−. An achievement commitment ca = (u+, Ta, pa) is a
probabilistic commitment where the commitment feature value is u+, the commitment
time is Ta, and the commitment probability is pa. Since the commitment feature value
is fixed to u+, we will abbreviate an achievement commitment ca = (u
+, Ta, pa) as
ca = (Ta, pa) for the remainder of this chapter. The commitment semantics constrains
the provider to follow a policy that changes the value of u to u+ by time Ta with at
least probability pa, i.e.
Pr(uTa = u
+|u0 = u−) ≥ pa. (5.1)
When planning with the achievement commitment, the provider can choose any policy
that induces an influence that respects the commitment’s semantics (5.1). Figure 5.1a
illustrates two such influences as the provider’s candidate influence for an achievement
commitment. The recipient does not know the provider’s true influence and adopts
a strategy to create an approximate influence.
Maintenance Commitments. As a reminder, a maintenance commitment is ap-
propriate in scenarios where the initial value of state feature u is desirable to the
recipient, who wants it to maintain its initial value for some interval of time (e.g.,
[HvR07, DTH14]), but where the provider might want to take actions that could
change it. Formally, for maintenance commitments, the initial value of the commit-
ment feature is u+, i.e. u0 = u
+, and a maintenance commitment cm = (u
+, Tm, pm)
is a probabilistic commitment where the commitment feature value is u+, the com-
mitment time is Tm, and the commitment probability is pm. As with an achievement
commitment, we will abbreviate an achievement commitment ca = (u
+, Ta, pa) as
ca = (Ta, pa) since u
+ is fixed. Given such a maintenance commitment, the provider
is constrained to follow a policy that keeps u unchanged for the first Tm time steps
with at least probability pm. Since u can be toggled at most once, this is equivalent
to probabilistically guaranteeing that u is still u+ at the commitment time Tm, i.e.
Pr(uTm = u0|u0 = u+) ≥ pm. (5.2)
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Figure 5.1: Candidate influences for an achievement commitment and a maintenance
commitment.
As with an achievement commitment, the provider can choose any policy that induces
an influence that respects the commitment’s semantics (5.2), and the recipient adopts
a strategy to create an approximate influence. Figure 5.1b illustrates two possibilities
for the provider’s candidate influence for a maintenance commitment.
Hence, from the provider’s perspective, achievement and maintenance commit-
ments are treated essentially identically, and from the recipient’s perspective, the
notions of approximate influence and suboptimality also identically apply to the two
types of commitment. Even though decision-theoretic formulations of, and reason-
ing methods for, achievement and maintenance commitments are nearly identical,
prior work has found it much harder to successfully coordinate for maintenance than
achievement [CS08, GMDB08, Hia09]. In the past, it has been assumed that the
difficulty lies on the provider’s side—that it might be inherently harder for a provider
to find good policies that maintain a feature than to change it. However, in this
chapter we claim and justify that instead the challenge actually lies on the recipient’s
side: that a maintenance commitment is fundamentally harder for the recipient to
model robustly than an achievement commitment is. We now substantiate this claim
theoretically in Section 5.3 and empirically in Section 5.4.
5.3 Bounding the Suboptimality
In this section, we develop several strategies for the recipient to approximate the
true influence, and present theoretical analyses that bound the worst-case subopti-
mality of these strategies. Our analyses make the following assumptions. Assumption
V.1 states that the recipient’s reward function only depends on its locally-controlled
features, such that the cumulative reward of an episode is based only on the trajectory
of l, (l0, l1, ..., lH). Note that, although the value of ut does not directly affect the
reward for time step t, it affects action choices that influence the value of lt+1 at the
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next time step. Assumption V.2 intuitively says that u+ establishes a precondition
for an action that would be irrational to take when u− holds. For example, if u+ is
a door being open, then the action of moving into the doorway could be part of an
optimal plan, but taking that action if the door is closed (u−) never is.
Assumption V.1. For the recipient’s reward function R, we assume
R(st, at) = R(st) = R((lt, ut)) = R(lt).
Assumption V.2. Let s− = (l, u−) and s+ = (l, u+) be a pair of states that only
differ in u. For any M with arbitrary influence Pu, there exists an optimal policy pi
∗
M
such that
Pl
(·|s−, pi∗M(s−)) = Pl (·|s+, pi∗M(s−)) .
To derive bounds on achievement and maintenance commitments, we will make
use of the following lemma, where M+ (M−) is defined as the recipient’s MDP iden-
tically to M except that u is always set to u+(u−). Lemma V.1 directly follows from
Assumption V.2, stating that the value of M− is no more than that of M+ and the
value of any M is between the two.
Lemma V.1. For any M with arbitrary influence Pu and initial value of u, we have
v∗M− ≤ v∗M ≤ v∗M+.
Proof. Let’s first consider the case in which Pu toggles u only at a single time step.
We show v∗M− ≤ v∗M by constructing a policy in M for which the value is v∗M− by
mimicking pi∗M− . Whether u is initially u
− and later toggled to u+ or vice versa, we
can construct a policy piM that chooses the same actions as pi
∗
M− assuming u = u
−
throughout the episode. Formally, for any s− = (l, u−), letting s+ = (l, u+),
piM(s
+) = piM(s
−) = pi∗M−(s
−).
By Assumption V.2, piM in M yields the same distribution over the trajectory of l as
pi∗M− in M
−, and therefore vpiMM = v
∗
M− since the cumulative reward only depends on
the trajectory of l.
Similarly, we show v∗M ≤ v∗M+ by constructing a policy piM+ in M+ for which
the value is v∗M by mimicking pi
∗
M . Formally, for time steps when u = u
− in M , let
piM+(s
+) = pi∗M(s
−). For time steps when u = u+ in M , let piM+(s+) = pi∗M(s
+), where
s− = (l, u−), s+ = (l, u+).
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When Pu toggles u at K > 1 time steps, we can decompose the value function for
Pu as the weighted average of K value functions corresponding to the K influences
that toggle u at a single time step, and the weights of the average are the toggling
probabilities of Pu at these K time steps.
5.3.1 Minimal Enablement Duration
We begin by analyzing an intuitive and straightforward strategy to create approx-
imate influences adopted in previous work for achievement commitments that models
a single branch, at the commitment time, for when u− probabilistically toggles to u+
[WD10, ZDS+16]. Modelling the commitment with a single branch for toggling to
u+ at the latest possible time ignores possibilities of being enabled earlier than the
deadline and of being enabled serendipitously after the deadline. Such an approxi-
mate influence models the achievement commitment pessimistically, in the sense that
it minimizes the expected duration of u being enabled over all influences that respect
the achievement commitment semantics (Equation (5.1)):
min
Pu∼ (5.1)
EPu
[∑H
t=0 1{ut=u+}
]
where Pu ∼ (5.1) means influence Pu satisfies Equation (5.1), and 1E is the indicator
function that takes value one if event E occurs and zero otherwise. We refer to this
minimizer as the minimal enablement duration influence, as formalized in Definition
V.1 and illustrated in Figure 5.2a.
Definition V.1. Given achievement commitment ca = (Ta, pa), its minimal enable-
ment duration influence P̂min+u (ca) toggles u in the transition from time step t = Ta−1
to t = Ta with probability pa, and does not toggle u at any other time step.
For maintenance commitments, the counterpart minimizes the expected enable-
ment duration over all influences that respect the maintenance commitment semantics
(Equation (5.2)):
min
Pu∼ (5.2)
EPu
[∑H
t=0 1{ut=u+}
]
.
The minimizer models a probabilistic toggling to u− at the earliest possible time, and
a deterministic toggling to u− (if it had not toggled earlier) after the commitment
time, as formalized in Definition V.2 and illustrated in Figure 5.2b.
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Figure 5.2: Minimal enablement duration for an achievement commitment and a
maintenance commitment.
Definition V.2. Given maintenance commitment cm = (Tm, pm), its minimal enable-
ment duration influence P̂min+u (cm) toggles u in the transition from time step t = 0 to
t = 1 with probability 1−pm, and (unless already toggled) from t = Tm to t = Tm+1
with probability one. It does not toggle u at any other time step.
As illustrated in Figure 5.2, the minimal enablement duration influence passes
through the specific point of the commitment probability at the commitment time
(i.e. (Ta, pa), (Tm, pm)), even though the provider’s true influence does not have to
(Figure 5.1). It is reasonable for the recipient to assume that the provider’s true
influence pass through the specific point, because otherwise the two agents could
have agreed on a different commitment with the higher commitment probability for
purpose of coordination. Therefore, in this thesis, we consider strategies, such as
the minimal enablement duration, that pass the specific point, and focus on the core
challenge that arises from the recipient’s uncertainty about the true influence at time
steps other than the commitment time.
Besides Assumptions V.1 and V.2, we also make Assumption V.3 for our analyses
in this section, as a simplifying assumption stating that the true influence agrees with
the minimal enablement duration influence after the commitment time, so that any
suboptimality is caused by the imperfect modeling up until the commitment time.
Assumption V.3. Pu(uh+1|uh) agrees with the minimal enablement duration influ-
ence for h ≥ T , where T is the commitment time.
Bounding Suboptimality for Achievement. Here, we derive Theorem V.1 that
bounds the suboptimality for achievement commitments as the difference between
v∗M− and v
∗
M+ . We use Assumptions V.2 and V.3, and Lemma V.2 which states that,
for achievement commitments, the possible ways the true influence differs from the
minimal enablement duration influence can only improve the expected value.
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Lemma V.2. Given achievement commitment ca = (Ta, pa), let P̂u = P̂
min+
u (ca), then
we have v
pi∗
M̂
M ≥ v
pi∗
M̂
M̂
where influence Pu in M respects the commitment semantics of
ca.
Proof. For achievement commitments, the initial value of u is u−. Let Pu(t) be the
probability that u is not enabled to u+ until time step t in influence Pu, and v
pi
t be
the initial state’s value under pi when u is enabled from u− to u+ at t with probability
one. By Assumption V.3, v
pi∗
M̂
M and v
pi∗
M̂
M̂
can be decomposed as
v
pi∗
M̂
M =
∑Ta
t=1 Pu(t)v
pi∗
M̂
t + (1− pa)v
pi∗
M̂
M− ,
v
pi∗
M̂
M̂
= pav
pi∗
M̂
Ta
+ (1− pa)v
pi∗
M̂
M− .
When u is enabled at t in M , pi∗
M̂
can be executed as if u is not enabled, by Assumption
V.2, yielding identical trajectory distribution of l (therefore value) as in M̂ . Therefore,
the recipient’s re-planning at t when u = u+ will derive a better policy if possible.
Therefore, the value of executing pi∗
M̂
in M is no less than that in M̂ , i.e. v
pi∗
M̂
t ≥ v
pi∗
M̂
Ta
.
Therefore,
v
pi∗
M̂
M =
∑Ta
t=1 Pu(t)v
pi∗
M̂
t + (1− pa)v
pi∗
M̂
M−
≥∑Tat=1 Pu(t)vpi∗M̂Ta + (1− pa)vpi∗M̂M−
≥pav
pi∗
M̂
Ta
+ (1− pa)v
pi∗
M̂
M− (commitment semantics)
=v
pi∗
M̂
M̂
.
Theorem V.1. Given achievement commitment ca, let P̂u = P̂
min+
u (ca). The subop-
timality can be bounded as
v∗M − v
pi∗
M̂
M ≤ v∗M+ − v∗M− (5.3)
where influence Pu in M respects the commitment semantics of ca. Further, there
exists an achievement commitment for which the equality is attained.
Proof. The derivation of the bound in Equation (5.3) is straightforward from Lemma
V.2:
v∗M − v
pi∗
M̂
M ≤ v∗M+ − v
pi∗
M̂
M̂
≤ v∗M+ − v∗M− .
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Figure 5.3: 1D Walk. Left: Example in the proof of Theorem V.1. Right: Example
in the proof of Theorem V.2.
Next, we use a simple illustrative example to give an achievement commitment for
which the equality is attained.
Example: An Achievement Commitment in 1D Walk. Consider the example of a
1D walk of L locations on [0, L− 1], as shown in Figure 5.3(left), where the recipient
starts at L0 and can move right, left, or stay still. There is a gate between 0 and 1
for which u+ denotes the state of open and u− closed. The provider toggles the gate
stochastically according to Pu. For each time step the recipient is at neither end,
it gets a reward of −1. Hence, the optimal policy is to reach either end as soon as
possible in expectation. Note that the reward function makes Assumptions V.1 and
V.2 hold.
Here, we derive an achievement commitment for which the bound in Theorem
V.1 is attained. Consider L = 10, L0 = 3, H = 10, achievement commitment (Ta =
L− 1−L0 = 6, pa = 1), and the true influence Pu in M that toggles the gate to open
at t = L0 − 1 = 2 with probability pa = 1. The optimal policy in M is to move left
to 0. Therefore, v∗M = v
∗
M+ = −L0 = −3. Given the minimal enablement duration
influence, moving right to L (arriving at time L−1−L0 = 6) is faster than waiting for
the gate to toggle at Ta = 6 and then reaching location 0 at time Ta+ 1 = 7. Had the
recipient known the gate would toggle at time t = L0 − 1 = 2, it would have moved
left, but by the time the gate toggles the recipient is at location L0 +L0− 1 = 5, and
continuing on to L is the faster choice. Therefore, v
pi∗
M̂
M = v
∗
M− = −(L−1−L0) = −6,
and the bound in Theorem V.1 is attained.
Bounding Suboptimality for Maintenance. We next ask if the bound in Equa-
tion (5.3) on suboptimality in achievement commitments also holds for maintenance
commitments. Unfortunately, as stated in Theorem V.2, the optimal policy of the
minimal enablement duration influence for maintenance commitments can be arbi-
trarily bad when evaluated in the true influence, incurring a suboptimality exceeding
the bound in Equation (5.3). We give an example for an existence proof.
Theorem V.2. Consider P̂u = P̂
min+
u (cm) to be the approximate influence when mod-
elling the maintenance commitment in M̂ . There exists an MDP M and a mainte-
nance commitment cm, such that the true influence Pu in M respects the commitment
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semantics of cm, v
∗
M = v
∗
M+, v
pi∗
M̂
M < v
∗
M−, and therefore the suboptimality
v∗M − v
pi∗
M̂
M > v
∗
M+ − v∗M− (5.4)
exceeds the bound in Equation (5.3).
Proof. As an existence proof, we give an example of a maintenance commitment in
1D Walk for which v∗M = v
∗
M+ and v
pi∗
M̂
M < v
∗
M− . Consider 1D Walk with the same
L = 10, L0 = 3, H = 10 as in the example for Theorem V.1. Consider maintenance
commitment (Tm = L0 + 1 = 4, pm = 0), and Pu toggles the gate to closed at Tm = 4
with probability 1−pm = 1. As shown in Figure 5.3(right), the optimal policy should
take L0 steps to move directly to 0, for which the value is v
∗
M = v
∗
M+ . We have
computed for Theorem V.1 that v∗M− = −6. With probability 1 − pm = 1, the gate
is closed at Tm = 4, and pi
∗
M̂
takes L + L0 − 1 > H steps to reach L − 1. Thus,
v
pi∗
M̂
M = −H = −10 < v∗M− .
In the example used in the existence proof above, the maximum suboptimality
is incurred with maintenance commitment probability pm = 0 (a no-guarantee com-
mitment), because this is when the recipient is most uncertain about the influence
and will be most negatively affected by the uncertainty. Note that for achievement,
a no-guarantee commitment still falls within the Theorem V.1 bound.
Comparing the bound Equation (5.3) in Theorem V.1 with the bound Equation
(5.4) in Theorem V.2 reveals a fundamental difference between achievement and main-
tenance commitments: maintenance commitments are inherently less tolerant to an
unexpected change in the commitment feature. For achievement commitments, the
easily-constructed minimal enablement duration influence has the property of be-
ing pessimistic, in that any unexpected changes to the feature, if they impact the
recipient at all, can only improve the expected value. Thus, if despite its minimal en-
ablement duration influence approximation, a recipient has chosen to follow a policy
that exploits the commitment, it can never experience a true influence that would
lead it to regret having done so. The same cannot be said for maintenance commit-
ments. There, the easily-constructed minimal enablement duration influence is not
pessimistic—it does not guarantee that any deviations from the influence can only
improve the expected value. As our theoretical results show, the minimal enablement
duration influence assuming toggling from u+ to u− right away can still lead to nega-
tive surprises, since if the toggling does not immediately occur the influence suggests
that it is safe to assume no toggling until Tm, but that is not true since toggling could
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happen sooner, after the recipient has incurred cost for a policy that would need to
be abandoned. In the example for Theorem V.2, the worst time for toggling to u− is
not right away, but right before the precondition would be used, where the gate shuts
just as the recipient is about to pass through it.
5.3.2 Alternative Influence Approximations
Besides using the minimal enablement duration strategy to create the approximate
influence, we next consider and analyze several alternative strategies.
Maximal Enablement Duration. As opposed to the minimal enablement du-
ration strategy, the maximal enablement duration strategy optimistically toggles u
right after the initial time step for achievement commitments, and at the commit-
ment time for maintenance commitments. Formally, given achievement commitment
ca = (Ta, pa), the maximal enable duration strategy, denoted as P̂
max+
u (·), chooses the
influence P̂max+u (ca) that toggles u in the transition from time step t = 0 to t = 1
with probability pa, and does not toggle u at any other time step; given maintenance
commitment cm = (Tm, pm), the maximal enablement duration strategy chooses the
influence P̂max+u (cm) that toggles u in the transition from time step t = Tm − 1 to
t = Tm with probability 1−pm, and (unless already toggled) from t = Tm to t = Tm+1
with probability one. It does not toggle u at any other time step.
Constant Toggling. The constant toggling strategy, denoted as P̂ constu (·), chooses
the influence P̂ constu (c), for either an achievement or a maintenance commitment c, that
toggles u at every time step up to the commitment time with a constant probability,
and the probability is chosen such that the overall probability of toggling by the
commitment time matches the commitment probability. The influence P̂ constu (c) agrees
with the minimal enablement duration influence after the commitment time.
Minimal Value Timing. Both the minimal and maximal enablement duration
strategies choose influences that model a single timestep no later than the com-
mitment time and agree with Assumption V.3 thereafter. We denote the set of
such influences as P1u(c) for either an achievement or a maintenance commitment
c. The minimal value timing strategy, denoted as P̂minVu (·), chooses the influence
from P1u(c) that has the minimal optimal value. Formally, for either an achievement
or a maintenance commitment c, its minimal enablement duration influence P̂minVu (c)
is arg minP̂u∈P1u(c) v
∗
M̂
where P̂u is the influence in M̂ .
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Minimax Regret Timing. The minimax regret timing strategy P̂minimaxu (·) chooses
an influence from P1u(c) based on the minimax regret principle. Formally, for either
an achievement or a maintenance commitment c, its minimax regret timing influence
P̂minimaxu (c) is
arg minP̂u∈P1u(c) maxPu∈P1u(c) v
∗
M − v
pi∗
M̂
M
where Pu, P̂u are the influences in M, M̂ , respectively.
The four strategies to create approximate influences, together with the minimal
enablement duration strategy, include three heuristics that are computationally inex-
pensive to compute (minimal and maximal enablement duration, and constant tog-
gling), and two more heuristics that are complex and expensive to compute (minimal
value and minimax regret timing). Except for the constant toggling, all strategies
create approximate influences that model a single branch for when u probabilisti-
cally toggles, and this single branching induces minimal computation cost for the
recipient’s planning. Recall that our theoretical analysis suggests, for maintenance
commitments, the pessimistic time for toggling to u− is not right away, but right
before the recipient uses the precondition, and this causes the poor performance of
the minimal enablement duration influence. One might hypothesize that the constant
toggling can be more pessimistic for maintenance (and thus better) than the minimal
enablement duration, because it projects the possibility of toggling to u− at every
single time step before the commitment time. One might also hypothesize that the
latter two heuristics can be more pessimistic (and thus better) than the minimal en-
ablement duration influence by identifying the worst possible toggling time. However,
Theorem V.3 states that, while the minimal value timing influence coincides with the
minimal enablement duration for achievement and therefore enjoys the same bound
in Equation (5.3) for the worst-case suboptimality, the bound does not hold for any
of the alternative strategies in either achievement or maintenance.
Theorem V.3. For an achievement commitment ca, the minimal value timing influ-
ence coincides with the minimal enablement duration, i.e. P̂minVu (ca) = P̂
min+
u (ca), and
thus the bound in Equation (5.3) holds for P̂minVu (ca). Except for this, the bound does
not hold, i.e. for P̂u ∈ { P̂max+u (ca), P̂ constu (ca), P̂minimaxu (ca), P̂max+u (cm), P̂ constu (cm),
P̂minVu (cm), P̂
minimax
u (cm)}, there exists an MDP M , and an achievement or mainte-
nance commitment, such that the true influence Pu in M respects the commitment
semantics of c ∈ {cm, ca}, and the suboptimality
v∗M − v
pi∗
M̂
M > v
∗
M+ − v∗M−
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exceeds the bound in Equation (5.3).
Proof. We first show that the minimal value timing influence coincides with the min-
imal enablement duration for achievement commitments, i.e. P̂minVu (ca) = P̂
min+
u (ca).
Consider achievement commitment ca = (Ta, pa), and P̂u, P̂
′
u ∈ P1u(ca) that toggles u
at T and T ′ respectively with T ′ < T ≤ Ta. We can construct a recipient’s policy for
the earlier toggling P̂ ′u that mimics the optimal policy for P̂u, and hence the optimal
value for T ′ is at least that for T , i.e. v∗
M̂
≤ v∗
M̂ ′
where P̂u and P̂
′
u are the influences in
M̂ and M̂ ′, respectively. Specifically, let pi∗
M̂
be the optimal policy for P̂u and pi
∗
M̂
(·|s)
be the action probability distribution of pi∗
M̂
in state s. For the earlier toggling time
T ′ < T , we construct a policy piT ′ that mimics pi∗M̂ : it chooses actions as if u = u
−
until T . Formally, for timesteps t < T , piT ′(·|s−) = pi∗M̂(·|s−) for any state s− = (l, u−)
in which u = u−, and piT ′(·|s+) = pi∗M̂(·|s−) where s+ = (l, u+) and s− = (l, u−) only
differ in u; for timesteps t ≥ T , piT ′(·|sr) = pi∗M̂(·|sr). Because piT ′ and pi∗M̂ yield the
same trajectories of l and the reward only depends on l, they achieve the same value,
and therefore v∗
M̂
≤ v∗
M̂ ′
.
As an existence proof, Table 5.1 summarizes examples for which the bound in
Equation (5.3) does not hold for P̂u ∈ { P̂max+u (ca), P̂ constu (ca), P̂minimaxu (ca), P̂max+u (cm),
P̂ constu (cm), P̂
minV
u (cm), P̂
minimax
u (cm) }. All the examples are in the 1D Walk domain
with fixed L = 10, H = 20. Besides the −1 reward for every time step until reaching
either end, the recipient also gets a one-time reward when reaching the left end of rleft,
which is an integer chosen from interval [0, 10]. We compute the suboptimality for
a commitment c, achievement or maintenance, with initial location L0 chosen from
{1, 2, 3, ..., 8}, commitment time chosen from {1, 2, ..., H} and commitment probabil-
ity chosen from {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1}, with the provider’s true influence Pu chosen from
P1u(c). For all possible combinations of rleft, c, L0, and Pu, the corresponding sub-
optimality is evaluated, and Table 5.1 reports combinations for which the bound in
Equation (5.3) does not hold.
While the analysis in this section chooses the provider’s true influence from P1u(c)
in an adversarial manner from the recipient’s perspective, a rational provider that
maximizes its value can indeed induce such an influence in P1u(c) for any given com-
mitment c, as formally stated in Theorem V.4.
Theorem V.4. For any commitment c, achievement or maintenance, and any influ-
ence Pu ∈ P1u(c), there exists an MDP for the provider such that the optimal policy
induces influence Pu.
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Table 5.1: 1D Walk Examples for Theorem V.3
Achievement Maintenance
Min Enablement The bound in Eq. (5.3) holds
L = 10, L0 = 3, rleft = 0
Tm = 4, pm = 0.0
v∗M+ − v∗M− = −3− (−6) = 3
Pu ∈ P1u,c toggles at t=3
Suboptimality = 8.8
Max Enablement
L = 10, L0 = 6, rleft = 7
Ta = 4, pa = 0.9
v∗M+ − v∗M− = 1− (−3) = 4
Pu ∈ P1u,c toggles at t=3
Suboptimality = 4.7
L = 10, L0 = 3, rleft = 0
Tm = 3, pm = 0.0
v∗M+ − v∗M− = −3− (−6) = 3
Pu ∈ P1u,c toggles at t=1
Suboptimality = 4
Constant Toggling
L = 10, L0 = 3, rleft = 0
Ta = 7, pa = 0.9
v∗M+ − v∗M− = −3− (−6) = 3
Pu ∈ P1u,c toggles at t=6
Suboptimality = 4.0
L = 10, L0 = 3, rleft = 0
Tm = 7, pm = 0.1
v∗M+ − v∗M− = −3− (−6) = 3
Pu ∈ P1u,c toggles at t=1
Suboptimality = 3.3
Min Value The bound in Eq. (5.3) holds
L = 10, L0 = 3, rleft = 9
Tm = 7, pm = 0.3
v∗M+ − v∗M− = 6− (−6) = 12
Pu ∈ P1u,c toggles at t=5
Suboptimality = 14.9
Minimax Regret
L = 10, L0 = 6, rleft = 7
Ta = 5, pa = 1.0
v∗M+ − v∗M− = 1− (−3) = 4
Pu ∈ P1u,c toggles at t=4
Suboptimality = 5.8
L = 10, L0 = 3, rleft = 0
Tm = 4, pm = 0.0
v∗M+ − v∗M− = −3− (−6) = 3
Pu ∈ P1u,c toggles at t=3
Suboptimality = 8.8
Proof. For achievement commitment c = ca = (Ta, pa) and influence Pu ∈ P1u(ca)
that toggles at time step T ≤ Ta, consider 1D Walk of Ta + 1 locations on [0, Ta]
as the provider’s MDP, where the provider starts at location 0. The provider gets a
reward of +1 for each time step at location Ta, and a reward of 0 everywhere else.
For each time step at location T , the provider toggles the value of u from u− to u+
with probability pa. Obviously, the provider’s optimal policy is to move to and then
stay at location Ta, which induces influence Pu.
Similarly, for maintenance commitment c = cm = (Tm, pm) and influence Pu ∈
P1u(cm) that toggles at time step T ≤ Tm, consider the same 1D Walk of Tm + 1
locations as the provider’s MDP, except that the provider toggles the value of u from
u+ to u− with probability 1−pm at location T . The provider’s optimal policy remains
the same, which induces influence Pu.
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As a brief summary, in this section we have developed several strategies for the
recipient to create the approximate influence, and theoretically analyzed their worst-
case suboptimalities for both achievement and maintenance commitments. Our the-
oretical results show that there exists a strategy, minimal enablement duration, such
that its worst-case suboptimality is reasonably bounded for achievement commit-
ments. However, such a guarantee does not hold for maintenance commitments for
any of the strategies we have considered. This not only includes the counterpart
minimal enablement duration strategy but also the strategies that are purposely de-
veloped using insights about worst-case timing of the toggling, as well as the constant
toggling strategy that models the toggling at every time step. While we cannot as-
sert that a bounded strategy does not exist for maintenance commitments, we have
shown that strategies specifically developed to account for the shortcomings of others
nonetheless can still induce the worst-case unbounded suboptimality.
5.4 Empirical Study
In Section 5.3, we have developed several strategies for the recipient to create the
approximate influence for a given (achievement or maintenance) commitment, and
analyzed their worst-case suboptimalities. Specifically, we have contrived MDPs for
the recipient in the 1D Walk domain, commitments, and the provider’s true influ-
ences respecting the commitment semantics, to maximize the suboptimality induced
by the approximate influences. We have shown that, for achievement, the worst-
case suboptimality of the minimal enablement duration influence (or equivalently the
minimal value timing influence) can be be bounded fairly tightly, while for mainte-
nance the worst-case suboptimality of any approximate influence we have developed
is effectively unbounded.
In this section, we conduct empirical evaluations of the suboptimality induced by
those approximate influences besides the worst case. In Section 5.4.1, we measure
suboptimality for general (achievement or maintenance) commitments in 1D Walk
with various choices of commitment time and probability. In Section 5.4.2, we focus on
value maximizer commitments, which either maximize the provider’s or the recipient’s
local commitment value, or maximize the joint commitment value.
5.4.1 Suboptimality for General Commitments
Here, we measure the suboptimality of the strategies to create approximate influ-
ences developed in Section 5.3 for a general achievement commitment ca = (Ta, pa)
77
or maintenance commitment cm = (Tm, pm) in 1D Walk, where the commitment time
Ta, Tm ∈ {1, 2, ..., H} can be any time step by the horizon and the commitment proba-
bility pa, pm ∈ { in}ni=0 is chosen from the interval [0, 1] evenly discretized with n = 10.
For a given (achievement or maintenance) commitment c, we measure the subopti-
mality with respect to all the influences in P1u(c) as the provider’s true influence. The
parameters for 1D Walk are the same as the example for Theorem V.1 except that
the horizon is longer, L = 10, L0 = 3, H = 20.
Figure 5.4 shows the mean, minimum, and maximum suboptimality over all re-
alizations of the provider’s true influence Pu ∈ P1u for commitment time Ta, Tm ∈
{1, 5, 10, 15}. We see that for achievement commitments, the suboptimality of the
minimal enablement duration (or equivalently the minimal value timing) influence in-
curs the lowest suboptimality. The more expensive minimax regret timing influence
has comparable suboptimality. The other two, maximal enablement duration and the
constant toggling influences, incur the most suboptimality overall. For maintenance
commitments, the minimal enablement duration and the minimax regret influences
incur the most suboptimality overall, and, among the other three approximate influ-
ences, it is difficult to identify a single best influence that reliably reduces the sub-
optimality for all the maintenance commitments. The maximal enablement duration
strategy has the lowest mean suboptimality overall, yet the maximum suboptimality
it induces over candidate true influences can be quite high especially when pm is close
to one. On the contrary, the constant toggling strategy incurs higher mean subop-
timality than the maximal enablement duration, yet its maximum suboptimality is
consistently lower. The suboptimality of the minimum value timing strategy is the
median among the five.
For both achievement and maintenance commitments, a larger commitment time
and a larger commitment probability tend to induce higher suboptimality. This is
because the recipient has more uncertainty about the provider’s true influence when
both the commitment time and probability are larger. In the extreme, as shown
in Figures 5.4a and 5.4b, for commitment time Ta = Tm = 1 the recipient has no
uncertainty about the toggling time, and hence the suboptimality is zero given that
the provider’s true influence Pu ∈ P1u matches the commitment probability. When
the commitment probability is pa = pm = 0, the suboptimality is also zero since the
recipient’s approximate influence matches the provider’s true influence in the sense
that there is no toggling in either of the two influences. The same reasoning explains
why the largest suboptimality occurs at pa = pm = 1.0.
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(h) Maintenance, Tm = 15
Figure 5.4: Suboptimality in 1D Walk. Please view in color. The results are for
the recipient with L = 10, L0 = 3, H = 20. Markers on the curves show the mean
suboptimality over possible true influences that toggles at a single time step before
the commitment time, Pu ∈ P1u,c. Bars show the minimum and maximum.
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5.4.2 Suboptimality for Value Maximizer Commitments
So far, in both Sections 5.3 and 5.4.1, we are concerned with the suboptimality
that is concerned with general commitments with various commitment times and
probabilities. Here, we introduce an environment that explicitly incorporates the
provider’s commitment value, and we focus on commitments that are rationally chosen
to be value maximizers, which either maximize the provider’s commitment value vp(c),
the recipient commitment value vr(c), or the joint commitment value vp(c) + vr(c).
We make a note here that these rationally-chosen commitments are likely to be the
ones adopted by the agents, and they are not chosen in favor of a particular type
of commitment, nor in favor of a particular approximate influence. Moreover, in
both Sections 5.3 and 5.4.1 we have been concerned with the virtual provider with
its true influence Pu ∈ P1u(c) toggling u at a single time step no later than the
commitment time. In this section, we are concerned with the more general situation
in which the true influence Pu is not restricted to be an element in P1u(c); instead,
Pu is naturally determined by the provider’s policy that maximizes its own value
while respecting the commitment semantics. We first describe the recipient’s and the
provider’s environments below.
The recipient’s environment. The recipient’s environment is the same 1D Walk
domain used for the proof of Theorem V.3. Specifically, the recipient is in a one-
dimensional space with L = 10 locations represented as integers {0, 1, ..., 9}. The
starting location L0 is randomly chosen from locations 1 − 8. The horizon for both
agents is set to be H = 20. The one-time reward of rleft is randomly sampled from
[0, 10]. In a specific instantiation of the recipient’s MDP, L0 and rleft are fixed, and
they are randomly chosen to create various MDPs for the recipient. Since the left
end has higher rewards than the right end, if the recipient’s start position is close
enough to the left end and the provider commits to opening the gate early enough
with high enough probability, the recipient should utilize the commitment by checking
if the gate is open by the commitment time, and pass through it if so; otherwise, the
recipient should simply ignore the commitment and move to the right end. Thus,
the various instances of the recipient’s MDP include diverse preferences regarding the
commitments.
The provider’s environment. The provider’s MDP is randomly generated from
a distribution designed such that, in expectation, the provider’s value when enabling
the precondition is smaller than when not enabling it. This introduces tension in the
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provider between enabling the precondition to help the recipient, versus increasing
its own reward. We now describe the provider’s MDP-generating distribution. The
MDP has 10 states the provider can be in at any time step, one out of which is
an absorbing state denoted as s+, and where the initial state is chosen from the
non-absorbing states. There are 3 actions. For each state-action pair (sp, ap) where
sp 6= s+, the transition function P p(·|sp, ap) is determined independently by filling the
10 entries with values uniformly drawn from [0, 1], and normalizing P p(·|sp, ap). For
achievement commitments, feature u takes the value of u+ only in the absorbing state,
i.e. u+ ∈ sp if and only if sp = s+, and the reward Rp(sp, ap) for a non-absorbing state
sp 6= s+ is sampled uniformly and independently from [0, 1], and for the absorbing
state sp = s+ is zero, meaning the provider prefers to avoid the absorbing state, but
that state is the only one that enables the precondition and realizes the achievement
commitment. For maintenance commitments, feature u takes the value of u+ only
in the non-absorbing states, i.e. u+ ∈ sp if and only if sp 6= s+, and the reward
Rp(sp, ap) for a non-absorbing state sp 6= s+ is sampled uniformly and independently
from [−1, 0], and for the absorbing state sp = s+ is zero, meaning the provider prefers
to reach the absorbing state, but that state disables the precondition and fails the
maintenance commitment.
We observe that, for small values of commitment time, the provider’s maximum
feasible probability of toggling u, or equivalently reaching s+, by the commitment
time is fairly low. Hence, in some experiments we also introduce a fourth action for
the provider, a+, such that, after taking a+ in any non-absorbing state sp 6= s+, the
provider will transit to the absorbing state s+ with probability p+sp , and will stay in
the current state sp with probability 1− p+sp . For each non-absorbing state sp 6= s+,
p+sp is sampled from a Gaussian distribution and then clipped into [0, 1]. In a specific
instantiation of the provider’s MDP, the mean of the Gaussian distribution, denoted
as p+, is chosen from {0, 0.5, 0.9}, and standard deviation is fixed to 0.1.
Results. Tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 show the suboptimality for the value max-
imizer commitments without action a+, with action a+ and p+ = 0, 0.5, and 0.9,
respectively, each reporting the means and standard errors over 2500 randomly-
generated pairs of the provider’s MDP and the recipient’s MDP. Since the problem
instances have different reward scales, the suboptimality is normalized by the bound
in Equation (5.3), i.e. v∗M+ − v∗M− . The tables highlight strategies that induce low
suboptimality for certain types of value maximizer commitments, with mean+error
≤ 5% underlined and mean+error ≤ 1% in bold.
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Table 5.2: Suboptimality for maximizer commitments (without action a+ for the
provider). The suboptimality is normalized by v∗M+−v∗M− . The results are means and
standard errors (in parentheses). Mean + standard error below 5% are underlined,
and below 1% are in bold.
Suboptimality (%)
Provider Value
Maximizer
Joint Value
Maximizer
Recipient Value
Maximizer
Achv.
Min Enablement
Min Value
0.21 (0.03) 0.27 (0.03) 0.40 (0.03)
Max Enablement 26.51 (0.61) 29.25 (0.65) 28.75 (0.65)
Minimax Regret 6.44 (0.23) 7.78 (0.26) 7.20 (0.26)
Constant Toggling 0.03 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.97 (0.04)
Maint.
Min Enablement 9.93 (0.83) 4.00 (0.56) 1.55 (0.18)
Max Enablement 11.04 (0.74) 11.04 (0.74) 11.04 (0.74)
Min Value 15.02 (1.11) 10.82 (1.06) 8.74 (0.96)
Minimax Regret 10.17 (0.83) 7.24 (0.62) 7.63 (0.58)
Constant Toggling 9.47 (1.01) 7.56 (0.91) 0.02 (0.01)
Table 5.3: Suboptimality for maximizer commitments (p+ = 0). The suboptimality is
normalized by v∗M+−v∗M− . The results are means and standard errors (in parentheses).
Mean + standard error below 5% are underlined, and below 1% are in bold.
Suboptimality (%)
Provider Value
Maximizer
Joint Value
Maximizer
Recipient Value
Maximizer
Achv.
Min Enablement
Min Value
0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.31 (0.02)
Max Enablement 2.69 (0.21) 14.81 (0.33) 34.28 (0.69)
Minimax Regret 0.66 (0.09) 6.01 (0.25) 10.15 (0.37)
Constant Toggling 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.46 (0.02)
Maint.
Min Enablement 6.31 (0.67) 0.68 (0.21) 0.01 (0.01)
Max Enablement 8.12 (0.63) 8.12 (0.63) 4.80 (0.49)
Min Value 14.42 (1.15) 6.62 (0.87) 0.97 (0.33)
Minimax Regret 7.30 (0.65) 7.56 (0.60) 4.45 (0.46)
Constant Toggling 6.33 (0.83) 2.56 (0.91) 0.01 (0.01)
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Table 5.4: Suboptimality for maximizer commitments (p+ = 0.5). The suboptimal-
ity is normalized by v∗M+ − v∗M− . The results are means and standard errors (in
parentheses). Mean + standard error below 5% are underlined, and below 1% are in
bold.
Suboptimality (%)
Provider Value
Maximizer
Joint Value
Maximizer
Recipient Value
Maximizer
Achv.
Min Enablement
Min Value
0.16(0.02) 0.12 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01)
Max Enablement 28.00 (0.63) 31.69 (0.69) 38.08 (0.63)
Minimax Regret 6.82 (0.23) 9.67 (0.34) 4.53 (0.30)
Constant Toggling 0.01 (0.01) 10.66 (0.43) 0.02 (0.01)
Maint.
Min Enablement 22.66 (0.70) 3.08 (0.36) 1.74 (0.20)
Max Enablement 45.09 (1.54) 45.09 (1.54) 45.09 (1.54)
Min Value 6.33 (0.39) 2.81 (0.35) 2.17 (0.31)
Minimax Regret 22.99 (0.70) 4.72 (0.35) 10.62 (0.65)
Constant Toggling 4.36 (0.37) 2.48 (0.34) 0.01 (0.01)
Table 5.5: Suboptimality for maximizer commitments (p+ = 0.9). The suboptimal-
ity is normalized by v∗M+ − v∗M− . The results are means and standard errors (in
parentheses). Mean + standard error below 5% are underlined, and below 1% are in
bold.
Suboptimality (%)
Provider Value
Maximizer
Joint Value
Maximizer
Recipient Value
Maximizer
Achv.
Min Enablement
Min Value
0.16 (0.02) 0.10 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Max Enablement 27.89 (0.63) 32.40 (0.67) 32.36 (0.67)
Minimax Regret 6.71 (0.23) 9.58 (0.36) 5.15 (0.31)
Constant Toggling 0.01 (0.01) 52.79 (1.48) 0.01 (0.01)
Maint.
Min Enablement 10.40 (0.48) 0.71 (0.16) 1.72 (0.20)
Max Enablement 46.83 (1.32) 50.00 (1.34) 50.00 (1.34)
Min Value 1.66 (0.13) 0.52 (0.11) 0.45 (0.10)
Minimax Regret 9.17 (0.42) 5.62 (0.24) 13.13 (0.64)
Constant Toggling 1.80 (0.13) 0.45 (0.10) 0.01 (0.01)
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For achievement commitments, the minimal enablement duration (or equivalently
the minimal value timing) strategy consistently induces suboptimality below 1% with
or without action a+, for all the three types of maximizer commitment, while the max-
imal enablement duration and the minimax regret often induce suboptimality higher
than 5%. Table 5.2 shows that, without action a+, the constant toggling influence
also induces suboptimality below 1% for all three types of maximizer commitment,
and this also holds with action a+ and a small p+ = 0 as shown in Table 5.3. How-
ever, as p+ increases, the constant toggling influence can induce suboptimality higher
than 5%, especially for the joint value maximizer commitments, as shown in Tables
5.4 and 5.5. Generally, the provider value maximizers are those weak achievement
commitments with late commitment time Ta and low commitment probability pa,
while the recipient value maximizers are those strong commitments with early Ta and
high pa. Since later commitment time Ta and higher commitment probability pa often
cause the recipient more uncertainty about the true influence and therefore higher
suboptimality (as evidenced by the results in Figures 5.4a, 5.4c, 5.4e, and 5.4g), it
is difficult to predict which type of value maximizer induces higher suboptimality.
Thus, it should be unsurprising that some strategies work well for one type of value
maximizer achievement commitment but not for another. Nonetheless, the minimal
enablement duration (or equivalently the minimal value timing) strategy consistently
induces low suboptimality for all types of value maximizer achievement commitment.
For maintenance commitments, the results show that none of the five strategies
has suboptimality below 1% consistently for all three types of maximizer commit-
ment, with or without action a+. Overall, the suboptimality of all five strategies for
maintenance is significantly higher than the suboptimality of the minimal enablement
duration strategy for achievement. It is worth noting that, while the maximal enable-
ment duration used to be an above-average strategy for maintenance commitments if
the true influence is chosen from P1u(cm) that toggles only at a single time step (shown
in Figures 5.4b, 5.4d, 5.4f, and 5.4h), here we see that the maximal enablement du-
ration is overall the worst among the five strategies, confirming that being optimistic
does not result in robust interpretation of maintenance commitments. Similar to
achievement commitments, it is difficult to predict which type of value maximizer
maintenance commitment is harder for the recipient to model, and a strategy can
work well for one value maximizer but not for another. For example, the constant
toggling induces lowest suboptimality for recipient value maximizer maintenance com-
mitments, suggesting that, when the commitment time Tm is late and the toggling
probability ≤ 1− pm is low, it is empirically better to model the toggling more often
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than a single time step. However, such a claim about the constant toggling strategy
does not hold for joint value maximizers, as shown in Table 5.3.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have focused on how the recipient should interpret the par-
tial information specified in a probabilistic commitment. Specifically, a commitment
specifies a lower bound on the probability of the commitment being realized at a
single time step, and this partial specification imposes uncertainty for the recipi-
ent’s planning. As described in Section 5.1, the recipient creates an approximate
influence that approximates the provider’s influence at other time steps. We are
particularly interested in the quality of this approximate influence, quantified by its
suboptimality, for two types of commitment, that of achievement and maintenance
formally defined in Section 5.2 in the probabilistic commitment framework. In Sec-
tion 5.3, we developed several strategies for the recipient to create the approximate
influence, and studied their worst-case suboptimalities that is induced in simple ex-
amples of commitments and the provider’s true influence. Using theorems in Section
5.3, we were able to identify a straightforward, computationally inexpensive strat-
egy, referred to as the minimal enablement duration, whose worst-case suboptimality
for achievement commitments can be bounded, while for maintenance commitments
the worst-case suboptimality of any of the strategies is effectively unbounded. Our
empirical study in Section 5.4 evaluated the strategies beyond worst-case examples.
The results showed that the minimal enablement duration is effective for achieve-
ment commitments, while for maintenance none of the strategies can reliably yield
low suboptimality.
With the recipient robustly interpreting an achievement commitment, successful
coordination with the provider can be secured. On the other hand, the fact that
interpreting a maintenance commitment is harder encourages future research in coor-
dination with maintenance. As an immediate next step, one can try to develop and
investigate better strategies than the ones we studied in this thesis. In a different
direction, one can explore specifications that are more detailed than the single time
step specification, which definitely reduce the recipient’s uncertainty when creating
the approximate influence, but, as a potential cost, could reduce the flexibility the
provider needs. More broadly, our results provide insights to the community designing
specifications and protocols for applying commitment-based coordination to domains
involving both achievement and maintenance.
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CHAPTER VI
Efficient Formulation of Cooperative Probabilistic
Commitments
We have seen that the semantics of a commitment constrains the provider’s policy
choice, and thus the provider would prefer a weaker commitment (e.g., lower commit-
ment probability, earlier commitment time for achievement, and later commitment
time for maintenance) if it aims to maximize its own value. On the other hand, the
recipient would prefer a stronger commitment (e.g., higher commitment probability,
later commitment time for achievement, and earlier commitment time for mainte-
nance) since the outcome specified by the commitment is desired. What commitment
should they agree on? In this chapter, we focus on formulating a commitment that
induces the optimal cooperative behavior between the agents in the sense that the
sum of their two values is maximized. This optimal cooperative commitment problem
is computationally challenging, because evaluating each commitment involves solving
a linear program that is expensive, and thus we aim to avoid exhaustively searching
the entire commitment space. We prove several structural properties of the provider’s
and the recipient’s values as functions of the parameters in the commitment specifi-
cation. This enable us to develop algorithms that exploit the properties to efficiently
formulate (near-)optimal cooperative commitments for both the centralized setting
(in which each agent’s information is known to a centralized coordinator) and the de-
centralized setting (in which the information relevant to optimization is distributed
between the agents).
6.1 Cooperative Probabilistic Commitments
As we have discussed in Section 2.3, for a given feasible probabilistic commitment
c = (uc, Tc, pc), the provider’s commitment value function v
p(c) corresponds to the
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provider’s policy that maximizes the initial state value while satisfying the commit-
ment constraint. The recipient’s value of commitment c, vr, is defined to be the
optimal value of the recipient’s initial state when planning with whatever it chooses
for its approximate influence of the shared state feature. Let vp+r(c) = vp(c) + vr(c)
be the joint commitment value function. The optimal commitment is a feasible com-
mitment that maximizes the joint value, i.e. c∗ = arg maxc v
p+r(c).
In this chapter, we focus on achievement commitments, where the shared state
feature u takes binary values of u+ and u− and is initially u−. The provider is
constrained to follow a policy that sets u to uc = u
+ desired by the recipient by
commitment time Tc with at least probability pc. As we have shown in Chapter V,
the minimal enablement duration, introduced in Section 5.3, is an effective strategy
for the recipient to create the approximate influence for achievement, and thus we
use it to compute the recipient’s commitment value vr(c). As the recipient’s robust
interpretation for maintenance is largely an open question, we leave the formulation
of cooperative maintenance commitments as future work beyond this thesis. Since
uc is fixed to u
+, we use abbreviation c = (Tc, pc) for the remainder of this chapter.
To formulate the optimal commitment for achievement, we need to specify (Tc, pc) ∈
[H]× [0, 1] where [H] = {1, 2, ..., H}, i.e.
c∗ = arg max
(Tc,pc)∈[H]×[0,1]
vp+r(c). (6.1)
A na¨ıve strategy for solving the problem in Equation (6.1) is to discretize the com-
mitment probability space, and evaluate every commitment in the discretized space.
The finer the discretization is, the more commitments are considered and the better
the solution will be. At the same time, the finer the discretization, the larger the
computational cost of evaluating every commitment in the discretized commitment
space. In Section 6.2, we prove structural properties of the provider’s and the recipi-
ent’s commitment value functions that enable us to develop algorithms that efficiently
search for the exact optimal commitment.
6.2 Structure of the Probabilistic Commitment Space
We show that, as functions of the commitment probability, both commitment
value functions are monotonic and piecewise linear; the provider’s commitment value
function is concave, and the recipient’s is convex. The proofs for the properties of
the provider’s commitment value function is agnostic about the commitment type,
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and thus can still apply to maintenance commitments. For the recipient, its com-
mitment value function for achievement hinges on the minimal enablement duration
influence, and the proofs of the structural properties cannot straightforwardly apply
to maintenance.
6.2.1 Properties of the Provider’s Commitment Value
Theorem VI.1. Let vp(c) = vp(Tc, pc) be the provider’s commitment value. For any
fixed commitment time Tc, v
p(Tc, pc) has the following properties as a function of
commitment probability pc:
1. vp(Tc, pc) is monotonically non-increasing in pc.
2. vp(Tc, pc) is concave in pc.
3. vp(Tc, pc) is piecewise linear in pc.
The proof of monotonicity is straightforward: by the inequality constraint in
the commitment semantics of Equation (3.1), the set of commitment-constrained
policies Πpc is non-increasing in pc. To show the concavity and piecewise linearity, we
consider the linear program that solves the provider’s constrained planning problem
in Equation (3.2). We now provide a full proof below.
Proof of Monotonicity. By the commitment semantics of Equation (3.1), Πpc = Π
p
Tc,pc
is monotonically non-increasing in pc for any fixed Tc, i.e. Π
p
Tc,p′c
⊆ ΠpTc,pc for any
p′c > pc. Therefore, v
p(Tc, pc) is monotonically non-increasing in pc.
Proof of Concavity. Consider the linear program (LP) in Figure 3.2 for which the
optimal value is vp(c), as also presented below for convenience:
max
xp
∑
sp,ap
xp(sp, ap)Rp(sp, ap)
subject to ∀sp, ap xp(sp, ap) ≥ 0
∀sp′
∑
ap′
xp(sp′, ap′) =
∑
sp,ap
xp(sp, ap)P (sp′|sp, ap) + δ(sp′, sp0)∑
spTc3uc
∑
ap
xp(spTc , a
p) ≥ pc.
For a fixed commitment time Tc and any two commitment probabilities pc and
p′c, let x
p
c , x
p
c′ be the optimal solutions to the LP for commitments c = (Tc, pc), c
′ =
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(Tc, p
′
c), respectively. For any η ∈ [0, 1], let pc,η = ηp′c + (1 − η)pc. Consider xpη that
is the η-interpolation of xpc , x
p
c′ ,
xpη(s
p, ap) = ηxpc′(s
p, ap) + (1− η)xpc (sp, ap).
Note that xpη satisfies the first two constraints, and so it is the occupancy measure of
policy pipη defined as
pipη (a
p|sp) = x
p
η(s
p, ap)∑
ap x
p
η(sp, ap)
.
Since the occupancy measure of pipη is the η-interpolation of x
p
c and x
p
c′ , it is easy to
verify that pipη is feasible for commitment probability pc,η. Therefore, the concavity
holds because
vp(Tc, pc,η) ≥ V pi
p
η
Mp(s
p
0) =
∑
sp,ap
xpη(s
p, ap)Rp(sp, ap)
=
∑
sp,ap
(ηxpc′(s
p, ap) + (1− η)xpc (sp, ap))Rp(sp, ap)
=ηvp(Tc, p
′
c) + (1− η)vp(Tc, pc).
Piecewise Linearity. We first convert the LP into its standard form [BT97]:
max
x˜p
rT x˜p
subject to Ax˜p = b
x˜p ≥ 0.
To convert the commitment constraint into an equality constraint, we introduce a
slack variable ξ ≥ 0: ∑
spTc3uc
∑
ap
x(spTc , a
p)− ξ = pc.
The slack variable is a decision variable in the standard form, x˜p = [xp | ξ] ∈
R|Sp||Ap|+1. The standard form eliminates redundant constraints so thatA ∈ Rm×(|Sp||Ap|+1)
is full row rank (rank(A) = m). Note that the elimination produces b ∈ Rm whose
elements are linear in pc.
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Pick a set of indices B corresponding to m columns of the matrix A. We can
think of A as the concatenation of two matrices AB and AN where AB is the m×m
matrix of these m linearly independent columns, and AN contains the other columns.
Correspondingly, x˜p is decomposed into x˜pB and x˜
p
N . Then, x˜
p = [x˜pB | x˜pN ] is basic
feasible if x˜pN = 0, AB is invertible, and x˜
p
B = A
−1
B b ≥ 0.
It is known that the optimal solution can be found in the basic feasible solutions,
vp(Tc, pc) = max
B:x˜p is basic feasible
rT x˜p
= max
B:x˜p is basic feasible
rTBx˜
p
B
= max
B:x˜p is basic feasible
rTBA
−1
B b.
Since b is linear in pc, v
p(Tc, pc) is the maximum of a set of linear functions in pc, and
therefore it is piecewise linear.
6.2.2 Properties of the Recipient’s Commitment Value
We here also make Assumptions V.1 and V.2 that we have made in Chapter V
when analyzing the worst-case suboptimality of the recipient’s approximate influence.
Recall that these assumptions imply Lemma V.1 that formalizes the notion that u+,
as opposed to u−, is the value of u that is desirable for the recipient.
Theorem VI.2. Let vr(c) = vr(Tc, pc) be the recipient’s commitment value. For
any fixed commitment time Tc, under Assumptions V.1 and V.2, v
r(Tc, pc) has the
following properties as a function of commitment probability pc:
1. vr(Tc, pc) is monotonically non-decreasing in pc.
2. vr(Tc, pc) is convex in pc.
3. vr(Tc, pc) is piecewise linear in pc.
The monotonicity is due to Lemma V.1: since u+ is more desirable to the recipient,
we can show that the recipient’s value of any policy, including the recipient’s policy
that is optimal for a specific commitment, is non-decreasing in the toggling probability
pc. To prove convexity and piecewise linearity, the key idea is to express the recipient’s
commitment value as the maximum over its deterministic policies. We now provide
a full proof below.
Proof of Monotonicity. We fix the commitment time Tc. For any recipient policy pi
r,
let vpi
r
t be the initial state value of pi
r when u is enabled from u− to u+ with probability
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1 at t, and let vpi
r
Mr be the initial state value of pi
r for M r. It is useful to notice that,
for commitment c = (Tc, pc),
vpi
r
M̂r
= pcv
pir
Tc + (1− pc)vpi
r
Mr− (6.4)
where M̂ r has the minimal enablement duration influence for commitment c. In words,
the initial state value can be expressed as the weighted sum of the two scenarios, with
the weight determined by the commitment probability. Consider the optimal policy
pi∗
M̂r
for M̂ r. It is guaranteed that v
pi∗
M̂r
Tc
≥ vpi
∗
M̂r
Mr− because, intuitively, u
+ is more
desirable than u− to the recipient. We will formally prove this later. Now consider
p′c > pc and let c
′ = (Tc, p′c):
vr(Tc, pc) = pcv
pi∗
M̂r
Tc
+ (1− pc)v
pi∗
M̂r
Mr−
≤ p′cv
pi∗
M̂r
Tc
+ (1− p′c)v
pi∗
M̂r
Mr− ≤ vr(Tc, p′c).
Now, we finish the proof by formally showing v
pi∗
M̂r
Tc
≥ vpi
∗
M̂r
Mr− . To this end, it is useful to
recall Lemma V.1 that directly follows from Assumptions V.1 and V.2, stating that
the value when u is always set to u− is no more than the value of any arbitrary M r,
i.e. v∗Mr− ≤ v∗Mr . Now we can show v
pi∗
M̂r
Tc
≥ vpi
∗
M̂r
Mr− because, otherwise, we have
vr(Tc, pc) = pcv
pi∗
M̂r
Tc
+ (1− pc)v
pi∗
M̂r
Mr−
< pcv
pi∗
M̂r
Mr− + (1− pc)v
pi∗
M̂r
Mr− = v
pi∗
M̂r
Mr− ≤ v∗M−
where vr(Tc, pc) < v
∗
M− contradicts Lemma V.1.
Proof of Convexity and Piecewise Linearity. Let ΠrD be the set of all the recipient’s
deterministic policies. It is well known [Put14] that the optimal value can be attained
by a deterministic policy,
vr(Tc, pc) = max
pir∈ΠrD
vpi
r
M̂r
= max
pir∈ΠrD
pcv
pir
Tc + (1− pc)vpi
r
Mr−
which indicates that vr(Tc, pc) is the maximum of a finite number of value functions
that are linear in pc. Therefore, v
r(Tc, pc) is convex and piecewise linear in pc.
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6.3 Centralized Formulation of Cooperative Commitments
Here we show how the structure in the recipient’s and provider’s value functions
presented above leads to a reduced search space for optimal commitments. This, in
turn, will allow for an efficient centralized search algorithm for optimal commitments
that we will use to benchmark the decentralized algorithms we develop.
As functions of the commitment probability, the provider’s commitment value
is non-increasing, the recipient’s commitment value is non-decreasing, and both are
piecewise linear. As an immediate consequence, the joint commitment value is piece-
wise linear in the probability, and any local maximum for a fixed commitment time
Tc can be attained by a probability at the extremes of zero and the maximum feasi-
ble probability p(Tc), or where the slope of the provider’s commitment value function
changes. We refer to these probabilities as the provider’s linearity breakpoints. There-
fore, without loss of optimality, one can solve the problem in Equation (6.1) to find an
optimal commitment by searching only over these linearity breakpoints, as formally
stated in Theorem VI.3.
Theorem VI.3. Let P(Tc) be the set of probabilities that are the linearity breakpoints
of the provider’s commitment value function for a fixed commitment time Tc. Let
C = {(Tc, pc) : Tc ∈ [H], pc ∈ P(Tc)} be the set of commitments in which the probability
is a provider’s linearity breakpoint. We have
max
c∈[H]×[0,1]
vp+r(c) = max
c∈C
vp+r(c).
Proof. This directly results from the properties in Theorems VI.1 and VI.2.
Further, the property of convexity/concavity assures that, for any fixed commit-
ment time, the commitment value function is linear in a probability interval [pl, pu] if
and only if the value of an intermediate commitment probability pm ∈ (pl, pu) is the
linear interpolation of the two extremes. This enables us to adopt a binary search
procedure to efficiently identify the provider’s linearity breakpoints. For any fixed
commitment time Tc, the strategy first identifies the maximum feasible probability
p(Tc). Beginning with the entire interval of [pl, pu] = [0, p(Tc)], it recursively checks
the linearity of an interval by checking the middle point, pm = (pl + pu)/2. The
recursion continues with the two halves, [pl, pm] and [pm, pu], only if the commit-
ment value function is verified to be nonlinear in interval [pl, pu]. This binary search
procedure is outlined in Algorithm 2, implemented using a FIFO queue. Stepping
92
through Tc ∈ [H] and doing the above binary search for each will find all probability
breakpoint commitments C.
Algorithm 2: Binary search for the provider’s linearity breakpoints
Input: The provider’s MDP Mp, commitment time Tc.
Output: P(Tc): the provider’s linearity breakpoints for Tc.
1 Compute p(Tc), the maximum feasible probability for Tc
2 queue ← A FIFO queue of probability intervals
3 queue.push([0, p(Tc)])
4 Compute and save the provider’s commitment value for pc = 0, p(Tc), i.e.
vp(Tc, 0) and v
p(Tc, p(Tc))
5 Initialize P(Tc)← {}
6 while queue not empty do
7 [pl, pu]← queue.pop()
8 P̂ ← P̂ ∪ {pi, pj}
9 pm ← (pl + pu)/2; compute and save vp(Tc, pm)
10 if vp(Tc, pm) is the linear interpolation of v
p(Tc, pl) and v
p(Tc, pu) then
11 continue
12 end
13 else
14 queue.push([pl, pm])
15 queue.push([pm, pu])
16 end
17 end
In summary, a centralized procedure to search for the optimal commitment first
constructs C as just described, and then computes the value of each c ∈ C for both
the provider and recipient. It returns the c with the highest summed value.
6.3.1 Empirical Evaluation
The principal theoretical result in this section is that, for centralized formulation,
the commitment probabilities to consider can be restricted to the linearity breakpoints
of the provider’s commitment value function without loss of optimality. Our empirical
evaluations here aim to confirm this optimality result, and test the hypothesis that
the space of breakpoints would be relatively small, allowing the search to be faster.
Our evaluations are in the domain used for studying value maximizer commitments
in Section 5.4.2. Recall that, for the provider, the domain is designed to introduce
tension between enabling the precondition to help the recipient versus increasing
its own value. For the recipient, the domain includes diverse preferences regarding
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the commitments. Thus, the commitments that maximize the joint value should be
carefully formulated.
6.3.1.1 Alternative Discretizations
To test the hypothesis of greater efficiency, we compare the breakpoints commit-
ments discretization to the following alternative discretizations:
Even discretization. A simple method that discretizes the continuous probabil-
ity space [0, 1] evenly as {p0, p1, ..., pn} with pi = in , where n is referred to as the
resolution of the discretization. The larger resolution n is, the more commitments
are included in the discretization and the better commitment found will be. At
the same time, the larger resolution n is, the larger the computational cost of
evaluating every commitment in the discretization.
Deterministic Policy (DP) discretization. We also consider another discretiza-
tion, adopted in prior work [WD07, WD10], that finds all of the probabilities of
toggling feature u at the commitment time that can be attained by the provider
following a deterministic policy.
For the even discretization, we consider the resolutions n ∈ {10, 20, 50}. For
the DP discretization, we found that the number of toggling probabilities of all the
provider’s deterministic policies is large, and the corresponding computational cost
of identifying and evaluating them is high. To reduce the computational cost and for
fair comparison, we group the probabilities in the DP discretization that are within
i
n
of each other for n ∈ {10, 20, 50}.
6.3.1.2 Results
Figure 6.1 shows the joint values of the best commitments for the seven discretiza-
tions, along with runtimes for forming and evaluating the discretizations, where the
provider does not have action a+ to directly transit to the absorbing state that realizes
the commitment. We report the mean and standard error over 50 randomly-generated
pairs of the provider’s MDP and the recipient’s MDP. Since the problem instances
have different reward scales, for each instance we normalize the joint value with the
value of the best commitment for the breakpoints discretization, and the lowest value
among the seven discretizations, such that the joint value for the breakpoints dis-
cretization normalizes to 1, and the lowest joint value among the seven discretizations
normalizes to 0.
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Figure 6.1: Centralized commitment formulation comparing the even, the DP, and
the breakpoints discretizations. We report means and standard errors over 50 prob-
lem instances, each being a provider-recipient pair randomly generated as described
in Section 5.4.2. Figure 6.1a shows the optimal joint commitment value for each
discretization. Figure 6.1b shows the runtime for forming the discretization and eval-
uating the commitments in the discretization.
Figure 6.1 confirms that our breakpoints discretization yields the highest joint
commitment value in a computationally efficient manner. In Figures 6.1a, we see
that, for the even and the DP discretizations, the joint commitment value increases
with the probability resolution n, and only once we reach n = 50 is the joint com-
mitment value comparable to our breakpoints discretization. Figure 6.1b compares
the runtimes of forming the discretization and evaluating the commitments in the
discretization, confirming our hypothesis that using the breakpoints discretization
is more computationally efficient than the even and the DP discretizations with a
probability resolution that yields comparable (and no higher) joint commitment val-
ues. Table 6.1 compares the sizes of these discretizations, and confirms our intuition
that the breakpoints discretization is the most computationally efficient because it
identifies a smaller number of commitments that are sufficient for the joint value
maximization.
Figure 6.2 visualizes the commitment value functions and their linearity break-
points for a randomly-chosen problem instance for commitment time Tc = 5, 10,
and 15. The visualizations confirm the structural properties of monotonicity, con-
cavity/convexity, and piecewise linearity. We observe that although the maximum
feasible probability p(Tc) unsurprisingly increases with the commitment time Tc, the
number of the provider’s linearity breakpoints does not increase proportionally to
p(Tc). This confirms that the breakpoints discretization can be relatively small even
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Table 6.1: Averaged discretization size per commitment time. The results are means
and standard errors over the same 50 problem instances as in Figure 6.1.
n = 10 n = 20 n = 50
Even 7.8± 0.1 15.1± 0.1 37.1± 0.1
DP 6.1± 0.2 12.0± 0.3 26.5± 0.7
Breakpoints 10.0± 0.1
though the feasible commitment probability space can be large. For this problem
instance, the number of the recipient’s linearity breakpoints is significantly smaller
than that of the provider, indicating that the binary search procedure is more effi-
cient that enumeration when evaluating the provider’s breakpoints on the recipient’s
commitment value function.
Effect of the Commitment Space Size. For small values of commitment time
Tc, the maximum feasible probability p(Tc) is fairly low without the provider’s action
a+, and so is the size of the feasible commitment space. Here, we further compare the
discretizations when the feasible commitment space is increased by the introduction
of the provider’s action a+. Recall that we use p+ to denote the mean of the Gaussian
distribution associated with action a+. For p+ ∈ {0, 0.5}, Figure 6.3 shows the the
maximum feasible probability p(Tc). For each p
+, we report the mean and standard
error over 50 randomly generated pairs of the provider’s MDP and the recipient’s
MDP. As shown in Figure 6.3, the maximum feasible probability dramatically in-
creases with p+ increased from 0 to 0.5. We hypothesize that, as feasibility increases,
the runtime of the even discretization also increases because its size is proportional
to the maximum feasible probability. We are interested in how the runtime of our
breakpoints discretization changes with feasibility.
Figure 6.4 shows the joint values of the best commitments for the seven dis-
cretizations and the runtimes. The results confirm that, for both values of p+, our
breakpoints discretization yields the highest joint commitment value with the small-
est runtime, which is consistent with Figure 6.1 that evaluates the discretizations
without the provider’s action a+. The results also confirm our hypothesis on the
runtime of the even discretization: comparing Figures 6.4b and 6.4d, it is noticeable
that, for n = 50, the even discretization’s runtime increases with p+. The breakpoints
discretization’s runtime does not change with p+. Perhaps surprisingly, DP’s runtime
for p+ = 0 is much larger than that for p+ = 0.5.
To have a detailed analysis on the runtime, we plot the runtimes for the even
96
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.03
4
5
6
7
8
9
pr
ov
id
er
 c
om
m
itm
en
t v
al
ue
7
6
5
4
3
2
re
cip
ie
nt
 c
om
m
itm
en
t v
al
ue
(a) Tc = 5
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.03
4
5
6
7
8
9
pr
ov
id
er
 c
om
m
itm
en
t v
al
ue
7
6
5
4
3
2
re
cip
ie
nt
 c
om
m
itm
en
t v
al
ue
(b) Tc = 10
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.03
4
5
6
7
8
9
pr
ov
id
er
 c
om
m
itm
en
t v
al
ue
7
6
5
4
3
2
re
cip
ie
nt
 c
om
m
itm
en
t v
al
ue
(c) Tc = 20
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.03
4
5
6
7
8
9
pr
ov
id
er
 c
om
m
itm
en
t v
al
ue
7
6
5
4
3
2
re
cip
ie
nt
 c
om
m
itm
en
t v
al
ue provider value
recipient value
provider breakpoints
recipient breakpoints
Figure 6.2: Visualizations of commitment value functions and their linearity break-
points for a randomly chosen problem instance. X-axis shows the commitment prob-
ability, and Y-axis shows the commitment value.
(n = 50), DP (n = 50), and the breakpoints in Figure 6.5a, where DP’s runtime
is decomposed into the runtime for forming the discretization and the runtime for
evaluating the commitments in the discretization. We see that the major reason
why DP’s runtime for p+ = 0 is larger is because forming the discretization takes
more time. For these six discretizations, Figure 6.5b shows their density defined
as the number of commitments per commitment time normalized by the maximum
feasibility commitment and averaged over the commitment time, i.e.
Discretization Density =
1
H
H∑
Tc=1
#commitments for Tc
p(Tc)
(6.5)
As confirmed in Figure 6.5b, the density of the even discretization is determined by n,
and therefore its size and runtime increases with the maximum feasible commitment
determined by p+. The density of the DP discretization is not only dependent on
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Figure 6.3: Maximum feasible commitment probability with the provider’s action
a+. X-axis shows the commitment time, and Y-axis shows the maximum feasible
commitment probability for a given commitment time. The results are means and
standard errors over 50 randomly generated MDPs for the provider.
n but also p+ that affects the structure of the state space and transition function.
Actually, as shown in Figure 6.5b, the DP’s density for p+ = 0 is larger than that for
p+ = 0.5. Similarly, the density of our breakpoints discretization for p+ = 0 is also
larger, which explains why the runtime does not increase with feasibility.
6.4 Querying Approach for Decentralized Formulation of Co-
operative Commitments
We now progress to the decentralized optimization setting where the agents try
to find a commitment that maximizes their joint value, even though neither agent
has full knowledge about the other’s environment. Recall from Section 3.3 that we
aim to develop a querying approach for eliciting the jointly-preferred commitment
based on exchanged knowledge about feasible commitment options and their local
values to an agent. In such a querying approach, the provider poses a commitment
query consisting of information about a set of feasible commitments, and the recipient
responds by selecting the commitment from the set that will best satisfy their joint
preferences. The number of commitments in the query is often small to limit costs
for communication and computation.
98
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
jo
in
t c
om
m
itm
en
t v
al
ue
 (n
or
m
al
ize
d)
(a) Joint Commitment Value, p+ = 0
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
ru
nt
im
e 
(s
ec
)
(b) Runtime (sec.), p+ = 0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
jo
in
t c
om
m
itm
en
t v
al
ue
 (n
or
m
al
ize
d)
(c) Joint Commitment Value, p+ = 0.5
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
ru
nt
im
e 
(s
ec
)
Even, n = 10
Even, n = 20
Even, n = 50
DP, n = 10
DP, n = 20
DP, n = 50
Breakpoints
(d) Runtime (sec.), p+ = 0.5
Figure 6.4: Centralized commitment formulation with the provider’s action a+. After
taking action a+, p+ is the probability of transiting to the absorbing state (and hence
realizing the commitment), which is sampled for each state from a Gaussian with
standard deviation of 0.1 and then clipped into [0, 1]. The mean of the Gaussian
distribution is chosen to be 0 (top) and 0.5 (bottom). The results are means and
standard errors of the optimal joint commitment value (left) and the runtime (right)
over 50 randomly generated problem instances, each being a provider-recipient pair.
Specifically, we consider a setting where the provider fully knows its MDP Mp,
and where its uncertainty about the recipient’s MDP is modeled as a probability
distribution µ over a finite set of N candidate MDPs. Given uncertainty µ, the
Expected Utility (EU) of a feasible commitment c is defined as the expected joint
value of the commitment under µ:
EU(c;µ) = Eµ
[
vp+r(c)
]
, (6.6)
where the expectation is with respect to the uncertainty about the recipient’s MDP.
If the provider had to single-handedly select a commitment based on its uncertainty
µ about the recipient, the best commitment is the one that maximizes the expected
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Figure 6.5: Profiled runtime and discretization density. The left plot decomposes the
runtime for DP (n = 50) in terms of forming the discretization (dark green, bottom
bar) and evaluating the commitments in the discretization (light green, top bar).
The right plot shows the discretization density (defined in Equation (6.5)) for even
(n = 50), DP (n = 50), and breakpoints. The results are means and standard errors
over the same 50 problem instances as in Figure 6.4.
utility:
c∗(µ) = arg max
c
EU(c;µ), with EU∗(µ) = max
c
EU(c;µ). (6.7)
But through querying, the provider is given a chance to refine its knowledge about
the recipient’s actual MDP. Formally, the provider’s commitment query Q consists of
a (small) finite number of feasible commitments. The provider offers these choices to
the recipient, where the provider also annotates each choice with its expected local
value of its optimal policy respecting the commitment (Equation (3.2)). The recipient
computes (using Equation (3.5)) its own expected value for each commitment offered
in the query, and adds that to the annotated value from the provider. It then responds
to the provider with the commitment that maximizes the summed value (with ties
broken by selecting the smallest indexed) to be the commitment the two agents agree
on. This querying approach is illustrated in Figure 6.6.
More formally, let Q  c denote the recipient’s response that selects c ∈ Q.
With the provider’s prior uncertainty µ, the posterior distribution given the response
is denoted as µ | Q  c, which can be computed by Bayes’ rule. To avoid large
communication cost, the number of commitments in the query, k = |Q|, is small, such
that the response usually cannot fully resolve the provider’s uncertainty. In that case,
the value of a query Q is the EU with respect to the posterior distribution averaged
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Provider
Known 𝑀!
Prior 𝜇 over𝑀" RecipientKnown 𝑀"
Commitment Query 𝒬 = {𝑐!, 𝑐", 𝑐#}
(with the provider’s commitments values)
Response 𝑐 ∈ 𝒬 has the highest joint value 
1
Figure 6.6: Illustration of the querying approach. Both the provider and the recipient
fully know their own MDPs, Mp and M r, respectively. The provider’s uncertainty
about the recipient’s MDP is modeled as a prior distribution µ. The provider poses a
commitment query Q consists of three commitments, along with their values for the
provider. The recipient’s response c ∈ Q has the highest joint value among the three
commitments in the query.
over all the commitments in the query being a possible response, and, consistent with
prior work [VB10, ZDS17], we refer to it as the query’s Expected Utility of Selection
(EUS):
EUS(Q;µ) = EQ c;µ [EU(c;µ | Q c)] .
Here, the expectation is with respect to the recipient’s response under µ. The
provider’s querying problem thus is to formulate a query Q ⊆ [H] × [0, 1] consist-
ing of |Q| = k feasible commitments that maximizes EUS:
max
Q⊆[H]×[0,1],|Q|=k
EUS(Q;µ). (6.8)
Importantly, we can show that EUS(Q;µ) is a submodular function of Q, as
formally stated in Theorem VI.4. Submodularity serves as the basis for a greedy
optimization algorithm [NWF78], which we will discuss in detail in Section 6.5.
Theorem VI.4. For any uncertainty µ, EUS(Q;µ) is a submodular function of Q.
That is, given two queries Q ⊆ Q′, commitment c /∈ Q, we have:
EUS(Q∪ {c};µ)− EUS(Q;µ) ≥ EUS(Q′ ∪ {c};µ)− EUS(Q′;µ)
Proof. Since the recipient always chooses the commitment that maximizes the joint
value over all commitments in the query, this reduces to the scenario referred to as
the noiseless response model in prior work on EUS maximization [VB10]. The prior
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work [VB10] proves the submodularity under the noiseless response model, which also
proves Theorem VI.4.
Submodularity means that adding a commitment to the query can increase the
EUS, but the increase is diminishing with the size of the query. An upper bound on
the EUS of any query of any size k can be obtained when k ≥ N such that the query
can include the optimal commitment of each candidate recipient’s MDP, i.e.
EUS = Eµ
[
max
c∈[H]×[0,1]
vp+r(c)
]
. (6.9)
Upper bound EUS can be computed with the centralized algorithm we described in
Section 6.3.
6.4.1 Structure of the Commitment Query Space
Due to the properties of individual commitment value functions proved in Section
6.2, the expected utility EU(c;µ) defined in Equation (6.6), as calculated by the
provider alone, becomes a summation of the non-increasing provider’s commitment
value function and the (provider-computed) weighted average of the non-decreasing
recipient’s commitment value functions. With the same reasoning as for Theorem
VI.3, the optimality of the linearity breakpoint commitments can be generalized to
any uncertainty. That is, for any uncertainty µ, the commitment probability of
an expected utility maximizing commitment c∗(µ) is a linearity breakpoint of the
provider’s commitment value function, as formalized in Lemma VI.1.
Lemma VI.1. Let C be defined in the same manner as in Theorem VI.3. We have
max
c∈[H]×[0,1]
EU(c;µ) = max
c∈C
EU(c;µ).
Proof. This directly results from the properties in Theorems VI.1 and VI.2.
As a consequence of Lemma VI.1, for EUS maximization, there is no loss in only
considering the provider’s linearity breakpoints, as formally stated in Theorem VI.5.
Theorem VI.5. Let C be defined in the same manner as in Theorem VI.3. For any
query size k and uncertainty µ, we have
max
Q⊆[H]×[0,1],|Q|=k
EUS(Q;µ) = max
Q⊆C,|Q|=k
EUS(Q;µ).
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Proof. We first give Lemma VI.2 that says any discretization that contains the lin-
earity breakpoints is no worse than any other discretization.
Lemma VI.2. Let C be defined in the same manner as in Theorem VI.5. Consider
any finite set of commitments C that contains C, i.e. C ⊇ C. For any query size k
and any uncertainty µ,
max
Q⊆C,|Q|=k
EUS(Q;µ) = max
Q⊆C,|Q|=k
EUS(Q;µ). (6.10)
Proof of Lemma 6.10. Because C ⊇ C, it is obvious that “≥” holds for Equation
(6.10). We next show “≤”.
Given a commitment query Q = {c1, ..., ck}, define T (Q) as a commitment query
where each commitment is the optimal commitment with respect to the posterior
given a response for Q, i.e.
T (Q) = {c∗(µ | Q c1), ..., c∗(µ | Q ck)}.
Previous work [VB10] shows that EUS(T (Q);µ) ≥ EUS(Q;µ). Due to Lemma VI.1,
we now have c∗(µ) ∈ C for any uncertainty µ. Thus, given an EUS maximizer Q∗ for
C, T (Q∗) is a subset of C with an EUS that is no smaller, which shows “≤” holds for
Equation (6.10).
We are ready to prove Theorem VI.5. Consider the even discretization of [0, 1],
Pn = {p0, p1, ..., pn} where pi = in . Because vp+r is bounded and piecewise linear in
the commitment probability, for any  > 0, there exists a large enough discretization
resolution n, such that for any size k query Q ⊆ [H] × [0, 1], there is a size k query
Q̂ ∈ [H]× Pn that |EUS(Q;µ)− EUS(Q̂;µ)| ≤ . Therefore, we have
EUS(Q;µ)−  ≤ max
Q̂⊆[H]×Pn,|Q̂|=k
EUS(Q̂;µ) ≤ max
Q⊆(C∪[H]×Pn),|Q|=k
EUS(Q;µ)
= max
Q⊆C,|Q|=k
EUS(Q;µ)
for any query Q ⊆ [H]× [0, 1] with |Q| = k, where the equality is a direct result from
Lemma VI.2. This concludes the proof.
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6.5 Efficient Commitment Query Formulation
Theorem VI.5 allows us to develop an efficient procedure for solving the query
formulation problem (Equation (6.8)). The provider first identifies its linearity break-
points commitments C and evaluates them for its MDP and each of the recipient’s
possible MDPs. Due to the concavity and convexity properties, commitments C can
be identified and evaluated efficiently with the binary search procedure outlined in
Algorithm 2. Finally, a size k query is formulated from commitments C that solves the
EUS maximization problem either exactly with exhaustive search or approximately
with greedy search:
Exhaustive query search. The finite EUS maximization problem can be ex-
actly solved by exhaustively forming and evaluating each k-subset of breakpoint
commitments, and selecting the best one.
Greedy query search. The finite EUS maximization problem can be approxi-
mately solved by a greedy procedure [VB10, CSD14] that iteratively grows the
query by adding the breakpoint commitment that contributes maximum EUS.
Formally, beginning with Q0 as an empty set, the algorithm iteratively performs
Qi ← Qi−1 ∪ {ci} for i = 1, ..., k, where
ci = arg max
c∈C\Qi−1
EUS(Qi−1 ∪ {c};µ).
Since EUS is a submodular function of the query (Theorem VI.4), the greedily
formed size k query Qk is within a factor of 1− (k−1k )k of the EUS of the optimal
query of size k [NWF78].
The overall procedure of formulating the greedy query is given in Algorithm 3.
6.5.1 Empirical Evaluation
Our empirical evaluations aim to answer the following questions regarding the de-
centralized commitment query formulation procedure, with the evaluations conducted
on the same domain as in Section 6.3:
• For commitment query formulation, how effective and computationally more ef-
ficient is the breakpoints discretization compared with alternative discretization
methods?
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Algorithm 3: Greedy query formulation from the provider’s linearity break-
points commitments
Input: The provider’s MDP Mp with horizon H
The provider’s uncertainty µ over the recipient’s MDP
The query size k.
Output: The greedy query of size k.
1 The provider’s linearity breakpoints commitments C ← {}
2 for commitment time Tc = 1, 2, ..., H do
3 Use Algorithm 2 to compute P(Tc), i.e. the provider’s linearity
breakpoints for Tc
4 C ← C ∪ {(Tc, pc) : pc ∈ P(Tc)}
5 end
// Formulate the greedy query from C
6 Q0 ← {}
7 for i = 1, 2, ..., k do
8 EUSmax ← −∞
9 for c ∈ C \ Qi−1 do
10 EUStemp ← EUS(Qi−1 ∪ {c};µ)
11 if EUStemp > EUSmax then
12 EUSmax ← EUStemp
13 cmax ← c
14 end
15 end
16 Qi ← Qi−1 ∪ {cmax}
17 end
18 Return Qk
• How effective and computationally more efficient is greedy query search com-
pared with exhaustive query search?
6.5.1.1 Evaluating the Breakpoints Discretization
The results in Figure 6.7 give the EUS for the seven discretizations, for N = 10, 50
as the number of the recipient’s candidate MDPs and k = 2, 5 as the query size, along
with the runtimes for forming the discretizations and evaluating the commitments in
the discretizations for the provider’s MDP and all the recipient’s candidate MDPs. We
report the mean and standard error over 50 randomly generated problem instances,
each of which is generated by randomly sampling an MDP for the provider, and 10
candidate MDPs for the recipient, setting the provider’s prior uncertainty µ over the
recipient’s MDP to be the uniform distribution over the 10 candidates. Since the
problem instances have different reward scales (rleft), for each instance we normalize
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the EUS with the upper bound EUS defined in Equation (6.9) and the EUS of the
optimal and greedy query of the even discretization for k = 1, n = 10, which we denote
as EUS. That is, a value for EUS is normalized as (EUS−EUS)/(EUS−EUS), such
that the EUS of the query consisting of the optimal commitments for the recipient’s
candidate MDPs normalizes to 1, and the EUS consisting of the optimal commitment
with respect to µ in the n = 10 even discretization normalizes to 0.
The results in Figure 6.7 show that, coupled with the greedy query algorithm
(evaluated next in Section 6.5.1.2), our breakpoints commitments discretization yields
the highest EUS in a computationally efficient manner. Figures 6.7a–6.7d compare the
EUS for the seven discretizations. The EUS for the even and the DP discretizations
increases with the probability resolution n as expected, and only once we reach n = 50
is the EUS comparable to our breakpoints discretization. In the comparison between
the even and the DP discretizations, we see that, for the same n, the EUS of the
DP discretization is consistently higher than that of the even discretization. This
indicates that the inductive bias of using the provider’s deterministic policies improves
the greedy query’s EUS. Recall that we use the same normalization constant for the
EUS results for k = 2 and 5, and thus the results in Figures 6.7a–6.7d show that
including more commitments in the query significantly improves the query’s EUS.
Specifically, for both N = 10 and N = 50, the normalized EUS for the breakpoints
discretization is nearly one when including k = 5, a relatively small number compared
with N , commitments in the greedy query. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the
greedy query for EUS maximization, and we will evaluate the greedy query more
thoroughly in Section 6.5.1.2.
Figures 6.7e and 6.7f compare the runtimes of forming the discretization and eval-
uating the commitments in the discretization for the downstream query formulation
procedure, showing that using breakpoints is significantly faster. The runtime for
the downstream greedy query formulation is not included in Figure 6.7, but in Fig-
ure 6.8b for the breakpoints discretization. We observe from Figure 6.8b that the
runtime for greedy query formulation is only a tiny fraction of that for forming and
evaluating the discretization (shown in Figures 6.7e and 6.7f). This implies that, to
efficiently perform the EUS maximization with the greedy query, it is crucial to first
efficiently form and evaluate the discretization, which is exactly what is achieved by
our breakpoints discretization.
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Figure 6.7: Decentralized commitment formulation comparing the even, the DP, and
the breakpoints discretizations. We report means and standard errors of the EUS of
the greedy query (Figures 6.7a–6.7d) and the runtime (Figures 6.7e and 6.7f) over 50
problem instances, each consisting of one provider MDP with a uniform prior over
N recipient MDPs randomly generated as described in Section 5.4.2. The runtime is
for forming the discretization and evaluating the commitments in the discretization.
Figure 6.8b shows the runtime for forming the greedy query, which is only a tiny
fraction of the runtimes shown in Figures 6.7e and 6.7f. The results are for N = 10
(left) and N = 50 (right).
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6.5.1.2 Evaluating the Greedy Query
Next, we empirically confirm that greedy query search is effective for the com-
mitment query EUS maximization. Given the results from Section 6.5.1.1, the query
searches here are over the breakpoint commitments. Specifically, we show that, given
the breakpoint commitments, formulating the commitment query greedily yields EUS
that is comparable to the optimal, and is computationally much more efficient than
exhaustively searching for the optimal query.
Figure 6.8c compares the EUS of the greedy query with the optimal (exhaustive
search) query, and with a query comprised of randomly-chosen breakpoints. For the
optimal query, we only show query size k = 1, 2, and 3, because we find that the
exhaustive search is extremely time-consuming for k > 3. The EUS is normalized with
EUS and the optimal EU prior to querying given uncertainty µ as defined in Equation
(6.7). That is, a value for EUS is normalized as (EUS −EU∗(µ))/(EUS −EU∗(µ)).
(Note that EU∗(µ) is also the EUS of the optimal and greedy query when k = 1,
since the recipient is only given one choice, which is the one optimizing the provider’s
model.) We vary the query size k, and report means and standard errors over the same
50 coordination problems as in Section 6.5.1.1. We see that, notably, the EUS of the
greedy query is very close to that of the optimal query. Besides, unsurprisingly, for all
three query formulation methods the EUS increases with the query size k; the random
query’s EUS after normalization is largely negative up to query size k = 20 as the
EUS is normalized to 0 for optimal and greedy with k = 1, and therefore both optimal
and greedy have significantly higher EUS than random. Figure 6.8b compares the
runtimes of the three query formulation methods (excluding the runtime they all share
for identifying the breakpoint commitments). Optimal relies on enumeration of the
exponential space, so its runtime scales poorly with the query size k. In comparison,
greedy scales much better and incurs moderate computational cost. These results
confirm our hypothesis that greedy query search is a computationally effective method
for formulating commitment queries that very nearly maximize EUS.
Robustness to diverse priors. Figure 6.8 has demonstrated the effectiveness of
the greedy query for a particular type of the provider’s prior µ, which is the uniform
distribution over the recipient’s N = 10 candidate MDP. Here, we further show that
the greedy query’s effectiveness is robust to diverse prior types. Besides the uniform
prior, we consider two other prior types. For the random prior, the probability for
each candidate recipient’s MDP is proportional to a number that is randomly sam-
pled from interval [0, 1]. For the Gaussian prior, the probability for each candidate
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Figure 6.8: Comparison of the optimal, the greedy, and the random commitment
queries. The commitment queries formed from the breakpoints discretization. The
results are means and standard errors of the normalized EUS and the runtime over
the same 50 problem instances with N = 10 candidate recipient’s MDPs as in Figure
6.7. Figure 6.8b is a zoom-in version of Figure 6.8a comparing the the optimal and
the greedy, also showing the theoretical lower bound of the greedy query’s EUS.
recipient’s MDP is proportional to the standard Gaussian distribution’s probability
density function evaluated at a number randomly sampled from the three-sigma in-
terval [−3, 3]. Figure 6.9 shows the EUS, normalized in the same manner as Figure
6.8c, of the greedy query for the three prior types, with the number of candidate
recipient’s MDPs N = 10, and 50. For comparison, Figure 6.9 shows, for query size
k = 1, 2, 3, the EUS of the optimal query and the greedy query’s theoretical lower
bound (1− (k−1
k
)k of the EUS of the optimal query of size k).
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Figure 6.9: EUS of the greedy query for the uniform (top), random (middle), and
Gaussian (bottom) priors. The queries are formed from the breakpoints discretization.
The results are means and standard errors of the EUS over 50 problem instances,
each consisting of one provider MDP and N recipient MDPs randomly generated as
described in Section 5.4.2. The results are for N = 10 (left) and N = 50 (right).
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We see that, as query size k increases, the greedy query’s EUS also increases and
quickly surpasses its theoretical lower bound. Moreover, besides the trivial case of
k = 1, the discrepancy between the greedy query’s EUS and the optimal query’s EUS
decreases as k increases. The greedy query’s EUS reaches the upper bound EUS
with query size k smaller than N , at k = 5 for N = 10 and k = 10 for N = 50,
respectively. For comparison, the optimal query’s EUS does not reach EUS at k = 3,
indicating that the greedy method is an effective procedure for EUS maximization.
Notably, these qualitative claims hold for both N = 10 and N = 50, and for all three
types of priors. The results verify that the greedy query is effective for diverse prior
types and is able to scale to a large number of candidates in the prior.
Robustness to multi-round querying. Besides priors that are synthetically gen-
erated, we here also explore priors that naturally emerge in a two-round querying pro-
cess. Specifically, the provider’s initial prior µ0 is a random prior over N candidate
recipient’s MDPs generated as described above. The provider forms the first greedy
query of size k0, updates its prior to µ1 based on the recipient’s response, and then
forms the second greedy query of size k for prior µ1. We are interested in the quality
of the second greedy query for the updated prior µ1, which emerges from the first
round of querying. Figure 6.10 shows the results for N = 50, k0 = 2 and 5, comparing
the greedy query with its theoretical lower bound and the optimal query. Consistent
with the results in Figure 6.9, the results in Figure 6.10 show that the greedy query
is effective for the priors that emerge from the first round of querying.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we focused on the problem of formulating cooperative probabilis-
tic commitments, formally defined in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2, we proved several
structural properties of the commitment value functions, which can be exploited to
efficiently compute a discretization of the continuous commitment space that is guar-
anteed to contain the joint value maximizer. In Section 6.3, we studied the setting
where there exists a centralized coordinator that has precise knowledge about both
agents’ MDPs and thus can directly exploit the discretization to efficiently search for
the optimal commitment. Our empirical evaluations in Section 6.3.1 demonstrated
such efficiency. In Section 6.4, we studied the decentralized setting where the coor-
dinator does not exist and neither agent has precise knowledge about the other. We
formulated the agents’ partial knowledge using a Bayesian prior, for which we designed
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Figure 6.10: EUS of the greedy query in the second round of querying. For the first
round, the prior is the random prior over N = 50 candidate recipient’s MDPs, and
the provider forms the first greedy query of size k0 and updates its prior based on
the recipient’s response. For the second round, the provider constructs the second
query of size k (X-axis) for the updated prior, and the corresponding normalized
EUS is shown along the Y-axis. The results are means and standard errors of the
EUS over 50 problem instances, each consisting of this two-round querying process,
for N = 50 and k0 = 2, 5. The provider’s MDP and N = 50 recipient MDPs are
randomly generated as described in Section 5.4.2.
a querying approach for the agents to improve their knowledge about each other to
agree on a better commitment. Our empirical evaluations in Section 6.5.1 demon-
strated that, paired with the discretization identified using the properties proved in
Section 6.2, high-quality queries can be formed efficiently to induce commitments
that nearly optimize the joint value.
The efficiency of the algorithms, in both centralized and decentralized settings, is
obtained from the properties of the commitment value functions. These properties
capture regularity in how the agents’ values change with the commitment specifi-
cation, implying that there are usually a small number of commitments (i.e. the
breakpoints discretization) that preserve the information of the entire commitment
space. This suggests that these commitments are worth more attention than others,
not only when formulating cooperative commitments considered in this thesis, but
also when two non-cooperative agents are negotiating a commitment, or when agents
are coordinating with a more detailed commitment specification involving more than
one time step.
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusion
Probabilistic commitments provide a general framework for coordinating agents
that are coupled by shared state features. This thesis formulates and solves problems
that arise from the two-phase procedure of commitment-based coordination between
the provider and the recipient. In the commitment formulation phase, the agents
agree on a probabilistic commitment regarding the provider’s influence on the recipi-
ent via the shared state features. For this phase, this thesis focuses on the cooperative
scenario in which the agents aim to agree on the commitment that maximizes their
joint value. In the commitment execution phase when the commitment is already
determined, the planning of the two agents is decoupled because the provider’s in-
fluence to the recipient on the shared state features is abstracted in the probabilistic
commitment. For this phase, this thesis formulates and solves the provider’s and the
recipient’s decoupled planning problems. The contributions to these problems, as pre-
sented in Chapters IV, V, and VI, lay the foundation of the probabilistic commitment
framework for multiagent coordination. We review these contributions below.
1. Chapter IV presents the commitment semantics for the provider that prescribes
its policy selection under Bayesian uncertainty about the environment model,
including the transition and reward functions. Results on an illustrative domain
show how such prescriptive semantics outperforms several alternatives because
it achieves better cooperative behavior between the provider and the recipient.
The chapter presents the method, Commitment Constrained Full Lookahead
(CCFL), for exactly optimizing the provider’s policy, often at a huge computa-
tional cost, while respecting the commitment semantics. Further, the chapter
develops Commitment Constrained Lookahead (CCL) and its online iterative
version (CCIL), that construct policies for the provider that provably respect
the commitment semantics. The empirical evaluations show that, compared
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with CCFL, CCL and CCIL can make better tradeoffs between computation
cost and policy quality. The novel prescriptive semantics and the new methods
together offer practical solutions for the provider to maximize its autonomy by
responding to its evolving model uncertainty without detriment to its trustwor-
thiness to the recipient, and thus solve the provider’s planning problem in the
commitment execution phase.
Besides the setting formalized in Section 4.1, one can apply the techniques de-
veloped in the methods, such as CCL’s parametrized posterior lookahead and
CCIL’s commitment-constrained online iteration, to other settings where an
agent is learning about the environment while its behavior is required to meet
spatial-temporal constraints. For example, such techniques can be straightfor-
wardly applied to 1) more detailed specifications of the provider’s influence that
involve multiple time steps, as we have discussed in Section 2.3, 2) and settings
where the agent’s model uncertainty is formalized in a non-Bayesian manner.
For example, we have considered the scenario where the provider’s model un-
certainty is non-Bayesian and applied the techniques developed in this thesis
to such a setting that involves minimax regret policy optimization objectives
[ZSD17].
2. Chapter V formulates the recipient’s planning problem in the commitment ex-
ecution phase as its robust interpretation of the commitment and focuses on
two commonly-studied types of commitment, achievement and maintenance.
The notion of robustness hinges on the suboptimality of the influence that the
recipient creates from the commitment specification, which the recipient uses
to approximate the provider’s true influence for its subsequent planning. This
chapter develops several strategies for creating the approximate influence, and
presents theoretical and empirical results showing that, despite strong similar-
ities in the provider’s modeling of the two types of commitment, there is a
strategy that induces low suboptimality for achievement, while no identifiable
strategy can robustly reduce the suboptimality for maintenance.
Although the idea of approximate influence has been explored in prior work,
this thesis is the first to develop principled strategies and evaluation metrics
for the recipient to interpret a probabilistic commitment. The results assure us
that the recipient can robustly interpret achievement commitments, and thus
successful coordination with the provider can be secured. On the other hand,
the results suggest that successful coordination with maintenance commitments
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is harder, encouraging us to explore specifications more detailed than the single
time step abstraction, so as to reduce the recipient’s uncertainty when creating
the approximate influence, but at the same time also reduce the flexibility the
provider has. This points out an important future direction to better understand
the pros and cons of more detailed specifications for maintenance. Section 7.1
presents concrete ideas in this direction.
3. Chapter VI solves the cooperative commitment formulation problem in an com-
putationally efficient manner. Specifically, for the centralized setting, the chap-
ter formulates and solves the problem of searching for the commitment that
exactly maximizes the joint commitment value. For the decentralized set-
ting, the chapter develops a querying approach for the agents to agree on an
approximately-optimal commitment. As the core contribution that leads to
the computational efficiency, the chapter proves several structural properties of
the commitment value functions, which can be exploited in both settings for
efficiently searching for the optimal cooperative commitment or constructing
valuable queries. The empirical evaluations show that exploiting the properties
significantly improves the computational efficiency.
The properties of the commitment value functions reveal the structure of com-
mitments: although the commitment space is infinitely large, there are usually
a small number of commitments that preserve all the information in the com-
mitment space. Thus, we expect that our identification of these properties will
be valuable to the broader community of multiagent research, especially on
commitment-based multiagent coordination and optimization.
7.1 Discussion of Future Work
We briefly discuss a few possible directions for future work.
Measuring trustworthiness of the provider. In this thesis, we have presented
semantics and algorithms for the provider to adhere to its probabilistic commitment.
A follow on and related problem is how the recipient can measure the provider’s trust-
worthiness, in order to decide whether it should trust the provider and agree on the
commitment. In the decentralized setting, as we have discussed in the problem of com-
mitment formulation, the recipient does not have full knowledge about the provider’s
environment and/or policy, thus making it a challenging problem to precisely assess
115
the probability of the commitment being realized. As a feasible approach, either
communicating directly about the provider’s environment and/or policy, or about
the provider’s historical interactions with its environment, or both, will facilitate the
recipient’s assessment. If the recipient can effectively measure the provider’s trust-
worthiness, we can ask how the provider can earn trust with minimum communication
with the recipient and/or interactions with the environment.
Improving the recipient’s interpretation of maintenance commitments. In
Chapter V, we have supported the claim that the recipient’s interpretation of mainte-
nance commitments is harder by studying several strategies for creating the approxi-
mate influence. A natural question to ask is whether there exists such an approximate
influence for maintenance, other than the ones we have studied, that we can prove has
a lower bound on its suboptimality (similar to the one in Theorem V.1 for achieve-
ment), and/or we can empirically show induces low suboptimality. If the answer is
negative or it is expensive for the recipient to create such an approximate influence,
then we might need to rethink how we represent maintenance commitments for multi-
agent coordination. For achievement, the customarily terse commitment abstraction
gives the provider a lot of flexibility by only constraining it to meet the probability at
the commitment time and so it can unilaterally change its influences before then. In
many cases, the gain in flexibility for the provider can be worth the relatively small
value loss to the recipient. However, for maintenance, as it is difficult to find an ef-
fective approximate influence, the potential for the recipient to lose more value could
mean that the provider should commit to a more detailed specification—the loss of
flexibility for the provider in this case is warranted because the recipient makes much
better decisions. Potential future work can better understand such tradeoffs in us-
ing maintenance commitments, allowing the community to apply commitment-based
coordination to domains involving both achievement and maintenance.
Efficient formulation of cooperative maintenance commitments. In Chap-
ter VI, we have developed algorithms that efficiently formulate cooperative commit-
ments for achievement by exploiting the structural properties of the commitment
value functions. A natural question is whether these properties still apply to main-
tenance commitments, so that we can develop similar algorithms for efficient formu-
lation of cooperative maintenance commitments. The proofs for the properties of
the provider’s commitment value function are agnostic about the commitment type,
and thus can still apply to maintenance. For the recipient, its commitment value
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function for achievement hinges on the minimal enablement duration influence where
u− probabilistically toggles to u+ at the latest time step by the commitment time.
Thus, the proofs of the structural properties of the recipient’s commitment value for
achievement cannot straightforwardly apply to maintenance. Moreover, as we have
discussed, it remains an open question what approximate influence is best to use to
compute the recipient’s commitment value for maintenance in the first place.
Beyond binary commitment features. For the recipient’s interpretation (Chap-
ter V) and cooperative commitment formulation (Chapter VI), this thesis has solved
these problems for the scenario where the commitment feature is binary, involving two
types of commitment that toggle the feature in opposite directions. The provider’s
modelling of a probabilistic commitment is nearly identical for the the two types
of commitment and can be easily extended beyond the binary commitment feature.
However, future work is needed to better understand how the recipient should in-
terpret and utilize a probabilistic commitment for which the commitment feature is
more complicated than binary and how the two agents can efficiently formulate such
a commitment for coordination.
Communication during commitment execution. We have focused on the sce-
nario in which the communication between the agents is only allowed during commit-
ment formulation, but not allowed during the commitment execution phase (including
the provider’s adherence and the recipient’s interpretation). We could relax this re-
striction by allowing (limited) communication during execution, and a number of
interesting questions could arise subsequently. Such a relaxation could lead to the
problem of how the agents can best exploit the limited communication. For example,
if the provider is allowed to inform the recipient, for a limited number of time steps
during execution, of the probability of realizing the commitment from the current
time step (e.g., the probability for the iterative lookahead in CCIL), how should the
provider wisely decide when to inform the recipient? Such a relaxation could also
lead to the problem of multi-commitment formulation. For example, if an achieve-
ment commitment ends up being unrealized by the commitment time, what if we
allow the agents to formulate a second commitment for the execution after the com-
mitment time? Moreover, once an achievement commitment is realized, the agents
can start formulating a maintenance commitment for the subsequent execution about
the precondition that was just enabled, and thus such a relaxation encourages us to
develop a unified framework for both achievement and maintenance.
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Scaling to more agents and commitments. Throughout this thesis, we are con-
cerned with a single commitment between two agents, with one agent fixed as the
provider and the other as the recipient. Much future work is needed for handling
scenarios where there can be more than two agents for coordination using multi-
ple commitments. The provider might make a commitment to multiple recipients.
Instead of a single commitment, agents might need to coordinate with a chain of
commitments that are temporally correlated. Mutual and cyclic commitments can
exist, where an agent can shift from being a provider to being a recipient over time,
or even can be both a provider and a recipient at the same time. These interesting
scenarios naturally exist in multiagent coordination, and extending the work accom-
plished in this thesis to these scenarios requires scaling the problem formulations and
solution methods to multiple agents and commitments.
7.2 Closing Remarks
With autonomous agents increasingly embedded in our daily lives, flexible and
trustworthy coordination is crucial for the agents to collectively make beneficial soci-
etal impact. Inspired by how people work together, the commitment-based framework
has emerged as one of the most promising ideas for achieving flexible and trustworthy
multiagent coordination. This thesis develops formal notions and new techniques for
the agents to represent, formulate, and plan with probabilistic commitments for coor-
dination under inherent uncertainty about their environments. With strong provable
guarantees and impressive empirical results in a range of classic multiagent planning
domains, the developed methods lay the foundation of multiagent coordination with
probabilistic commitments. We believe the contributions of this thesis are valuable
to other researchers and engineers who are dedicated to building effective multiagent
systems for complex, real-world settings.
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